Having looked at the economic impact of Brexit & Covid a lot, this will probably turn out to be true but we can't know for sure now. It all depends on your assumptions about the long term scarring on our economy from Covid. (1/4)
Brexit presents a set of known permanent changes which incur costs. Covid & the response have a lot of huge short term economic costs, but many of these may prove to be temporary once things return to normal. But importantly that is not guaranteed. (2/4)
This is partly why the Government has unleashed unprecedented economic support, in order to avoid the short term impacts becoming longer term & viable parts of the economy being destroyed permanently. But we don't yet know how successful that has been or will be. (3/4)
Only time will tell in the end. It will also depend a lot on the further policies pursued as things begin to return to normal. So why Bailey will probably turn out to be right, I don't think we can be 100% sure at this stage (4/4)
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Ahead of a crucial week in Brexit talks, issue of level playing field (beyond state aid) has become a major obstacle to a deal. Especially around evolution/ratchet clauses. Both sides have got themselves into an ideological corner & are struggling to get out. Thread explaining 1/
The evolution/ratchet clause would mean that if both sides increased their levels of regulation in these areas (environmental, workers rights etc.) in the future this would become the new bar for non-regression. Helping to avoid a gap opening up between the two sides. 2/
Both sides have adopted very ideological positions when in reality this approach makes little difference in practice. On the UK side, the approach in the original EU draft suggests this evolution could only happen if both sides agreed. i.e. UK would have a veto. 3/
Don't think we should get too carried away about this being over, but message UK is sending is serious. Main thing I think EU have misjudged is sequencing on all this. UK has finally begun to move on state aid issues, instead of responding in kind EU has pushed for more 1/
Not entirely surprising. They are right further moves from UK are needed, but the way they are going about it is wrong way to achieve them. Putting all pressure on UK to move on all things difficult for it with EU leaving theirs until very end always makes it unbalanced. 2/
The EU should respond to UK moves by beginning to move on fish and opening up other areas for intense talks. If UK doesn't follow through with further moves, EU can always pull back later. 3/
Building on the thread below, I've got a new piece out today on the interplay between Brexit & Covid-19, in particular in terms of practical impacts for business. A real challenge in many sectors, here's a thread setting out key points 1/ www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/gl…
As the chart below highlights, in many cases the two shocks will hit different sectors, spreading the breadth of economic challenges at the end of this year. But there are some sectors (mostly those with complex manufacturing supply chains) which will face a double hit 2/
We identify three themes where there are likely to be particular interplays between Brexit & Covid-19 for business - supply chains, people & finance/resources. 3/
Have taken time to digest internal market bill & talk to various people on both sides. The text is worse than I expected & is/will be a clear breach of Protocol. Some analysis and thoughts on what happens next (spoiler - nothing particularly good)...1/
What surprised me about the clauses in the internal market bill is that not only do they seek to set out UK's interpretation of the Protocol (which might have been defensible) but they pre-emptively set out that UK will ignore any ruling on these issues. Impossible to defend 2/
Furthermore, if the UK wanted to argue that Article 6(1) of the Protocol gave it licence to do these things, it could have earlier on. Indeed I tweeted about this sort of approach in Oct 2019 but UK accepted exit declarations legally required 3/
At some point both sides in the Brexit negotiations have to realise threatening no deal or warning of the consequences simply doesn't work & won't result in a shift of position on the other side. At no stage in these negotiations has it done so. A thread with some examples...1/
Johnson didn't shift on a more NI only Protocol last year due to fear of no deal. He shifted because it allowed for a more distant future relationship with EU than the backstop & because he needed a deal of some form to use in an election campaign focused on delivering Brexit 2/
Similarly the EU didn't shift on democratic consent in the Protocol last autumn due to fear the UK would leave without a deal (there was still no majority in Parliament for that) but because they actually thought Johnson may be able to deliver a deal through Parliament 3/
This has been the case for some time & why I think focusing June high level conference on purely process issues was a mistake. But I fear the idea UK political level detached from negotiations may be wishful thinking...1/
Yes PM may be distracted & have a lot on his plate. But I wouldn't expect there to be huge gaps between what he & Frost think. Yes he can inject some more impetus & give some flexibility but on the detail he will likely listen closely to Frost's advice. 2/
It may be a case of hoping for a similar intervention from the PM as last year with the NI Protocol. But that was very different in terms of the political situation & the concessions were a direction he was more comfortable with (a harder Brexit essentially). 3/