I reviewed @ezraklein‘s “Why We’re Polarized” for @hsozkult. A few thoughts, from a historical perspective, on an important book that still left me unconvinced that "polarization" is the right lens through which to analyze America’s recent past and present. 1/
https://twitter.com/hsozkult/status/1323312288535904257
Quick disclaimer: I’m not a political scientist and not necessarily interested in policy prescriptions. My perspective on “Why We’re Polarized” is that of a historian of 20th century U.S. politics who’s working on the history of the polarization idea/narrative. 2/
First of all, everyone should read "Why We’re Polarized." I learned an awful lot from this book, and the way @ezraklein summarizes and synthesizes the conflicts that shape U.S. politics and the forces that are shaping American society is truly impressive. 3/
Historians should definitely read it too, as polarization has clearly become one of the major frameworks for recent U.S. history, providing an overarching theme and terminology for interpreting seemingly disparate developments in politics, society, and culture since the 60s. 4/
I’m not gonna mention all the important insights and observations @ezraklein provides in the book (I tried to do it justice in the review, of course); just a few things that stood out for me from a historical perspective: 5/
First of all, @ezraklein provides an impressive overview of the latest polarization research in the political and social sciences, and the book also succinctly introduces the relevant political / social psychology scholarship. 6/
As an introduction into and synthesis of these different fields, "Why We’re Polarized" is tremendously helpful and valuable. 7/
Secondly, @ezraklein‘s interpretation of recent U.S. history is entirely free of nostalgia - it’s the biggest strength of the book, in my opinion, and a much-needed counterpoint to the polarization discourse’s dominant tendency to glorify pre-1970s history. 8/
Too often, the polarization story tends to create a narrative of the American polity in decline - suggesting that the status quo ante against which the polarized decades since the 1970s are measured was one of unity and order. 9/
Thankfully, @ezraklein rejects any attempt to cast the “consensus” of the postwar era in a favorable light, emphasizing instead that it was based on the exclusion of large parts of society from the seats of power and the bipartisan acceptance of a de facto apartheid state. 10/
It was not a coincidence that "polarization" started when one party decided to break with this white elite consensus and support the civil rights legislation of the 60s. 11/
In many ways, @ezraklein convincingly suggests, "polarization" is the price U.S. society has had to pay for real progress towards multi-racial democracy – there is absolutely no need for polarization-induced nostalgia. 12/
I have, broadly speaking, one critical question about @ezraklein's emphasis on group psychology in "Why We’re Polarized," one objection to the book’s core argument, and one suggestion for how historians should tackle the polarization narrative. 13/
The question: @ezraklein focuses very much on group psychology and personality traits – or what he calls the “psychological roots of our politics.” 14/
While it seems to me that there are slight inconsistencies in the way the relationship between partisan sorting, political identity, and group psychology is conceptualized throughout the book, there can be no doubt that the psychological dimension matters a great deal. 15/
This is an aspect to which historians should probably pay closer attention – I know I should, as I have been rather reluctant thus far to familiarize myself with how psychologists explain human behavior. There is obviously much to be learned here! 16/
However, retro-psychologizing the behavior of historical actors can yield rather problematic results. We’ve all come across kitchen sink psychological explanations for why ruler X started war Y because he was suffering from “trauma” Z. 17/
.@ezraklein's take on psychology is smarter than that. But still, there is a fine line between taking human psychology seriously and presenting an essentialized understanding of the past and the present in which developments are determined by psychological dispositions. 18/
Sometimes it seems like @ezraklein wants to suggest that history can basically be reduced to a process of (de-)activation of those essential psychological dispositions. That, however, is a claim that deserves more of a critical reflection than is provided in the book. 19/
And you do not have to be a historian to be reluctant to embrace such an approach that, at the very least, seems to focus on rather a-historical aspects of the human condition while de-emphasizing historical contingencies and specific change over time. 20/
Both @daschloz, who is a political scientist… 21/ dissentmagazine.org/article/up-fro…
…as well as @OsitaNwanevu took issue with the focus on group psychology; I find myself in agreement with their critique and believe that @ezraklein was a little too willing to base his arguments on such far-reaching psychological claims. 22/ newrepublic.com/article/157599…
Let’s tackle what I think are the main problems with @ezraklein’s interpretation – and with the polarization framework in general. Fundamentally, I’m just not convinced that what the author so powerfully lays out in his book is adequately interpreted as "polarization." 23/
In the final third of the book, Klein emphasizes that we’re not looking at a radicalization on both sides of the political spectrum – but only on the right. As a matter of fact, he sees Democrats as largely immune to extremism due to the heterogeneity of their supporters. 24/
To allow for some asymmetry between left and right, Klein employs the concept of "asymmetrical polarization." But I would argue that doesn’t really solve the problem. 25/
The problem is that even when it comes with the qualifier "asymmetric," the term "polarization" still implies *both sides* moving towards the extremes at least to a somewhat significant degree (that is certainly how the term is used in the broader public discourse). 26/
But based on the evidence @ezraklein himself presents, there is no liberal version of Fox News and the rightwing media bubble, the Democrats don’t have a Trump, and there is no equivalent on the left to the influence of reactionary and white nationalist forces inside the GOP. 27/
What if we de-emphasized the concept of "asymmetric polarization" and instead foregrounded the idea of a radicalization of the conservative movement and the GOP – wouldn’t that capture the central development in recent U.S. history and politics more adequately and precisely? 28/
And if that is so, what additional analytical value is gained from using the term "asymmetric polarization"? 29/
There are specific aspects and areas in which "asymmetric polarization" is precisely what’s happened. But big picture, what @ezraklein describes seems to demand a shift in emphasis away from the “polarization” narrative and towards a “radicalization of the right” framework. 30/
It’s not just political scientists and journalists, of course, who are focusing on polarization. Many historians, too, have embraced the concept of polarization, and it has emerged as the closest thing to a master narrative for recent American history. 31/
Jill Lepore’s grand retelling of U.S. history in “These Truths,” for instance, offers an instructive example of the limits and potential pitfalls of using polarization as a governing historical paradigm. 32/
The final 250 pages of "These Truths" are basically a long-drawn-out lament over America’s decline since the 1960s that was supposedly caused by "both sides" being increasingly extreme and unreasonable. And it’s entirely unsupported by the evidence presented in the book. 33/
Lepore’s description of the media landscape is a case in point for "both sides"-ism completely distorting the picture. She laments the emergence of radically partisan media on "both sides" resulting in what she calls "mutually assured epistemological destruction" (p. 711). 34/
The metaphor is striking—but it is not supported by the evidence presented in the book and hinges on the questionable characterization of Fox News and MSNBC as equally partisan. 35/
When Lepore gives a detailed account of Rush Limbaugh’s outsized influence on conservative politics or the machinations of conspiracy theorist Alex Jones, it becomes clear that there are simply no equal counterparts on the left. 36/
And yet, the narrative of polarization indicates that there should be, and encourages the search for (false) equivalence. 37/
(For a longer discussion of the pitfalls of using #polarization as a governing historical paradigm and the challenges of writing a (pre-)history of the polarized present, see my @ModAmHist piece from 2019) 38/
https://twitter.com/tzimmer_history/status/1198206896668389378?s=20
Back to @ezraklein: What I missed in "Why We’re Polarized," and what is sorely lacking in the polarization discourse in general, is an acknowledgment of the fact that the *idea of polarization* has itself a history, and has itself shaped political reality for decades. 39/
The idea of political polarization rose to prominence in the late 1960s and has ever since played an important role in the imaginary of the nation; it has shaped the way U.S. society has been analyzed and conceptualized, the way political actors have conceived of the polity. 40/
It is crucial to understand that the polarization narrative has itself influenced the way the polity has developed – it has acted upon contemporaries for over half a century. The *idea of polarization* has been a historical actor in its own right. 41/
Polarization is not just a thing happening around us – it has also been a significant part of the collective imaginary, a powerful story that we have told about ourselves and society for several decades, and that story has shaped people’s decisions, perceptions, and actions. 42/
To give just one example of these dynamics: Around 2000, the media started adopting the red (Republican) and blue (Democratic) color scheme – and ever since the country has been portrayed as one defined by stark divisions – polarized! – between red and blue states. 43/
But these *representations* of political division have themselves tangibly affected the social and political realities: They affect and produce what they are supposedly merely depicting. 44/
https://twitter.com/sarakonrath/status/1324820567330086916?s=21
This is just one example for the fact that the way we frame these divisions and conflicts, the way they are represented in the media and popular culture, matters greatly – for why we need to take more seriously how the *story of polarization* has been constructed and told. 45/
Where does all that leave us? The lesson here is not, of course, to stop engaging with polarization—but to make the concept itself the focal point of historical analysis, and to take seriously the task of historicizing one of the prevailing discourses of our era. 46/
We should not content ourselves with accepting the omnipresence of the polarization idea as a mere representation of supposedly unprecedented division, but instead strive to properly historicize the polarization discourse. 47/
This is also, I believe, how historians can best contribute to a better understanding of our present and recent past, by asking how "polarization" has been theorized in the social and political sciences, used in politics, and how it has shaped the broader political discourse. 48/
To bring this to a close: "Why We’re Polarized" is an important book, and everyone should read it. But I hope people will take the opportunity to reflect not just on the benefits, but also on the blind spots and pitfalls of "polarization" as a master narrative for our era. /end
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