The recent days quarrel between the #Iraqi gov. and resistance groups reflects an internal Iraqi power struggle more than a US-Iran showdown. With the upcoming anniversary of the killings of Muhandis and Soleimani, the fasa’il may be more anxious to take revenge than Iran is.👇
On 22 December, a barrage of rockets damaged parts of the US Embassy in the GZ. The @WSJ called it the largest attack on the embassy in a decade. Previous threats by the USG to close the Embassy ahead of an expected US military response still stand.
In the days following the rocket attacks, sec. forces detained members of Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH). On 25 Dec. footage was released of one of the detainees, Husam al-Zerjawi. AAH denied any accusations against him compromising national security and called for his immediate release.
Video footage of unknown resistance groups pledging allegiance to AAH leader Qais al-Khazali circulated on resistance-affiliated platforms threatening to attack the government.
PM Kadhimi ordered the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) into Baghdad streets to avoid a potential repeat of the Dora raid scenario against Kataib Hezbollah (KH) in June, when an armed convoy of the fasa’il threatened the government inside the GZ.
National Security Adviser Qasim al-Araji was sent to mediate with AAH. In a tweet on 26 Dec. Khazali claimed that the situation had been resolved, with reason prevailing. The Interior Ministry denied reports that it had transferred custody of the detainee to the Hashd al-Shaabi.
The same day, Abu Ali al-Askeri, KH’s security spokesperson, tweeted that the rocket attacks only play into the enemy’s hands and should stop, but reasserted that the resistance factions will defend each other, as threats against one impacts all of them.
He urged PM Kadhimi not to test the patience of the resistance (Iraqi and foreign), which is ready to confront him, and that intelligence services of neither the US nor Iran can protect him.
This is indicative of two things: On the one hand the fasa’il are emphasizing the national faultline - the resistance against the ‘treacherous’ government - and on the other they distinguish their affiliation with the IRGC/Quds force from the MOIS of Iran.
Simultaneously, another prominent player, Muqtada al-Sadr, seeks to ride the wave of the latest quarrel, presenting himself as a level-headed politician. On 25 Dec. he cautioned against US-Iran tensions playing out in Iraq, and later stated that a US exit should be negotiated.
Whatever happens on the 3 January anniversary, the internal power struggles between the Iran-affiliated resistance groups and the government, Sadr and other more nationalist Shia parties will remain tense in the run-up to the planned June parliamentary elections.
The best scenario for 3 January is one in which continued rocket attacks will cause no casualties nor spark fierce demonstrations by the resistance groups in front of the US Embassy, thus preventing further escalation before Biden takes office on 20 January.
Some thoughts on the agreement between Baghdad and Erbil to stabilise Sinjar. It addresses two main challenges: (1) Unifying the administration and (2) expelling all external forces from the area in order to enable reconstruction and the return of IDPs. 1/10
There are currently two parallel administrations in Sinjar, one backed by the Hashd and the other by the KDP. The agreement establishes that an independent, technocratic, district head will be selected, and other positions will be appointed by a joint committee. 2/10
A possible outcome is some kind of power-sharing formula that revolves around the main positions: the district head (likely to be KDP-affiliated), the president of the district council and the heads of Sinuni and Qairawan sub-districts. 3/10
Former PM Maliki appeared in an interview at @alsharqiyatv, stating that the state lost control in the wake of the October protests last year. Provinces such as #Nassriya have fallen at the hands of violent protesters, he says. [Thread 1/4]
"Demanding employment is a legitimate demand", (read: calling for the downfall of the system is not). It is therefore incumbent on the government to counter the chaos unleashed by 'politicised' revolting youth. Maliki's solution? [2/4]
A repeat of the 2007 Operation Imposing the Law, which cleared the capital of Shiite and Sunni armed groups during the surge. It was followed by Operation Knight's Charge which targeted militia groups in #Basra, specifically Sadr's Mahdi Army. [3/4]