States have been monopolizing currency of all sorts since ancient times, and they have been claiming for just as long that their monopolies are necessary to preserve the integrity of their nations' currency stocks. So necessary that threats to them were typically capital crimes.
The claims were first made w.r.t. coinage. They were never valid. Coins are standardized metal discs, and there is no reason at all why they couldn't be privately and competitively supplied, just like many other standardized products.
What's more, we know it, not just from theory, but from evidence taken from those rare instances in which govt's have tolerated private coinage. Here's a brief summary of U.S. experience w/ private gold coins: fee.org/articles/priva…
"Fractional" (small change) coins have also been successfully produced by competing private mints and issued by private issuers. In the U.K., it was private initiative that 1st solved "The Big Problem of Small Change." I tell the story here: amazon.com/Good-Money-Bir…
If competition encouraged the production of "good money," the Royal Mint's monopoly was a source of every sort of perverse incentive leading to its opposite. Details here: jstor.org/stable/2322655…
So why did governments monopolize coinage if not for our own good? For the seigniorage revenue, of course! The motive was essentially the same one that once gave us gov't monopolies in soap, salt, mining, and all sorts of other stuff. All were abused. All save coining now gone.
For an overview of the seigniorage motive's role in government control of money see here: cato.org/sites/cato.org…
It was mainly thanks to official mint's crappy coins that we got our earliest banks and bank-issued coin substitutes, including banknotes, that ultimately reduced the need for coin--and gov'ts seigniorage revenues along with it. So guess what happened next?
Why, governments muscled their way into the paper currency business, eventually monopolizing it as well, with rare exceptions. But in many cases they didn't do so w/out a fight. Vera Smith's wonderful book tells that story. econlib.org/library/LFBook…
For more on the U.S. story, see my "New York's Bank," which I wrote as a corrective to both "triumphalist" or "Whiggish" accounts and crude conspiracy theories. "cato.org/publications/p…
Nor is it by any means clear that the Fed has lived up to its promises. sciencedirect.com/science/articl… (And this was written before 2008.)
So, when some central bankers or other government officials now tell you that they've just _got_ to monopolize digital currency for your own good, please don''t take their word for it. If experience is any guide, they're trying to sell you a digital bill of goods.
"At the start of 2020, the dollar’s run had endured 100 years. That would have been reason to question how much longer it could continue." This crude instance of the gambler's fallacy is one of many reasons why I find Ruchir Sharma's FT piece unconvincing: ft.com/content/ea33b6…
Another is his suggestion that, although "When the pandemic hit, the US dollar was as mighty as ever," the pandemic has changed that. To paraphrase Mark Twain, rumors of the end of the dollar's "exorbitant privilege" are much exaggerated.
In fact the demand for dollars rose to exceptional levels early in the crisis; if it has declined somewhat since, it is only from that unusual peak: globalbankingandfinance.com/does-the-pande…
Thread: Why is currency monopoly so important to these gov't representatives? And what sort of dissembling are they up in claiming that they want "to make sure the currency monopoly remains in the hands of states”?
Do they suppose that the only alternative to "states" possessing such monopolies is some sort of private currency monopoly? What about competition? Do they think it impossible? If so, on what grounds?
Not history: until the 20th century, state currency monopolies were the exception, not the rule. Many commercial banks issuer circulating notes, denominated and redeemable in what where then typically gold or silver standard money units.
Like @MoneyIllusion, I believe the Fed's calls for a larger fiscal response are calls for relief rather than stimulus. Generally Fed officials are reluctant to chime in on fiscal policy. themoneyillusion.com/does-the-fed-f… 1/n
But complaints about limited uptake some of the Fed's 13(3) facilities, and of its MSLF and MLF especially, have egged them on this time. Those complaining have often suggested that the Fed's lending terms have been too strict.
Some wonder why the Fed can't take bigger risks, or make its loans forgivable, like the SBA. But the Fed's 13(3) lending rules aren't so flexible, even with Treasury backstops. So Fed officials have called for more fiscal action to relieve the Fed of such pressure.
I should add that the belief in question wouldn't be problematic if it were based on careful studies of the evidence and theories informed by such. But it isn't. Instead, we get theories (like the Diamond-Dybvig model) concocted to rationalize prior beliefs. 1/2
People in turn cite such theories as proof that their preconceived notions are in fact sound. In fact the theories prove nothing of the kind. They are so many formal models of a myth.
As such, the theories are useful, as they show what sorts of things would have to be true for the mythical crises to actually occur. But too many fail to use them that way. Instead they write things like, "Banking is inherently unstable (See Diamond and Dybvig, 1983)." Ugh!
The debate about stablecoin regulation is at bottom part of a broader debate about regulatory classification of fintech payment service providers (PSPs). But it is, IMHO, wrong to reduce this debate to the question, "Is it a 'bank' or not?"
Posing the question that way implies that there are only two options: (1) Fintech PSPs aren't banks, and therefore shouldn't have to get stnd. bank charters or abide by the reg's that go w/ such to gain access to public settlement facilities. That's what many stablecoin fans say.
(2) fintech PSPs are banks; and therefore must be get bank charters and be subject to the same regulations ordinary banks must abide by. That's the answer offered by the STABLE Act tlaib.house.gov/media/press-re…
The WSJ responds to Lamar Alexander's suggestion that placing Shelton on the Board of Governors would have meant handing control of monetary policy "to a Congress and a President who can’t balance the federal budget."
It tries to turn the tables on the Shelton-less Fed, observing it has already "willingly become the chief enabler" of the present government's failure to balance the budget--as if the Fed were a schoolyard drug pusher and Trump and Congress were innocent schoolchildren.