So you have probably noticed @terra_money’s exponential rise in 2021. And you’re probably wondering “where did this all come from?”
Well not from nowhere—in fact it’s been a relatively long and super interesting journey, well worth a review.
A thread👇🏻
For some context, Terra is a Tendermint based Layer 1, optimized for financial services. The lifeblood of the system is an expanding set of stablecoins. Stability is achieved via seigniorage enabled by the native protocol asset, LUNA—burn $LUNA, mint stablecoins and so on.
Validators stake LUNA to secure consensus, and are also responsible for casting oracle votes that feed the system with information on the various exchange rates of assets on the platform.
Terra launched in 2019. The first stablecoins introduced to the system were the KRW and the SDR. These stables powered the back-end of Chai—a mobile payments and e-comm app with a large footprint in Korea.
Volumes and users on the KRW pair increased steadily over time. At the same time though, $LUNA was not looking like it was capturing a lot of that value. “Why is that?” you will naturally wonder.
When I first looked at Terra back in 2019, I immediately thought “if anything will disrupt Stripe, it will look like this on the back-end.”
But there was one issue—how do you get from 0 to 1?
Let me explain what I mean by that.
Say you are a merchant in the ecosystem and you receive synthetic KRW (KRT) as payment because lower fees and it’s convenient. If KRT is interchangeable with KRW, a rational agent would opt for always swapping into legal tender post payment, because KRW bears less risk than KRT.
If you extrapolate that behaviour to the ecosystem level, it means that the market is always net short KRT (or other stable) and the system is always in a state of excess supply!
And excess supply means that KRT would always trade under the peg—and so it did.
Given how seigniorage works in Terra, in order to bring KRT back to the peg, LUNA is minted in order to buy back the KRT overhang. All good—back to stability. But there’s one problem.
Inflation!
This meant that over time validators would be getting diluted much more than they are compensated for.
So when does this stop? Well, when “network effect”—ie when the rational play for merchants and other users of stables is to hold them—not swap them for the legal tender.
Enter @mirrorfinance and subsequently @alice_finance and @anchor_protocol—now the ecosystem has gone from a state of no clear incentive to hold the stables, to up to 400%+ APY on UST.
Incentive enough? Definitely looks like it!
UST is in such demand that now the opposite is happening—the pair is consistently trading above the peg (as is KRT) and to temper this, LUNA must burned in order to mint more UST. That makes LUNA ever scarcer over time, as demand for UST and other stables increases.
Is this likely to continue? My bet is yes—subsidised yield is great to acquire users, but if utility in the Terra ecosystem keeps increasing (new facilities etc), it will very likely end up being Hotel California; you come for yield, but stay for the good times!
If we don’t take stock of what works in this ecosystem, we will never scale it.
There are important lessons in bootstrapping money eco’s in what @d0h0k1 and co have delivered. Hopefully this thread helps put it all in perspective—and may the odds be ever in your favour!
As always—this is NOT investment advice.
If you are interested in learning more about @terra_money and how you can get involved—if you’re so inclined—my colleagues at @BisonTrails have put together a really great guide 👇
Seems to me that $BTC correlation with global markets is being used fairly indiscriminately, and with some confirmation bias in most takes I’ve seen recently - i.e. cherry picking the starting point of the analysis to fit narrative.
Let’s clear the air a bit.
1/ While Covid-19 was a given since the beginning of the year, the impact in global markets hit around 17/2 when China changed the methodology of how active cases were recorded.
On that day 20k new cases were announced, fear took over, and risk-asset correls went to 1.
2/ 17-Feb is the point where we entered a post-risk-parity domain space. Among other things, this means that cross-asset strategies that worked before 17-Feb don’t any more, and likely won’t for the near future.
With all the talk on $BTC miner capitulation, it's a good time to look at what kind of story the data tells - with a little help from @thetokenanalyst.
A short thread 👇🏼
1/ The miner wallet net flows from September to present day, point to the story so far having been driven by speculation. Nothing out of the ordinary.
Until yesterday.
2/ Untagged miner wallets saw $20M of net outflows. While it might not sound like a lot, comparatively, it is the 2nd largest single day of net outflows from untagged wallets in 2019 in USD terms.
That time of the term again; this is a tweetstorm on the current state of Bitcoin and outlook for Q4.
If it were to have a title, it would be sth along the lines of "and now we wait..."
Let's do this 👇
1/ Since the top in July 2019, active addresses have been in decline. While an equilibrium was found for most of Q3, it looks like we are making way for new lows.
Definitely more SoV than means of payment.
Also, a sign of fading vibrancy.
2/ The volume of transactions has also decreased, normalizing back to Feb-March 2019 levels.
With that, the fees generated have reverted back to late March 2019 levels.
~55% of the total supply of $Grams was distributed to investors; ~12% will be unlocked on Day 1, with the rest to follow in 6 month intervals.
2/ Total supply of Grams stands at 5B. At SAFT 2 prices, this is a fully diluted network valuation of ~$6.5B, aka 1/3 of $ETH, 1/2 of XRP, making TON the 4th largest network by mcap.
Inflation at 2%, validator reward at 20% (18% likely to come from ledger fees).