1/ Kim Jong Un may not acknowledge that Biden is President until Jan. 21, partly out of respect for Trump, who hasn’t and may never concede. Kim has adhered to his understandings with Trump since June 2018 and not tested long-range missiles or conducted nuclear tests. Kim's
2/ position to Biden is likely to be that the U.S. must build on his agreement with Trump. Conversely, if Kim were to test a long-range missile (provocation) in early 2021, he would unilaterally break his understanding with Trump’s successor. The likely reason Kim might break
3/ that understanding is if Biden declares in his early days as President that Kim’s agreement with Trump is not binding on him. The Biden Administration should therefore make clear it is willing to negotiate with Kim and will abide by the understandings he reached with his
4/ predecessor as long as Kim does likewise. He could also offer COVID assistance. Let’s just hope that Trump doesn’t destroy his letters to Kim, which he wouldn’t even show to Bob Woodward, and that the full negotiating record will be preserved.
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There's good reason Biegun said no summit chance until after Election Day: The Republican convention ends 8/27, then it's the general election campaign with several debates in October. Trump will not make foreign trips in September-October. Every day will be spent on campaigning.
But President Moon is right to urge a third summit before Election Day, because any resuscitation of the U.S.-DPRK relationship would have to begin at the top. But it would have to happen by mid-August (8/15?), and there's little chance of any serous prep on the U.S. or NK sides.
1/ As much as some think Trump got taken for a ride by Kim Jong Un, Kim must also think he got taken for a ride by Trump since March 2018. In the end, from Kim's point of view, there was no "there" there. The leaks from Bolton's book only serve as further evidence for NK to
2/ assert that the U.S. was insincere and deceptive in its communication with the DPRK, much as others insist the North has been with the U.S. I think the North hates an insincere, BS policy from the U.S. more than it does a consistent, principled hardline policy. Now there is
3/ sheer chaos for Kim Jong Un: if he indeed had cardiovascular surgery in April, his health future becomes more uncertain; sister Kim Yo Jong taking on a more upfront role may be a direct consequence of that. Outwardly, Trump's reelection looks less assured than ever, and Kim
1/ I arrived in Seoul on June 16, 2000 to speak the next day at a Korean Political Science Association conference - one day after the 1st inter-Korean summit. I very well remember the US was not thrilled with the summit because it did not want the ROK to get out ahead of the US
2/ with North Korea. Nonetheless, Vice Marshal Jo met with President Clinton in early October 2000, and Secretary of State Albright made a reciprocal trip to Pyongyang late that month and met with Kim Jong Il. Of the three reasons Clinton did not visit Pyongyang by the end of his
3/ term, the main one was the undecided presidential election for 36 days. Then things went downhill with George W. Bush, who stiffed Kim Dae Jung in March 2001 in his visit to Washington and then declared NK part of the "axis of evil." So, as President Moon speaks to the nation
1/7 The two Koreas are technically still in a state of war after 70 years and an armistice has been in place since 1953. Whether or not leaflet balloons violate a recent inter-Korean agreement, they cannot help but be seen as provocative by the North because they don't know
2/7 what's really in the balloons. The North is always highly suspicious and permitting balloons to fly over an armistice line when a war has not ended is the height of stupidity. Moreover, my estimate is that the groups doing the balloons are the "sour grapes" crowd whose allies
3/7 most recently suffered major electoral defeat in the 4/15 National Assembly elections. Some of them, I believe, are largely responsible for the disinformation campaign fed to the media in April that Kim Jong Un was sick or had died (we even saw a fake video of his funeral
1/5 In December 1994, at the earliest signs of North Korea’s famine, my colleague, an NGO leader in Washington, DC, was asked by Kim Jong Il’s inner circle if he could request food assistance for the DPRK from European capitals. The European diplomats on the continent he met were
2/5 very surprised at the DPRK's request, thinking the North was able to feed itself, but nonetheless responded to him favorably. But days later, the ROK government of that time, aware of my colleague's inquiries, specifically contacted each European government my colleague met
3/5 with and strongly insisted North Korea was perfectly fine and would not need food assistance. The rest is history; the famine occurred in 1995-96 with great loss of life. The lesson is when North Korea quietly contacts international NGOs seeking the assistance of the outside
1/18 "North Korea and the Shadow of Finlandization" -- The American public should not be under the impression that our problems with North Korea are solely related to its nuclear and missile programs, which indeed threaten not only South Korea and Japan, but the U.S. mainland. As
2/18 vital as these issues are to resolve after 30 years of their emergence, for the North, they are ultimately tools to achieve survival, security and independence from the interference of its bigger neighbors – an age-old story in the history of Korea. Korea's experience is of
3/18 being repeatedly thrown under the bus by the surrounding major powers from the beginning of the 20th century. This includes China, Russia, Japan – and the United States, which conveniently looked the other way as Japan began to colonize Korea in 1905 while America acquired