Thread by @tshugart3

This headline, even more than the article it references, raises unwarranted doubt in the integrity of US nuclear command and control.

US nuclear forces only execute nuclear strikes authorized by the President. Period.

https://twitter.com/WarOnTheRocks/status/1330949399208407040

The intention of the authors, as indicated in both the intro and conclusion of the articles, seems to be to opposition to the provision of limited nuclear strike options as part of US nuclear strike planning.

Reasonable people can certainly disagree (and they have, often) about whether limited nuclear strike options are a good idea - see the endless debate on Low Yield Trident SLBMs. defense.gov/Newsroom/Trans…

But in this case the authors oppose limited nuclear options by raising, through much conjecture, what are IMO unwarranted fears about US nuclear forces executing unauthorized nuclear strikes.

First the authors raise what, to the lay reader, may seem like unanswerable questions about what could happen given various contingencies in the execution of a limited nuclear strikes.

This makes me wonder: what do the authors think US nuclear forces have been practicing over decades of nuclear exercises, both at the unit and command center level?

Do they really think US nuclear forces don't have regularly-practiced procedures to deal with things like failed missiles, battle damage assessment, or rapid retargeting due to changing circumstances? That they are only prepared for set-piece, ho-hum, un-faulted countdowns? 🤔

To deal with these sorts of uncertainties, the authors surmise that the President might authorize a limited strike, and then a back-up strike, and then the possibility of specifying whether or not "additional authorization" is required for that backup strike.

This hypothetical, on its own, is a misrepresentation or misunderstanding of the nature of sole presidential nuclear authority in US NC3. And it is repeated later in the article.

As has been discussed often (and as an issue of particular focus over the last 4 years), POTUS has sole authority over the execution of nuclear options.

A nuclear launch is either authorized by POTUS or it isn't. If it's authorized, it gets executed. If not, then it isn't.

Thus, the idea that a nuclear launch might be executed via specified instructions "without additional authorization" is non-sensical. If it has been authorized, then...no additional authorization is required. It is authorized.

If not authorized, then it won't happen. Period.

Later, the authors wonder about an SSBN pausing a launch and resuming later, that they might launch additional strikes, again without "additional presidential authorization".

All one can say to this is...well, yes, if an SSBN had to pause a nuclear launch for whatever reason...

...due to approaching ASW forces, a malfunction, etc., they would - per established procedures - attempt to resume operations & accomplish their mission, as any military unit would. And yes, they would do so without additional authorization, as the launch is...well, authorized.

Later, the authors discuss the issuance of what they call a universal unlock code, which would allow ICBM and SSBN crews to launch all of their weapons, and that this code exists with the intent of being able to launch additional weapons if POTUS can't be found, etc.

Again, whether POTUS can be found or not, or whether the situation changes, nuclear employment authority rests strictly with POTUS. Any additional unlock codes do not change that.

A strike is authorized by POTUS...or it isn't. Period.

The authors also raise the specter that releasing universal unlocks would give US nuclear command centers the "ability to transmit orders for additional strikes even if they were not authorized by the president."

This would, of course, at either a command center or at a lower level, be a gross violation of US NC2 procedures, with any officer who even suggested doing so likely being immediately removed from nuclear duties.

The fact that the authors propose this as a possibility - that is, if nuclear command centers were to be able to gain access to unlock codes - makes one wonder: where do they think those unlock codes come from?

They also raise the fear that, following the release of unlock codes, submarines could be out at sea in possession of unlock codes, and could thus engage in unauthorized strikes.

This is an interesting bit of hand-wringing as the authors fail to mention that, for several decades, US submarines routinely operated at sea without any such firebreak, which was only installed after questions raised by the movie Crimson Tide in the 1990s.

What would keep unauthorized nuclear strikes from happening in such situations is the same thing that has kept them from happening for the last 75 years - the fidelity, training, and procedural compliance of our nuclear operators.

One other minor detail: the authors state that, in the event of a nuclear launch from a submarine, that launch keys would be retrieved from a safe by two "senior officers". In reality, such a key would be likely retrieved by two *junior* officers, but this is a niggle.

I recognize that this article was probably the last to be written by the late Bruce Blair, whose dedication to his principles I truly admire.

And I respect the expertise of the article's other authors, @seb6philippe and Dr. Sharon K. Weiner

But I think this article raises unwarranted fears in the solidity of US nuclear C2 in its effort to oppose the idea of limited nuclear strikes - and in particular when it proposes that unauthorized launches might take place due to the misbehavior of US nuclear operators.

Fin.