And while we are talking about Syrian CW, here's a short thread about the Syrian air force's decentralized chemical weapons production facilities destroyed by the OPCW.
In 2013, the Syrian government declared a large part of its CW program to the OPCW. While its official declaration has remained classified, some UN documents do mention the names of facilities.
This 2013 letter from the UN Secretary General lists a total of 18 fixed chemical weapons facilities and also mentions mobile units. securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF…
The location of some of these sites were already revealed by Syrian opposition media outlet Zaman al-Wasl (I can share coordinates if people are interested).
But others haven't been mentioned in the Zaman al-Wasl report. Among these are Baly, Khalkhala, Tha'lah, Shayrat, as-Sin and Dhabaa.
Now if you have been following the Syrian civil war, there is a good chance you have heard these names before. These are all Syrian air bases. And curiously enough in 2015, the OPCW talked about the destruction of seven aircraft hangars using explosives. opcw.org/sites/default/…
Satellite imagery clearly shows that at each of seven Syrian air forces bases, a single hangar vanished between 2014 and 2017. Below are examples from Dhabaa and Shayrat.
And here are the coordinates for the hangars at all seven airbases.
But this still leaves one question. Why were these hangars oddly labeled as CW production facilities by the UN instead of let's say storage hangars for CW munition? Well, here we enter the peculiarities of the Syrian program.
The UN document also mentions mobile CW production 'facilities' and a 2015 WSJ article explains what these were: Mobile mixing stations on trucks, where precursors would be mixed to create the chemical agents for Scud warheads in the field. wsj.com/articles/missi…
It seems that the Syrians did not produce filled nerve agent Scud warheads that would be a huge hazard to store but rather intended to simply store the precursors and then produce the agent in the field shortly before combat use.
Considering their numbers, their presence at every major airfield and their labeling as chemical weapons production facilities by the UN, it is very likely the hangars fulfilled the very same role for aircraft and aerial bombs as the trucks did for Scuds and their warheads.
ie a facility where nerve agents would be mixed right before a combat sortie, filled into bombs and then loaded onto planes passing through the hangar like the world's most nightmarish drive-through.
End.
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So this is quite interesting. If I am correct, the Zoljanah motor test Iran showed us already took place in December 2015. How can we know and what does it mean for Iran's missile and space program? A quick thread.
Let's start with the basic location. The footage was recorded at AIO's large horizontal test stand in Khojir ( 35.653232° 51.658307°) which was built between 2005 and 2008.
The first thing to note is the scorch mark visible in the footage. A scorch mark first appeared at the site in Mar 2015. While it faded and regained strength after testing, it never completely disappeared. So the footage must have been recorded after Mar 2015.
A quick thread on the Tondar 69, a missile that is often forgotten but played an important role in Iranian missile development.
Like so much of Iran's missile program, the history of the Tondar 69 goes back to the Iran-Iraq war when the Iranians were seeking ballistic missiles from a variety of sources. Among them were the Soviet Union and Syria, both of which rebuffed their requests for Scuds.
Libya and the DPRK proved more cooperative but there was also a third country willing to sell ballistic missiles to Tehran – China. For reasons of secrecy, negotiations with the Chinese were held in Thailand and on the Iranian side they included both Moghaddam and Vahid Dastjerdi
And it's time for more Scud history! Here's the story of how Iran began a Scud B reverse-engineering effort and ended up buying a factory from the DPRK. Thread.
Reverse-engineering the Scud was a priority for the Iranians from the very beginning despite the extremely bleak initial prospects for doing so. Moghaddam was obsessed with the idea and when training with his crew in Syria in late 1984...
he actually instructed them to leave their barracks at night under the pretext of holding religious ceremonies. They would sneak into the Syrian warehouses to rasp off material samples of the missiles to be brought back to Iran and analyzed.
With Iran-DPRK missile cooperation in the news, it might be a good idea to recount a pretty fascinating story. The IRGC's first Scud B shopping trip to North Korea. Thread.
During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran acquired its first Scuds from Gaddafi's Libya and soon used them to strike Baghadad in retaliation for Iraqi air attacks. However, there were issues with the Libyans (will try to make a thread on this later) and Iran began looking for a new supplier
At this point, the Iranians were already importing arms from the DPRK and during one of their factory visits they noted that the DPRK was producing Scuds. So around August/September 1986, IRGC Minister Rafiqdust, and missile force commander Moghaddam went to Pyongyang.
Talking about fatwas and nonpro, there is actually an interesting parallel in the missile field.
In the 1980s Aytollah Khomeini ruled that deliberate attacks on civilian were forbidden. However, when the Iraqi aerial attacks on Iranian cities started to become unbearable the rulings were modified.
Deliberate attacks on cities were now allowed if they remained limited and only served only to deter further attacks through 'retaliation in kind' allowing the shelling of Basra and Scud attacks on Baghdad in retaliation for Iraqi aerial attacks.
Short thread on the institutional framework of Iran's solid propellant SLV effort and the interesting questions posed by the new Zoljanah SLV as well as the Qased SLV.
So we know that Hassan Moghaddam began project Ghaem to develop a solid-propellant SLV in the mid 2000s. Frustrated by the slow pace of missile and rocket development he launched his own research and development organization the IRGC Self-Sufficiency Jihad organisation IRGC-SSJO.
The SSJO would work in parallel to Iran's established missile and SLV producer, the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) and had separate facilities. The first was Bidganeh and we strongly suspected Shahroud was the second one. armscontrolwonk.com/archive/120771…