So let me run a quick thread on this session at the European Parliament, which just concluded.
The speakers' call for personalised sanctions on corrupt Russian officials is very reasonable. I'd only add that any such sanctions must of course go beyond "Russia." Corruption is not a specifically Russian phenomenon.
So if Usmanov's or Abramovich's yachts are chased out of European ports (as by god, I am only happy that they are), it's important to see whose yachts remain, and on what grounds.
The question of non-recognition of Putin, as @vkaramurza proposed. Two issues here. First, this of course would have to be a rhetorical, not a legal decision.
Presumably, failure to recognise Putin if he remained in power through fraud (as he well might) would not actually entail severance of diplomatic relations with Russia. "Unrecognized" Putin would remain the head of of a recognised state, a member of the P5, G20, OSCE etc.
Putin's signature would still appear on international treaties committing Russia to this or that course of action, his officials (ambassadors, ministers etc) would still have the power to negotiate on Russia's behalf. What, then, is the meaning of this proposed gesture?
Incidentally, have not followed if there have been any practical implications of @LinkeviciusL's non-recognition of Lukashenka - seems like a pertinent precedent, though of course Belarus and Russia are in different leagues, and the implications would be quite different.
The second issue is that if Putin is declared an illegitimate imposter due to the falsified elections, then what should be said of other authoritarian countries, e.g. China (which doesn't hold elections), Kazakhstan, Vietnam, etc? An important question that's rarely addressed.
Interesting comments from @v_milov who (if I heard him correctly) called for sectoral sanctions on Belarus, suggesting that victory is at hand, and that Lukashenka should be denied the financial resources he draws upon to oppress the people.
But the same resources are used to run hospitals and schools in Belarus. One can rest assured that Lukashenka will sacrifice hospitals and schools first - before we ever get to the security services (the same questions btw apply to Russia as well).
One of those issues that always comes to mind when discussing the efficacy of sanctions, and in particular the impact of sectoral sanctions. No easy answers here.
In short, an interesting discussion. Many thanks to @navalny, @vkaramurza, @v_milov and @IlyaYashin for thought-provoking comments.

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More from @DrRadchenko

26 Nov
Trump's pardon of #MichaelFlynn reminds me to post bits and pieces of an interesting document I recently unearthed in the Russian archives, which tells a remarkable story of corruption and treason. The dramatis personae are Nikita Khrushchev and Cyrus S. Eaton.
Cyrus S. Eaton (1883-1979) was an American-Canadian businessman and philanthropist. He was known for critical views of the US posture in the Cold War, and helped organise the first Pugwash Conference. He even received the Lenin Prize from the USSR in 1960.
In February 1964 Eaton travelled to the USSR where, on February 16, he met Nikita Khrushchev. They had a lengthy discussion of world affairs - not unlike many other conversations Khrushchev would have with visiting politicians and public figures. Until all of a sudden...
Read 15 tweets
24 Nov
Brezhnev and Castro discuss Qaddafi. Brezhnev: "I think Qaddafi is just a boy. ... They have no idea about Lenin or socialism. What they do have is a lot of money. ... At the same time Qaddafi is a fanatical Muslim." Image
Castro: "I am not too sure that they are fanatical Muslims. I think these are just rude, uncultured, impolite, and, I would say, ill-meaning people." Image
Castro on Qaddafi: "My general impression is that he is crazy or at least half-crazy." Image
Read 4 tweets
23 Nov
Reflecting a little more here on @ARVershbow's comments today that it was wrong to see the USSR "as it was" under Brezhnev because by doing so you missed out on Gorbachev... I think this somewhat misconstrues what Gorbachev sought to accomplish.
There's an interesting perspective in the West that sees Gorbachev for someone who embraced Western values and turned the USSR away from a confrontation to a partnership with the United States. I think this is not exactly correct - indeed, probably mostly incorrect.
Gorbachev, like Soviet leaders before him, saw the US as an aggressive superpower, which sought to bankrupt Moscow in the arms race. His early arms control initiatives were all about seizing moral leadership from the United States through the advocacy of nuclear disarmament.
Read 9 tweets
23 Nov
Enjoyed this presentation by @AmbDanFried, @ARVershbow and Celeste Wallander. Of course, as someone who has closely studied Russia's take on the "long 1990s," I will have a number of points of disagreement with the distinguished speakers, some of them major disagreements.
I've set out the evidence here: tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…, and I am happy to say that there's going to be a sequel (on Kosovo). To sum up the argument with a Chinese proverb, "it takes two hands to clap."
At the same time, I can only endorse the authors' very reasonable recommendations, which call for engagement with Russia on issues like arms control, counterterrorism, proliferation, and climate change. The authors' argument in favour of people-to-people contacts is spot on.
Read 5 tweets
21 Nov
Oh, didn't know that: apparently when the North Koreans and the South Koreans published their 4 July 1972 Joint Declaration (an epochal document for dialogue on the Korean Peninsula), the North Koreans didn't even bother to inform their ally, the USSR.
Check out Brezhnev and Kosygin complaining that they literally heard this on the radio. (Apparently, Kosygin tuned in to the BBC - what, he listened to the BBC?):
Brezhnev speculates that the South Koreans probably warned the Americans (this was true). But you have to feel for the Soviets who had such a useless ally as North Korea.
Read 4 tweets
21 Nov
Brezhnev & Kosygin here seen complaining about the fact that the Vietnamese would not supply samples of downed US equipment to the Soviets. "They say 'yes, yes, yes'. They promise all the time." But "we have not received anything from them."
Curiously, the Soviets had much better luck with their non-Communist allies in Egypt who would actually provide them with the captured Israeli (often US-supplied) military equipment.
On the scale of 1 to 10 (1=least reliable; 10=most reliable), the Vietnamese were never above 2 or 3 for the USSR. A real pain! (I guess it got worse, e.g. Albania and Romania).
Read 4 tweets

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