"...although IAMs aim to function as ‘heuristic guides’ to explore strategies, they are in fact performative: they shape the possibility space in which future options for climate action are discussed & thus the content of policy deliberation in international climate politics"
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The authors find five phases representing shifts in the position of IAMs in the climate science-policy interface.
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PHASE 1: The emergence of global modelling:
* Limits to Growth
* Oil crises (MARKAL, EMF, IIASA, ...)
* Climate-economics (Nordhaus, ...)
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PHASE 2: Applications in policy:
* Acid rain: IIASA & RAINS - it seems a very proactive approach to help policy makers
* IAMs in climate: ASF, IMAGE
* IPCC ARs: SA90, IS92 scenarios used in assessment reports
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PHASE 3: Agendas to target setting
* Rapid expansion of IAMs & act as input into climate models: IPCC "provided an environment in which they could grow & be applied"
* Inspired to replicate the success of RAINS
* Target setting: Triptych approach, tolerable windows, 2°C, ...
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PHASE 4: IPCC WG3
* SRES, RCPs
* IAMs become the anchor for IPCC WG3 & connects WGs
* RCP2.6 (feasibility)
* IAM Model Intercomparisons
* Protocols, standardisation, databases, ...
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PHASE 5: Prominence (or dominance?)
* "IAMs ... the backbone of IPCC’s AR5"
* Paris Agreement (1.5°C, well below 2°C)
* Carbon budgets
* UNFCCC Structured Expert Dialogues
* UNEP Emissions Gap Report
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How could they do this?
* Enabling conditions
* 'Trust in numbers'
* Flexibility, breadth, & hybrid IAMs
* Pro-active community (anticipating & shaping demand)
[To me, it seems the IPCC was a rather important enabling factor, maybe also EU research funding]
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This is all rather impressive. Cut & paste this article for the next impact section of a research proposal! Guaranteed funding!
But, it is not without problems. Just a few points noted by the authors.
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"Paradoxically, the desire for numbers and predictions of policy communities certainly helps explain the influence of IAMs, yet is incongruent with the goals and conclusions of IAM analyses, which are explicitly non-predictive."
[IAMs are performative, if desired or not]
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"Considering the dense network of a relatively small group of authors & institutions underlying WGIII, this prominent position may be problematic as it risks 'narrowing' the construction of climate mitigation within the IPCC"
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"The IAM community formulated a number of criteria that scenario developers need to meet in order to be included in the scenario database ... thus strongly defined the scenario practice within the IPCC WGIII & excluded scenario approaches such as sectoral modelling."
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The IAM community has been very smart & active to get such a dominant position (whether intended or not), but with that comes a lot of power & therefore responsibility.
We don't need another decade building more complex models that exploit exascale computing, but one that: 1. Better understands & characterizes fundamental conceptual issues 2. Integrates multi-disciplinary knowledge & perspectives
Many presume that inadequacies of current models can be solved with more resolution, more detail, more computer.
But, fundamental questions on the inadequacies of models have note been addressed (eg model structure, initial conditions, nonlinear dynamics, etc)
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"Climate economists [have] spent decades attempting to provide ever-better numerical estimates of a benefit-cost ratio... Even if the ECS isn’t strictly fat-tailed, the benefit-cost ratio [is] highly sensitive to ... parameters which suffer from deep uncertainty"
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3. (bonus extra). It is not necessary to have so much CDR that it causes temperature overshoot (light green in previous figure) because of net-negative emissions.
Here is a scenario which just goes to net-zero, & has enough CDR to stay there.
Where does the European (EU27+UK) land sink come from?
It is mainly forest land remaining forest land. This is essentially managed forests, but also includes update from environmental factors (eg warmer climate & CO₂ fertilisation).
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There are large variations across countries. Ireland has a large source from grasslands (not sure of the background, but I am guessing drained peat lands essentially?).
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The Nordics all have large forest sinks, and their sinks are large relative to domestic emissions. Sweden, for example, is nearly has net-zero CO₂ emissions if the land sink is included.
If it is just an academic exercise, then assuming this & that, to find what happens to coal is fine. This will also vary by model, given assumptions.
SSP2-45 from 6 models, very different answers... Academically interesting.
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@benmsanderson If I am a user, what do I do with that spread? Same socioeconomics, same effective climate policy, completely different outcomes (SSP is sort of current trends continue). Coal could rise or decline... Which may be true, but one would want to dig deeper...
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@benmsanderson Of course, every other year the path looking forward may differ depending on events, so need to redo scenarios again (& again)... But, that is just the way it is.
You can do scenarios which include current policies, I have not plotted those here.
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Baseline scenarios without climate policy can still have declining coal, if the socioeconomics (colours) are favourable (SSP1, SSP2, etc): low population, preference for clean air, etc.
Unlikely coal will grow SSP3 or SSP5 style...
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Under weak mitigation (colours are radiative forcing levels in 2100, bold are marker scenarios), coal can either decrease or increase...
But, given what we know today, what is the narrative that would have increasing or decreasing coal?
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Given the current pressure on coal, I would expect coal to be flat & then declining slowly (in the current policy environment), faster if policies are ramped up (like China, US, etc, net-zero).
Which scenarios should I use to get a realistic picture of coal?