Video of the Iranian Defense Industries Organization's (DIO) recently inaugurated new solid propellant plant (from 0:30).
The report mentions that similar facilities are operated by AIO but DIO established this one to further strengthen the supply chain with all equipment designed and produced domestically.
There is a single outside shot showing mountains, some poles or support structures as well as overground piping likely for centralized climate control.
I have a suspicion it could be this new site within the Parchin complex but haven't been able to match the October 2020 satellite imagery to the outside shot yet. 35.565477° 51.778603°
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With Iran-DPRK missile cooperation in the news, it might be a good idea to recount a pretty fascinating story. The IRGC's first Scud B shopping trip to North Korea. Thread.
During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran acquired its first Scuds from Gaddafi's Libya and soon used them to strike Baghadad in retaliation for Iraqi air attacks. However, there were issues with the Libyans (will try to make a thread on this later) and Iran began looking for a new supplier
At this point, the Iranians were already importing arms from the DPRK and during one of their factory visits they noted that the DPRK was producing Scuds. So around August/September 1986, IRGC Minister Rafiqdust, and missile force commander Moghaddam went to Pyongyang.
Talking about fatwas and nonpro, there is actually an interesting parallel in the missile field.
In the 1980s Aytollah Khomeini ruled that deliberate attacks on civilian were forbidden. However, when the Iraqi aerial attacks on Iranian cities started to become unbearable the rulings were modified.
Deliberate attacks on cities were now allowed if they remained limited and only served only to deter further attacks through 'retaliation in kind' allowing the shelling of Basra and Scud attacks on Baghdad in retaliation for Iraqi aerial attacks.
Short thread on the institutional framework of Iran's solid propellant SLV effort and the interesting questions posed by the new Zoljanah SLV as well as the Qased SLV.
So we know that Hassan Moghaddam began project Ghaem to develop a solid-propellant SLV in the mid 2000s. Frustrated by the slow pace of missile and rocket development he launched his own research and development organization the IRGC Self-Sufficiency Jihad organisation IRGC-SSJO.
The SSJO would work in parallel to Iran's established missile and SLV producer, the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) and had separate facilities. The first was Bidganeh and we strongly suspected Shahroud was the second one. armscontrolwonk.com/archive/120771…
Thread on the history of Iran's manned space program, which often has been treated as a joke but actually represents a serious development effort.
The development of a manned capsule is being conducted by the so-called Aerospace Research Institute ARI (Pazhuheshgah-e Havafaza) one of the civilian-controlled R&D entities associated with Iran's space program. (35.763451° 51.378740°)
However, there are cross connections to the military. The institute's current president Abdolfattah Omi was an old pal of Moghaddam and among the first to spill the beans on the Ghaem project.
In the light of these reports, a few thoughts on the missile capabilities of Iraqi and Yemeni militias and whether they could be employed against Israel.
First Iraq. The range needed to target Israel from Western Iraq would be about 500-600km. There is a really high chance, Iranian proxies in the country are already in possession of such systems.
In 2018, Reuters reported the transfer of Iranian Zolfaghar solid-propellant precision-guided missiles with a range of 700km to Iranian proxy groups inside Iraq. reuters.com/article/us-ira…
Merry Christmas everyone! What better way to distract yourself these days than a long thread about the largely unnoticed establishment of a vast military production infrastructure in Myanmar!
While Myanmar has maintained some military production capabilities for along time, these have traditionally been rather limited. Only in the last two decades has this infrastructure been vastly expanded with the country now mustering at least 25 factories.
These facilities are surprisingly large and usually built in remote jungle areas of the country with on-site housing for workers. Maintained by the Directorate of Defence Industries, they are known by their Burmese acronym Ka Pa Sa and numbered.