As a package of measures had been promised, markets were able to anticipate the ECB´s decisions ± correctly. The longer horizon for the TLTROs was perhaps a bit of a surprise but is the more relevant measure supporting credit supply, despite no change in the tier multiplier. 1/
The increase and extension of PEPP (and APP) offer a way to avoid any future cliff-effect by allowing a gradual phase-out of the programme. QE, when sovereign yields are already so low, has per se diminishing returns in terms of its impact on the economic recovery 2/
Further QE can, however, be effective if fiscal policy continues to be suitably expansionary, leading to sizable new debt issuance.The ECB “presence for longer”, is, of course, reassuring in that perspective. An insufficient fiscal stimulus continues to be a big risk for 2021. 3/
When interest rates attain their effective lower bound, fiscal and monetary policies become complementary and, even if independently decided, should collaborate as a necessary condition for getting a robust recovery and a normalisation of inflation from the present low levels.4/
Some observers continue to try to make the case that the bilateral euro/dollar exchange rate should concern the ECB, but what counts is the rate against the currencies of trade partners. A chart from @johnauthers shows how the euro has depreciated against other G10 countries.5/
Projections point to inflation at 1% in 2021, but pent-up demand, damaged supply chains, higher relocation costs and a Spring oil base-effect, can provoke one-off price spikes, increasing headline inflation. It is crucial not to confuse this with a higher inflation process 6/6
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The excellent ECB Financial Stability Review, ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/fsr/ec… illustrates well the 2 main risks I see for the EA economy next year: possible insufficient fiscal stimulus and weakening of bank credit supply. The FSR mentions “a slightly tighter fiscal stance" in 2021 1/
The FSR correct statement “fiscal tightening at a time when output gaps are still projected to be negative could exacerbate the current economic situation.”, caused some stir and many comments in social media. The same regarding the accompanying chart 2/
The FSR uses the Commission forecasts showing a slight increase of the cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance from -3.2% this year to -2.9% in 2021. 0.3% is a small change not comparable with the mistake of 2012/13 when it went from -0.6% in 2011 to +0.5 & +1.4 in 2012/13 3/
Many papers have emerged analysing the March episode of price collapse and illiquidity in US treasuries, an unprecedented event in the “deepest and most liquid “ financial market in the world. Many things hinge on this analysis 1/n
Two days ago, at the ECB Monetary Conference, ecb.europa.eu/pub/conference… , A.V-J presented a comprehensive paper. It identified the main sellers after the severity of the virus came into the open: investment/mutual funds, hedge funds and non-residents.2/
On a panel with D. Duffie and Vice-Chair Quarles at a webinar organised by the Systemic Risk Council on 14th Oct. , I particularly underlined the role of hedge fund´s sales as they unwound Treasuries basis trades that crucially involve funding with repos 3/..
Amid the Trump shenanigans of last week, the relevant speech by the FED Chairman J. Powell was perhaps not much noticed. He clarified some aspects of the new monetary framework (that so far didn´t trigger any new measures) and made a very strong appeal for more fiscal stimulus /1
“The expansion is still far from complete. At this early stage, I would argue that the risks of policy intervention are still asymmetric. Too little support would lead to a weak recovery..By contrast, the risks of overdoing it, seem..to be smaller”/2 federalreserve.gov/newsevents/spe…
Basically, he implied that monetary policy is practically done:“ The Committee also left the target range for the federal funds rate unchanged . and it expects .. to maintain this target range.”. So, the additional effort has to be fiscal. The same approach applies to Europe. /3
Besides the increasing virus infections and the dangerous volatility coming from the US, two main points became more visible, augmenting downside risks for Europe: likely insufficiency of fiscal policy and possible credit supply deceleration due to a stressed banking sector !/7
The first stems from the delay of the Recovery Fund (NGEU) disbursements and the possible caution of national fiscal policies, after a year of big deficits in 2020. The regrettable protracted timetable for the NGEU payouts is in this ECB chart 2/7 ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/ecbu/e…
The recovery depends mostly on fiscal policy staying expansionary, as consumers increase their savings and investment suffers from unused capacity and lack of demand. The suspension of the Stability Pact for 2021 was welcomed, but we need a deep revision of the Pact 3/7
Thoughtful @ErikFossing on the Goodhart/Pradhan book. In my blurb, in the book, I recalled that “demography is destiny” but there is no determinism. It is a “great thought-provoking book” that deals with many deep trends, from labour supply, inflation, and the “debt trap”.1/6
Other drivers, besides declining demography, affect future labour supply and wages, so that future high inflation is not a certainty. I ask “Will AI be enough to counter the labour shortage?” There is also later retirement and Japan. The book discusses it, but doubts remain 2/6
Ageing and health & retirement costs imply higher taxation or more debt. A future clash between fiscal and monetary policy is possible due to the “debt trap” problem, questioning CBs independence. The present policy cooperation may not last 3/6
Analysts and even some FED members have belittled the recent framework change as just a form of target symmetry or temporarily accepting inflation above target. However, the decision was to go for Averaging Inflation Targeting (AIT), which is different /1 ft.com/content/d2fd2c…
AIT strategy is a commitment to take measures to increase inflation above the average target (e.g.2%) if actual inflation had been below it for several years. So, it should commit the FED to decide now on corresponding policy changes. Will it happen this week? /2
What could change? Since March 23, the QE policy is already to purchase “in the amounts needed to support smooth market functioning and effective transmission of monetary policy,”, i.e.,” whatever is necessary” or “unlimited”. No need to announce new numbers to use it. /3