Highlights from the DoD IG’s latest quarterly report on Afghanistan on Taliban violence, al-Qaida & ISIS, and Pakistan: 1/n media.defense.gov/2021/Feb/17/20…
Taliban increased violence in reporting period; intra-Afghan talks are unlikely to result in ceasefire or reduction in violence in 2021.
Enemy-initiated attacks in reporting quarter were higher than the same quarter year before; UN SG report found 10439 incidents between July and September 2020, which was an 18% increase on same period year before.
Civilians harmed in reporting quarter remained very high — 810 killed, 1776 injured — but the number was lower than civilian harm level in same quarter last year, which was 1058 killed, 1959 injured.
There were no US military casualties in reporting period.
The Taliban maintained ties to al-Qaida and AQIS: some al-Qaida fighters were integrated in Taliban forces and command structure but they played a marginal role in the insurgency.
AQ+AQIS total is fewer than 200; al-Qaida and AQIS remain willing to abide by Taliban directives for preserving safe haven.
ISIS is attempting to rebuild; while there are no financial relationships between the Taliban and ISIS, in major ISIS areas, loyalties between Taliban and ISIS are fluid.
Pakistan foreign minister Qureshi has expressed support for peace process but said Taliban alone are not responsible for ceasefire.
There was a video of Afghan Taliban deputy Mullah Baradar on social media showing him meeting Taliban rank-and-file in Karachi.
Taliban diverted and co-opted USAID assistance for gaining public support. n/n
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“McKenzie met Friday with Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa, who’s concerned about whether the new administration has a clear plan for what’s ahead in Afghanistan...”
“Pakistan’s military leaders “would not be unhappy” if the United States extended its departure date, one Pakistani military official said in an interview after the [Bajwa-McKenzie] meeting.”
.@ResoluteSupport commander Scott Miller: "Taliban violence is much higher than historical norms...It just doesn't create the conditions to move forward in what is hopefully a historic turning point for Afghanistan." reuters.com/article/us-afg…
“Miller said that the fighting now was an indicator that not only would there be a spring offensive - a move many diplomats view as against the spirit of the Doha agreement - but that it could be more intense than before.”
“"If the violence isn't reduced, it's going to make a peace process very, very difficult; it would be very difficult for any side to make the necessary compromises," Miller said.”
.@Tmgneff and @Taimoornyt report a dire situation in Kandahar with the Taliban moving "closer to taking the provincial capital than they have in more than a decade." nytimes.com/2021/02/15/wor…
"If the Biden administration honors the withdrawal date, officials and analysts fear the Taliban could overwhelm what’s left of the Afghan security forces and take control of major cities like Kandahar in a push for a complete military victory or a broad surrender .."
"During an offensive in [Panjwai in] the fall, the Taliban took swaths of territory and then mostly held their ground despite attempts by the Afghan security forces and U.S. airstrikes to dislodge them."
Thread on some pieces on US policy towards Pakistan, issues that will be in focus in the Biden era: 1/n
Olson says US should engage on security issues due to China's influence, but "days of a tight U.S.-Pakistan relationship, in which the military and intelligence aspects of cooperation dominated, are probably gone for good." 2/n usip.org/publications/2…
Chaudhary and Nasr argue that "If the United States continues to tether the stability of the region to Pakistan, then it must make far more significant investments in the country beyond security interests." 3/n atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atla…
.@SimNasr with an informative piece on the politics of al-Qaida's West and north affiliate(s). He argues that there are "tight organizational and subordination links between JNIM and AQIM." Also quotes responses by new AQIM chief al-Annabi to his 12 questions in early 2019.
"In his answers to the author’s questions, al-Annabi gave insight into the dynamics between JNIM and AQIM: “JNIM is a non-dissociable part of AQIM, which in its turn is an non-dissociable part of al-Qaeda central."
"AQIM’s willingness to overlook personal and ethnic grievances to coalesce...under the JNIM banner has given it flexibility and resistance to military pressure, and...garnered praise from al Qaeda central – [which] criticized Droukdel a decade earlier for being too compromising."
In a video msg, Al-Qaida in Arabian Peninsula chief Batarfi channels Bin Laden's bait-bleed-exhaust doctrine to US negotiations with Taliban: "[bleeding] militarily and economically in Iraq and Afghanistan...forced [US] to negotiate with Taliban movement." ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/aqa…
To be sure, US negotiations with the Taliban are not the main point of the video. He uses them as one of a number of data-points on supposed US decline, including the Jan 6 storming of the capitol and 400K cases (deaths) in COVID.