One thing that's probably worth mentioning as impeachment polling starts to come out: Until we have a better sense of factors behind 2020 election polling error, can't discount that some of the same factors are affecting non-election political surveys.
To the extent there was a likely-voter-model problem, that's not a factor. But differential non-response very well could be.
Reasonable hypothesis that national impeachment polling might understate opposition by up to 3-4 points.
Compared to elections (where slim margins can be crucial), something like 39% opposition vs. 42% opposition isn't as meaningfully different.
But it's probably a good reminder that all these numbers are, by definition, estimates.
Pew has a very good discussion of what the potential sources for error were, and how some of them could be more impactful on non-election polls than others:
To summarize very broadly, there are two main buckets:
-Errors in gauging which people were likely to vote (this happened in 2012, when polls underestimated Obama)
-Systemically missing some bloc of voters, who don't fall along usual party/demo lines accounted for by weighting
Former is not a problem for surveys of the full population, latter quite plausibly could be.
Again, this is something we'll have a somewhat better understanding of in a few months.
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Dem voters say, 43% to 33%, Biden should compromise to work with GOP. GOP voters say, 54% to 25%, that Republicans in Washington should stick to their positions.
That same asymmetry shows up in voters' expectations: Dem voters think that Biden will work with GOP (but not vice versa), while GOP voters don't expect either side to work together.
Sort of an interesting crosstab: how likely Dem voters think it is that GOP will work with Biden vs. whether they think Biden should try to work with GOP. Even those who think he should compromise are mostly bearish it will be reciprocated.
It is going to be really interesting to see if/how this affects public opinion over the next couple of months.
Right now, we're in a place with clear partisan divides for preventative measures, but nevertheless still pretty broad public support across the board.
One scenario I've worried about: With Trump's messaging so inconsistent, many Trump voters focused on the more pro-restriction things he said, which aligned with their own beliefs. (See this from July.)
With a Dem president advocating for preventative measures, is there any possibility of some backlash effect? Probably depends to some extent on who the loudest GOP voices are, and what message they're putting forward.
I don't have a ton to add to the polling discussion at the moment -- want to get a lot more information before I start theorizing in detail about what happened, or what that means for polling in the future.
Here's an initial writeup, to which I'll add a few personal thoughts:
I think there are two main issues here: the communication and the data. Polling is an inexact snapshot, and this level of error was always a possibility.
Exit polls!
-Yes, they're happening this year
-A lot of the work was done prior to Election Day
-Final results not foolproof, but provide useful data about the electorate
-Don't try to use early results to guess who's going to win
-Especially this year
One of the big advantages of finalized exit polls is that they're weighted to the actual results of the election, rather than our best guess of what the electorate will look like.
As we all know by now, this year it'll while to get the actual results of the election.
Polling errors are indeed real! They could favor either Trump or Biden! If they do favor Trump, it's still probably not because of social desirability bias!
I do not understand why this is the one concept to which the Discourse has latched onto like a remora.