For years, some other countries have accused China of using government authority, influence and money give Chinese firms advantages that businesses in other countries don't get.
3/ "So what, it's the government of China, of course it supports Chinese firms?"
The problem is the global trading system is kind of built on a trade-off (sorry).
Governments agreed to lower tariffs in exchange for also agreeing not to subsidize too much.
4/ If your firms are allowed to compete in my market on an equal footing (no or low tariffs) then subsidies might give them an unfair advantage.
That leaves me with the choice of entering into a subsidies arms race, enduring the lost jobs, or breaking my tariff commitments. Bad.
5/ Similarly, if your subsidies are high then your lower tariffs are worthless to me because my exporters can't compete with your subsidized domestic producers.
That leaves me in a position where I'm offering you access to my market, in exchange for nothing in return.
5/ That's why the WTO Agreements, and many Free Trade Agreements have provisions limiting subsidies, state aid and positive discrimination for state enterprises.
These are basically governments giving one another promises they won't use state patronage to exploit low tariffs.
6/ "So is China breaking the rules then?"
Probably, but the bigger issue seems to be that the way China supports its firms may not be very well covered by the rules as written.
The Chinese system is so complex much of what they're doing falls in grey areas between the rules.
7/ For example, the definition for "state-trading-enterprises" relies on formally identifiable ownership, advantage, or monopoly.
As any China watcher will tell you, trying to pin down that kind of black and white causality in the Middle Kingdom is like nailing jelly to a wall.
8/ There are some mechanisms within the WTO rules that allow governments that feel their firms are being harmed by foreign subsidies to defend them through limited, targeted tariffs.
However, these laws too aren't necessarily fit for purpose.
9/ Eg. If a Chinese widgets are being subsidized & hurting Australian widget makers in the Australian market, then Australia can raise tariffs on Chinese widgets.
... But that does nothing for Australian widgets losing out to Chinese competition in China or Malaysia.
10/ So what are countries calling for when (as in the article) they suggest a global alliance to tackle Chinese subsidies?
Really, they could mean any of three things, none of them easy or uncomplicated:
11/ 1⃣ Use WTO dispute settlement to push for Chinese compliance with existing rules.
China has a decent record of complying with WTO rulings, so the theory goes that if you successfully take disputes against it, it may change some of the ways it does things.
12/ The challenge with this approach are:
- The WTO Appellate Body currently has 0 "judges" on it due to a US blockade;
- Cases can take a very long time;
- As mentioned above, the rules as written may mean what China is doing isn't always "illegal";
- China may not comply.
13/ 2⃣ Push to tighten rules in the WTO.
This falls under the banner of so-called "WTO Reform" and envisages tightening WTO agreements, adding new rules, and closing some of the loopholes Chinese subsidies may be currently falling through.
There's a glaring problem with this.
14/ Any change would require Chinese consent.
The WTO is a consensus based organization and can't simply tighten the rules in a way that restricts China, without China approving such rules.
You'd have to convince China to approve rules that bind it. That's a tough sell.
15/ 3⃣ Use tools outside the WTO to make China change.
This envisages a combination of diplomatic and economic pressure, the creation of plurilateral agreements like TPP to 'zone out' China, decoupling from reliance on Chinese manufacturing etc.
16/ The problem with this approach is that it requires a lot of actors, across a lot of sectors, in a lot of countries, to sacrifice short term economic gains.
There is a tonne of money to be made in China, and a tonne of Chinese investment capital to play for. They know it.
17/ If all this sounds kind of hopeless, then I'm sorry to be a Debbie Downer.
Making a multi-trillion dollar global superpower change an economic system its one-party ruling state is actually kind of fond of is really easy to call for in principle but hard to execute. /end
18/ Note: The above is my attempt to shortly summarize a ludicrously complex set of issues.
I have definitely oversimplified a lot in the interest of comparative brevity.
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1/ My pet theory on conservative culture wars the world over is they can be effective politically but only provided the government doesn't get carried and actually try to do anything... at which point the wheels tend to come off.
2/ Whatever you think of its substance or ethics, banging on rhetorically about the War on Christmas, cancel culture, woke statue assassins, student lefties and communist academics clearly has some electoral appeal.
Focus groups are clearly telling governments it's a winner.
3/ However, when you move from railing in principle against these social forces to enacting policies to defeat them you almost inevitably do a couple of things that ruin the appeal.
1/ Regulations are ultimately about managing risk, whether that risk is fraud, unsafe practices or someone building an ugly building.
The more (actually or performatively) worried you are about the specific risk, the more checks, approvals, rules and guidelines you put in place.
2/ Governments on both the left and right actually have similarly low appetites for risk, they just focus primarily on different risk categories and operate from an assumption that different groups are bastards that must be watched.
3/ Left wing governments have a tendency to focus on risks arising from business activities and capital.
Their regulations tend to assume that management are bastards, and must be monitored and constrained lest they exploit people or generate negative externalities for profit.
"If you knew everything you needed to know and did everything right, is your existing business and delivery model still viable and competitive?"
The answer to that question determines if for you the problem is Brexit, or how Brexit was delivered.
3/ Some of the challenges at borders could have been prevented while still having the exact same model of Brexit (No Single Market, No Customs Union, but an FTA).
That they're appearing is an implementation failure and you can fully support Brexit but still be pissed about them.
1/ The EU calculation on fish is relatively simple and very cold blooded (sorry). The latest Barnier comments reflect that.
It wants access to UK waters for its vessels and is seeking to trade for it from a position of strength.
That strength is the threat of tariffs.
2/ The EU wants to avoid a future negotiation where it is seeking access to UK waters without the threat of tariffs in its arsenal.
That's why it wants fish included in this deal and why Barnier wants the ability to leverage tariffs if EU vessels are locked out in the future.
3/ The EU aren't stupid. If this deal locks in some access for 5 years and then goes to a bilateral negotiation untied to anything else, what does year 6 look like?
The Sun:
"PRIME MINISTER DARREN GRIMES TELLS EUROPIRATES NON FISH, NON WAY"
I know the media is eager to points score who 'won' or 'surrendered' on the final outstanding issues in this negotiation.
The fact is, regardless of who moves, where, and how far on fishing, governance and LPF, the final deal will be good for both the EU and UK. 🤷♂️
On fish, the worst case scenario for the UK is that the status quo is maintained in a tiny sector.
The worst case scenario for the EU is they'll have negotiate annually for access to UK waters on behalf of a tiny sector.
On LPF, the worst case scenario for the UK is that at some point in the future, their regulations fall so far behind the EU's that they lose some of the market access this deal secures.
For the EU, it's that in that hypothetical, they have fewer options.