With @ProfHansNoel, I've been doing research that may shed some light on divides within the Senate GOP.
In 2016, we asked groups of 500 GOP and 500 Dem activists via YouGov to tell us who in a pair of senators was more conservative in 3 online surveys throughout the year.
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This is a fairly challenging task, since respondents could be asked about any of their party's senators (or centrist out-party senators) at the time. And let's just say not everyone has an opinion about every single senator.
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We then used a Bradley-Terry model to generate one-dimensional "perceived ideology scores."
Here are the perceived ideology scores (y-axis) by DW-NOMINATE's first dimension (x-axis).
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Overall, the scores from these activists are highly correlated with NOMINATE's one-dimensional voting score.
Notice folks like Warren and Sanders are almost always listed as more liberal, while Cruz anchors the conservative end of the scale.
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It's also noteworthy that Democratic activists appear to distinguish Democratic senators more with respect to ideology than do Republican activists for their party's senators.
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When these perceived ideology scores differ from NOMINATE, there's an instructive pattern visible even in 2016, before Trump took office.
Pro-Trump Senators like Jeff Sessions & Tom Cotton are perceived to be more conservative than their voting records suggest.
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OTOH, anti-Trump Republicans are perceived to be more centrist, even when their voting records (Sasse, Flake) are quite conservative.
So even in 2016, GOP activists were starting to redefine who was conservative based on who was pro- or anti-Trump.
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Was Trump's 2016 victory driven more by turnout or persuasion? That question shadowed the 2020 Democratic presidential primary. In this new @monkeycageblog piece I try to answer it, drawing on new research with @seth_j_hill and Greg Huber.
That lets us make figures like this, which plots the GOP's gain on the y-axis by decile of precinct turnout stability (x-axis). Higher stability=more of the same voters in 2012, 2016.
Shift to GOP is *larger* on average in more stable precincts. Suggests persuasion is impt. 3/n
I've been fortunate to be able to track the political attitudes of a set of American adults recruited by Knowledge Networks using off-line methods before 2008. I've repeatedly surveyed these folks, most recently via Ipsos 10/7-10/22/20. n=1,131. Some initial results.
(By the way, if you are curious for some previous work using this panel, check out these @FiveThirtyEight articles:)
This is *not* a representative sample of the current electorate. Since this is a long-running panel, the youngest respondents are now 30. And it has been subject to attrition. Here I report unweighted results.
In early April, @spbhanot and I conducted a survey via @Civiqs to look at how online Pennsylvanians were responding to COVID-19. Now, @abuttenheim joins us for a second wave with many of the same respondents to see what those views look like (May 30-June 2, n=2,045).
In early April, 59% said "We must continue to stay home for as long as necessary, even if the economy suffers." By early June, that was down to 43%, with 46% instead saying "We must reopen the economy as soon as possible, even if more people will get sick." (Had been 27%.) 2/n
I teamed up with @abuttenheim and @spbhanot to administer an online survey via @civiqs of 1,912 Pennsylvania adults April 4th-8th focusing on residents' responses to coronavirus, and am going to tweet some of the topline results in this thread. 1/n
When asked about trade-offs between re-opening the economy and keeping it closed to prevent the spread of the virus, 59% said we should "stay home for as long as necessary" while 27% said we should re-open the economy as soon as possible, even if more people get sick." 2/n
On the economy question, there is a stark divide between Republicans and Democrats. The percentage of Democrats saying we should re-open the economy as soon as possible? Just 4%. Republicans? 49%. Independents come in at 29%.
With Sen. Sanders throwing his hat into the ring, some data and observations from his 2016 primary campaign... 1/10
As with any political coalition of any meaningful size, Sanders' 2016 supporters weren't all alike. Sanders' 2016 campaign combined voters on the left w/ more disaffected, anti-establishment voters. I wrote about this coalition for @538politics here: fivethirtyeight.com/features/does-… 2/10
Take Sanders' 2016 victory in West Virginia Dem primary. Sanders did better in the places where Keith Judd had done better running against Obama in 2012. The ultimate protest candidate, Judd was a federal inmate who won > 40% of the WV vote in 2012. 3/10
Central question w/ Kennedy's retirement is political impact of potentially overturning Roe. My new book "The Increasingly United States" (goo.gl/SgHtsb) provides a way to approach that. Key is to first recognize that nationalization can mean two different things. 1/n
Politics can be nationalized when state, national divisions are over similar issues (figures on right side). But politics can also be nationalized when voters care only about nat'l issues, aren't engaged in state or local pol (figures on bottom). 2/n
These two sides of nationalization don't always move in tandem. Along the first dimension, nationalization rose in 1930s and 1940s, declined until ~1980, grew to new heights after. 3/n