So this is quite interesting. If I am correct, the Zoljanah motor test Iran showed us already took place in December 2015. How can we know and what does it mean for Iran's missile and space program? A quick thread.
Let's start with the basic location. The footage was recorded at AIO's large horizontal test stand in Khojir ( 35.653232° 51.658307°) which was built between 2005 and 2008.
The first thing to note is the scorch mark visible in the footage. A scorch mark first appeared at the site in Mar 2015. While it faded and regained strength after testing, it never completely disappeared. So the footage must have been recorded after Mar 2015.
Another clue is the canopy briefly visible in the testing footage. The test stand seems to have been damaged in June 2018. Afterwards, the once flush roof was rebuilt in a slightly different style with ribs. The testing footage shows the earlier flush version.
So the footage must have been taken between March 2015 and June 2018. With snow visible, this leaves winter 2015/16, winter 2016/17 and winter 2017/18 as possible candidates.
Now, there is another small but crucial detail in the footage – three concrete slabs at the end of the test stand's platform.
In Nov 2015, a number of similar looking objects can be seen at the same location. On Dec 13, 2012, only two of the objects are visible their location matching the one in the video. The place where the third should be is covered by snow.
By December 29, one of the objects is gone (clearer in the Jan and Mar imagery) and a very intense scorch mark appears. All of this leads me to believe that a test happened between December 13 and December 29 and that this was the test Iran showed us.
There are further similarities between the footage presented by Iranian state TV and the December 13 shot. Namely, the vehicle tire marks on the pad as well as the soil structure and coloration at the end of the pad and other minor details.
So what does it all mean? Well, it means that Iran is probably further ahead in the solid fuel game than expected. If they successfully tested a 1.5m diameter motor more than five years ago, it's quite likely they are already progressing on the next steps.
What could those be? Well better tech is the first answer and AIO spokesman Hosseini already gave it to us. He said that the Zoljanah would be improved and this would include lighter casings, higher specific impulse and flexible nozzles. ttps://www.telewebion.com/episode/2495892
Of course, increased dimensions could be another step forward. It's noteworthy that when well-connected Iranian journalist Mehdi Bakhtiari talked about the motor he called it the strongest solid fuel motor „publicised“
End of thread and a big shoutout to @JosephHDempsey for checking my analysis and ensuring I hadn't lost my mind after looking at earth discolorations for way too long :)
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A quick thread on the Tondar 69, a missile that is often forgotten but played an important role in Iranian missile development.
Like so much of Iran's missile program, the history of the Tondar 69 goes back to the Iran-Iraq war when the Iranians were seeking ballistic missiles from a variety of sources. Among them were the Soviet Union and Syria, both of which rebuffed their requests for Scuds.
Libya and the DPRK proved more cooperative but there was also a third country willing to sell ballistic missiles to Tehran – China. For reasons of secrecy, negotiations with the Chinese were held in Thailand and on the Iranian side they included both Moghaddam and Vahid Dastjerdi
And it's time for more Scud history! Here's the story of how Iran began a Scud B reverse-engineering effort and ended up buying a factory from the DPRK. Thread.
Reverse-engineering the Scud was a priority for the Iranians from the very beginning despite the extremely bleak initial prospects for doing so. Moghaddam was obsessed with the idea and when training with his crew in Syria in late 1984...
he actually instructed them to leave their barracks at night under the pretext of holding religious ceremonies. They would sneak into the Syrian warehouses to rasp off material samples of the missiles to be brought back to Iran and analyzed.
With Iran-DPRK missile cooperation in the news, it might be a good idea to recount a pretty fascinating story. The IRGC's first Scud B shopping trip to North Korea. Thread.
During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran acquired its first Scuds from Gaddafi's Libya and soon used them to strike Baghadad in retaliation for Iraqi air attacks. However, there were issues with the Libyans (will try to make a thread on this later) and Iran began looking for a new supplier
At this point, the Iranians were already importing arms from the DPRK and during one of their factory visits they noted that the DPRK was producing Scuds. So around August/September 1986, IRGC Minister Rafiqdust, and missile force commander Moghaddam went to Pyongyang.
Talking about fatwas and nonpro, there is actually an interesting parallel in the missile field.
In the 1980s Aytollah Khomeini ruled that deliberate attacks on civilian were forbidden. However, when the Iraqi aerial attacks on Iranian cities started to become unbearable the rulings were modified.
Deliberate attacks on cities were now allowed if they remained limited and only served only to deter further attacks through 'retaliation in kind' allowing the shelling of Basra and Scud attacks on Baghdad in retaliation for Iraqi aerial attacks.
Short thread on the institutional framework of Iran's solid propellant SLV effort and the interesting questions posed by the new Zoljanah SLV as well as the Qased SLV.
So we know that Hassan Moghaddam began project Ghaem to develop a solid-propellant SLV in the mid 2000s. Frustrated by the slow pace of missile and rocket development he launched his own research and development organization the IRGC Self-Sufficiency Jihad organisation IRGC-SSJO.
The SSJO would work in parallel to Iran's established missile and SLV producer, the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) and had separate facilities. The first was Bidganeh and we strongly suspected Shahroud was the second one. armscontrolwonk.com/archive/120771…
Video of the Iranian Defense Industries Organization's (DIO) recently inaugurated new solid propellant plant (from 0:30).
The report mentions that similar facilities are operated by AIO but DIO established this one to further strengthen the supply chain with all equipment designed and produced domestically.
There is a single outside shot showing mountains, some poles or support structures as well as overground piping likely for centralized climate control.