2/10 In our report for @CSETGeorgetown, we measured the relationships between elite 🇨🇳 universities and China's defense industry by looking at their Graduate Employment Quality Reports.
3/10 We looked at disaggregated employment data for 29 of 45 leading universities—China’s Double First Class universities + those administered by MIIT.
Our dataset reflects the career moves of 140,000 Chinese university graduates in 2019.
6,000 took jobs at defense SOEs.
4/10 We confirmed that 🇨🇳 defense giants like CASC, CETC, and CSIC disproportionately recruit from seven universities: the Seven Sons of National Defense (国防七子).
The Seven Sons produced just 16% of graduates in our dataset, but 72% of those who took jobs at defense SOEs.
5/10 Then we started looking into the resources available to Chinese universities, investigating documents from the Ministry of Education.
MOE frequently "asks" foreign companies to help Chinese universities in research & curriculum development—the price of doing business in 🇨🇳.
6/10 The Seven Sons benefit from such collaborations, and so does China’s defense industry.
At MOE’s behest, 🇺🇸 tech companies have built the Seven Sons new lab facilities, trained faculty members, and developed course curricula on quantum computing, AI, and chip design.
7/10 MOE documents specify that the 🇨🇳-based subsidiaries and joint ventures of
Autodesk, Dell, Google, Honeywell, IBM, Intel, Merrill Lynch, Microsoft, National Instruments, Rockwell Automation, Synopsys, Tektronix, and Texas Instruments
have partnered with the Seven Sons.
8/10 This has serious U.S. national security implications. MOE documents indicate @synopsys partnered with the PLA National University of Defense Technology on integrated circuit design.
Beijing has tried for decades to source the equipment and knowledge to build advanced ICs.
9/10 Our report indicates the Seven Sons are responsible for training the next generation of China’s defense industry engineers.
More broadly, U.S. tech companies and universities should step up due diligence when engaging with Chinese research institutions.
10/10 Special thanks to Tai Ming Cheung, @ScottWHarold, and @tiffert for their reviews. Grateful to many folks at @CSETGeorgetown, especially the External Affairs team, who made this report possible.
In my first article for @ChinaBriefJT, I mapped the budget of China's united front, the collection of organizations the CCP leverages to silence political opponents, persecute religious minorities, and acquire foreign tech.
(2/9) For years, Chinese diplomats have insisted that the united front is nothing more than a benign administrative bureaucracy and accused Western analysts of overhyping its role.
But the CCP's own public budget documents belie its claims about the UF's importance and function.
(3/9) For @ChinaBriefJT, I analyzed 160 budget reports from organizations involved in China's central and provincial united front systems.
The central 🇨🇳 government's UF spending exceeds $1.4 billion USD each year—and probably even surpasses the budget of @MFA_China.
This week @GeorgetownCSS we review foundational texts on Chinese strategic thinking -- Sun Tzu, Sun Bin, and others. But how heavily do these texts weigh on China's military, compared to, say, Clausewitz? Is there value in comparing 🇺🇸 and 🇨🇳 strategic culture in 2020? (1/6)
Eurocentrism in IR and security studies programs has penetrated global military thinking, in ways I don't think Western academics appreciate.
Why do we assume Sun Tzu matters more to China's (modern) strategic thought than Western military strategists? (2/6)
If you read through papers by Chinese military officers, it's clear Clausewitz is nearly as foundational for the PLA as he is for the U.S. services.
Still, these 123 academic papers might not be representative of broader Chinese military thinking (3/6):
This summer, @CSETGeorgetown has been publishing a whirlwind of papers about #AI and China's efforts to acquire it. Some projects have been months or years in the making. In case you missed them, here's a roundup of data-driven analyses I'm proud to have contributed to:
2/ On the military side of things, we wanted to know how PLA officers and defense engineers envision using AI in future warfare. It turns out the PLA is facing major hurdles in AI development: limited access to data, workforce issues, and a dearth of GPUs: cset.georgetown.edu/research/chine…
3/ That dovetails nicely with a more fundamental question: How is data used in military applications of AI, and can we measure whether 🇺🇸 or 🇨🇳 has a "data advantage"? With @HsjChahal and @carrickflynn, we uncovered the messy reality: cset.georgetown.edu/research/messi…