To obtain such a profit, the attacker executed 11 transactions.
Below is a very superficial explanation of what was happening in these transactions👇
1/ Flash loaned 116k ETH from dYdX 2/ Flash loaned 99k ETH from Aave v2 3/ Borrow 134M USDC and 129M DAI using ETH as collateral on Compound 4/ Add 134M USDC and 36M DAI to 3crv Curve pool 5/ Withdraw 165M USDT from 3crv Curve pool 6/ Repeat five times👇
- Deposit 93M DAI to yDAI vault (less w/ each time)
- Add 165M USDT to 3crv pool
- Withdraw 92M DAI from yDAI vault (less w/ each time)
- Withdraw 165M USDT from 3crv pool 7/ In the last time withdraw 39M DAI and 134M USDC instead USDT 8/ Repay Compound debts 9/ Repay flash loans
Each time the attacker had more 3crv tokens, which he was later able to swap for stablecoins.
Lol, it's funny how so many flash loans have been used.
This means that my new research piece about flash loans, which will be released very soon, will be relevant.
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Let’s go back to Curve’s SynthSwap and use a real example to calculate the benefits of using it for large trades.
Due to the way Synthetix works, trades using Virtual Synths are divided into two transactions. Consequently, people using SynthSwap carry certain price risks.
2/5
The first transaction: 1) 9M USDT swapped to 8.95M sUSD through Curve sUSD v2 pool (0.5% negative slippage) 2) 8.95M sUSD swapped to 6.69k sETH through Synthetix Exchange (0.3% fee)
3/5
The second transaction took place 37 minutes after the first: 3) 6.69k sETH swapped to 6.71k ETH through Curve sETH pool (0.3% positive slippage)
So in this trade, ETH price was $1,341. For comparison, CoinGecko gives us $1,330.6 as ETH price, but what about the slippage?
Shortly, Curve will start supporting a new @synthetix_io feature - ‘Virtual Synths.’ Presumably, this will open the door to infinite liquidity for large trades.
Along with this, Synthetix Exchange had record trading volumes a few days ago.
But is everything so good?
2/6
A week and a half ago, @lawmaster noticed that all these volumes belong to a few specific addresses.
For some reason, these addresses were using the new ‘Multi-Collateral Loans’ feature, although they were not receiving any visible profits.