Thread by @matthefler

Hey #twitterstorians! Since gaining my PhD in @warstudies I’m preparing a monograph on my research. Here’s a thread outlining my doctoral work.

My PhD examined the role of secret intelligence and clandestine diplomacy in Anglo-French relations during the Second World War. /1

Going into @KCLSecurity I was ready. I had great supervision and training. I’d learned how to analyse intelligence material. My research on Intel and Anthony Eden's resignation over Italian Appeasement is based on that work and found in @IntelNatSecJnl: tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…

This work would be bigger. Much bigger. Here was the question:

By the end of #WWII, the world had changed. British and French grand strategy had the same goal: How to maintain your great power status. The exhausted empires faced rising #superpowers. /3

Early archival releases made clear that key leaders wanted Anglo-French cooperation. Eden, Rene Massigli, Charles de Gaulle. Ernest Bevin even supported a Western Bloc – a radical Anglo-French ‘third force’ in international affairs. But real cooperation never came. Why not? /4

Historiography was good but divided. Weight given to the US/Commonwealth vs Europe, international pressures, culture, economic/military weakness. Most of all tensions in the Middle East and personal disputes – especially between Winston #Churchill and Charles #deGaulle. /5

I set out to find out whether intelligence archives could shed light on these matters? Over 2016-17 I explored 8 archives in three countries. I took many hundreds of thousands of photographs. I got the ‘conventional’ archive – but I focused on unanalysed intelligence material. /6

Important side note: archival staff are amazing. I can't say enough about everyone at the @UkNatArchives, @OxfordMEC, @ChuArchives, @CadburyRL, @ArchivesnatFr, La Courneuve, le Vincennes, and @USNatArchives. /7

So what did I look at? Lots but esp. diplo Sigint from the UK & USA. These are foreign cables intercepted by the Anglo-Americans and often shared/concealed etc. They went to top decision-makers. Intercepted in the UK by the GC&CS (@GCHQ) and in the US by G-2 (Army Sigint). /8

These are tough sources. Messages of others - hard to know who saw them, harder to determine their influence. But using them together? In the UK the HW12 Series @UkNatArchives - raw cables, often in French. In the US RG4579030 @USNatArchives - daily summaries of material. /9

What could intelligence tell us? I argue international archives transform our understanding of Anglo-French relations from 1943-45. In fact, I argue this was the final ‘failure’ of real A-F cooperation. By the time Bevin took office the Western Bloc scheme was already dead. /10

My work shows for the first time that leaders like Winston Churchill were aware of a campaign of anti-French subversion in the Middle East. During WWII, Churchill embarked on a secretive plan to reorganize the ME. To create a Jewish State and consol. control, France had to go./11

Intelligence reveals that Churchill conducted an unofficial policy against France in the ME. In contrast to Britain’s official policy, which said France could stay, Churchill sanctioned a sophisticated operation to oust France. Further- Churchill knew that de Gaulle had evidence.

How do I show this? I reconstruct Churchill’s policy through it’s opposite. FM Anthony Eden disagreed with the PM’s policy. He opened a secret channel to de Gaulle in which he discussed some of the scheme and promised to regain control of British policy. /13

Yet Eden’s clandestine diplomacy failed. The Prime Minister was permitted to betray de Gaulle and sacrifice relations with France for larger strategic goals. Intelligence shows how secret information and clandestine diplomacy wrecked Anglo-French relations.

I hope that gives a sense of my doctoral research @warstudies. I'm working now on a monograph for publication. If you'd be interested in reading this book, please say so in the comments or like and retweet.

Thanks. /End