Thread: This brief @PilkingtonPhil note on Gunnar Myrdal's _Monetary Equilibrium_ is indeed very good. That work (which helped earn Myrdal the Nobel he shared w/ Hayek) Some follow-up remarks here.
As Phil notes, Myrdal was a member of the Stockholm School, whose contributions to monetary theory built upon the work of Knut Wicksell, the school's founder. In By 1931, when _Monetary Equilibrium_ appeared, a (polite) rift had separated the school in two.
The rift began with a debate between Wicksell and David Davidson concerning the sort of price stability implied by a policy of keeping interest rates at their "natural" levels. Wicksell of course claimed that this would result in stable _output_ prices.
Davidson instead argued for a "productivity norm," with the stable factor prices, which would have the output price index move inversely with factor productivity.
Eli Heckscher and Gustav Cassel were among the more well-known Swedes who sided with Wicksell. Myrdal, in contrast, was , as did many those who sided with Davidson. (Hayek, by the way, also shared Davidson's opinion, as did many non-Swedes. See read.dukeupress.edu/hope/article-a….)
Although many (myself among them) believe that the Davidson gang had the better arguments, the Riksbank ultimately went the (output) price-level stability route. David Laidler has an excellent paper on this: tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.108…. )See also bis.org/publ/work136.p…)
One of Myrdal's particular contributions to the debate was his claim that stabilizing factor prices made more sense, because factor prices tend to be stickier than final goods prices. The less the former have to adjust, the fewer episodes of monetary disequilibrium.
Phil addresses some important differences between Myrdal's analysis in _Monetary Equilibrium_ and that of Keynes's _General Theory_. One he doesn't point out is that Keynes took the Wicksellian view. But it's clear that Keynes's was torn on the issue.
As I've noted in comparing Keynes's position on this matter with Hayek's (Hayek's of the 1930s, that is), Keynes's came within an ace of embracing the Davidson "productivity norm" view: citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/downlo…
Please insert "deserves more attention" after "That work (which helped earn Myrdal the Nobel he shared w/ Hayek)." (I'm working on an old computer that has a very sticky keyboard. A real nuisance!)
Finally--and importantly--the productivity norm/factor price stability ideal amounts in practice to a form of nominal income targeting, and as such is akin to the NGDP targeting recommended by @MoneyIllusion, @DavidBeckworth, @MaMoMVPY, and others.
So I say we award ol' Gunnar an honorary NGDP targeting mug. How about it, @DavidBeckworth?
Apologies for tagging the wrong Philip Pilkington! Although it was the account linked to the article, it is apparently not his. (He does not seem to be on Twitter.)
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"At the start of 2020, the dollar’s run had endured 100 years. That would have been reason to question how much longer it could continue." This crude instance of the gambler's fallacy is one of many reasons why I find Ruchir Sharma's FT piece unconvincing: ft.com/content/ea33b6…
Another is his suggestion that, although "When the pandemic hit, the US dollar was as mighty as ever," the pandemic has changed that. To paraphrase Mark Twain, rumors of the end of the dollar's "exorbitant privilege" are much exaggerated.
In fact the demand for dollars rose to exceptional levels early in the crisis; if it has declined somewhat since, it is only from that unusual peak: globalbankingandfinance.com/does-the-pande…
States have been monopolizing currency of all sorts since ancient times, and they have been claiming for just as long that their monopolies are necessary to preserve the integrity of their nations' currency stocks. So necessary that threats to them were typically capital crimes.
The claims were first made w.r.t. coinage. They were never valid. Coins are standardized metal discs, and there is no reason at all why they couldn't be privately and competitively supplied, just like many other standardized products.
What's more, we know it, not just from theory, but from evidence taken from those rare instances in which govt's have tolerated private coinage. Here's a brief summary of U.S. experience w/ private gold coins: fee.org/articles/priva…
Thread: Why is currency monopoly so important to these gov't representatives? And what sort of dissembling are they up in claiming that they want "to make sure the currency monopoly remains in the hands of states”?
Do they suppose that the only alternative to "states" possessing such monopolies is some sort of private currency monopoly? What about competition? Do they think it impossible? If so, on what grounds?
Not history: until the 20th century, state currency monopolies were the exception, not the rule. Many commercial banks issuer circulating notes, denominated and redeemable in what where then typically gold or silver standard money units.
Like @MoneyIllusion, I believe the Fed's calls for a larger fiscal response are calls for relief rather than stimulus. Generally Fed officials are reluctant to chime in on fiscal policy. themoneyillusion.com/does-the-fed-f… 1/n
But complaints about limited uptake some of the Fed's 13(3) facilities, and of its MSLF and MLF especially, have egged them on this time. Those complaining have often suggested that the Fed's lending terms have been too strict.
Some wonder why the Fed can't take bigger risks, or make its loans forgivable, like the SBA. But the Fed's 13(3) lending rules aren't so flexible, even with Treasury backstops. So Fed officials have called for more fiscal action to relieve the Fed of such pressure.
I should add that the belief in question wouldn't be problematic if it were based on careful studies of the evidence and theories informed by such. But it isn't. Instead, we get theories (like the Diamond-Dybvig model) concocted to rationalize prior beliefs. 1/2
People in turn cite such theories as proof that their preconceived notions are in fact sound. In fact the theories prove nothing of the kind. They are so many formal models of a myth.
As such, the theories are useful, as they show what sorts of things would have to be true for the mythical crises to actually occur. But too many fail to use them that way. Instead they write things like, "Banking is inherently unstable (See Diamond and Dybvig, 1983)." Ugh!
The debate about stablecoin regulation is at bottom part of a broader debate about regulatory classification of fintech payment service providers (PSPs). But it is, IMHO, wrong to reduce this debate to the question, "Is it a 'bank' or not?"
Posing the question that way implies that there are only two options: (1) Fintech PSPs aren't banks, and therefore shouldn't have to get stnd. bank charters or abide by the reg's that go w/ such to gain access to public settlement facilities. That's what many stablecoin fans say.
(2) fintech PSPs are banks; and therefore must be get bank charters and be subject to the same regulations ordinary banks must abide by. That's the answer offered by the STABLE Act tlaib.house.gov/media/press-re…