Baseline scenarios without climate policy can still have declining coal, if the socioeconomics (colours) are favourable (SSP1, SSP2, etc): low population, preference for clean air, etc.
Unlikely coal will grow SSP3 or SSP5 style...
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Under weak mitigation (colours are radiative forcing levels in 2100, bold are marker scenarios), coal can either decrease or increase...
But, given what we know today, what is the narrative that would have increasing or decreasing coal?
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Given the current pressure on coal, I would expect coal to be flat & then declining slowly (in the current policy environment), faster if policies are ramped up (like China, US, etc, net-zero).
Which scenarios should I use to get a realistic picture of coal?
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And how do I deal with scenarios with weak mitigation that have loads of coal with carbon capture and storage?
Who is going to invest in coal with CCS at today's carbon prices?
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If a user, an investor, a policy maker asks for where coal is heading in the next decade or two, how can scenarios help?
Scenarios have specific narratives, but rarely the current narrative. Can we realistically model the evolution of coal markets, from where we are today?
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Side note: Scenarios are often based on predefined parameters, like a story line or narrative of how the world develops (eg, SSPs). Very few scenarios are simulations trying to predict where the world is headed (some do this, not many).
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If it is just an academic exercise, then assuming this & that, to find what happens to coal is fine. This will also vary by model, given assumptions.
SSP2-45 from 6 models, very different answers... Academically interesting.
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@benmsanderson If I am a user, what do I do with that spread? Same socioeconomics, same effective climate policy, completely different outcomes (SSP is sort of current trends continue). Coal could rise or decline... Which may be true, but one would want to dig deeper...
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@benmsanderson Of course, every other year the path looking forward may differ depending on events, so need to redo scenarios again (& again)... But, that is just the way it is.
You can do scenarios which include current policies, I have not plotted those here.
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"Nothing would have been better than us being wrong"
"If we are right, as I am pretty sure we are, then we have helped to improve climate models and can provide better input on policy"
"It is wrong to say that our model cannot be used to analyze this type of question"
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"The point is that it is a different model that is casual, dynamic & based on fundamental physical causal models"
"The reason we are writing this is because we are begging on our knees that they investigate whether this is present in their models. Now we have attention."
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There are a range of measures. The system boundary is expanded to include Scope 3 (use of oil by third-parties), but then allow offsets for third-party CCS.
On the Scope 1 (&2) the ambition is to "achieving carbon neutral global operations by 2030", which allows the use of carbon markets, but to go "near zero" by 2050 in Norway (no offsets).
This is likely required by legislation anyway (eg EU may require net-zero GHG in 2050)?
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On Scope 1 (&2) in global operations by 2050, the ambition is not clear but presumably net-zero allowing offsets. This is perhaps ok, as some global operations may be in countries that have no or weak policy, so it would be more ambitious than the host country policy.
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1. We have heard the mantra that net-zero CO₂ is needed to get stable temperatures, but nearly all mitigation scenarios have negative net emissions. Why?
This means that the temperature declines when emissions go negative.
2. In this scenario, by 2100, the large scale negative net emissions shaves of 0.2°C. Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) at scale has many potential non-climate impacts & may be costly.
Would the world generate so much CDR to slowly bring temperatures down by 0.2°C?
3. It is more likely, in my view, that the world would simply stabilise temperatures.
CDR is still needed to offset hard- or expensive-to-mitigate emissions, but the scale is greatly reduced.
2. Contrary to the view of many, the Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS) was already quite aggressive (~1.65°C).
The Net-Zero 2050 Scenario (NZE2050) is more aggressive than the SDS on power & end-use, but also includes some additional behavioural measures.
3. The thing with the behavioural measures is that you have to do a lot of them, & they are quite specific & targeted. This is on top of aggressive technological change.
The point is that 1.5°C requires pulling on pretty much every level, to the max. Now, not tomorrow.
@timinmitcham@kmac@bataille_chris@SvenTeske@JoeriRogelj@IEA I have not put all the IEA WEO2019 into my system, but I show what I have. CO2 was tweeted earlier. I show a figure for 1.5C (no and low overshoot from IPCC) & Lower 2C (around 66% <2C). IEA is sort of in between in terms of carbon budget (I think).