Reading Michael Morgan's The Final Act, amazon.co.uk/Final-Act-Hels… - an account of the Helsinki process. A great read by the way - highly recommend. But here's my difficulty.
Following Jeremi Suri, Morgan argues that the Helsinki process was legitimating for both the East and the West in so far as both systems were losing legitimacy for different albeit overlapping reasons. In the Soviet case, it was the loss of faith in the Communist project.
Yet, if we take a longer view of Soviet / Russian foreign policy, we'll see that the striving for recognition by the West as a great power (i.e. legitimation via Western recognition) preceded Brezhnev and certainly survived Brezhnev.
What Brezhnev achieved in Helsinki, Stalin sought to accomplish at Yalta and Potsdam, and Khrushchev at Camp David and in Paris. By the time Gorbachev took the helm, faith in Communism was as good as gone but the need for external legitimation remained.
One has to conclude therefore that a quest for detente that characterized Soviet foreign policy in the 1970s was not necessarily a response to some internal stimuli or the regime's loss of legitimacy, as tempting as the connection may appear. It had other sources.
Never mind, this is just bemused rambling of a historian on a subject that two and a half people out there care about.

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More from @DrRadchenko

1 Apr
A fairly common-place take on the late Cold War that is somewhat off both in terms of the broader picture and the particulars. As far as the Soviets were concerned, detente began to fall apart almost immediately after it was inaugurated with the 1972/73 Brezhnev-Nixon summits.
Brezhnev's hopes for economic engagement with the US ran aground, partly because of Ford's weakness, and the passing the Jackson-Vanik amendment. Decline in the Soviet positions in the Middle East post-1973 pointed to limits of condominium Brezhnev hoped to achieve with the US.
So disappointed were the Soviets with Ford that they welcomed Carter's election in 1976 but he annoyed Moscow with his human rights agenda that (to the Soviets) smacked of arrogance unacceptable in relations between "equal" superpowers.
Read 14 tweets
16 Feb
Did a lecture today on Stalin and the origins of the Cold War. Here's the difficulty I face as a historian. There's evidence that would suggest that Stalin was *not* single-handedly responsible for the Cold War - that both sides were responsible. Let's just say there's evidence.
But Stalin was such a hideous character that I genuinely struggle to exonerate him. Because of what I know about Stalin outside of this particular context, I am strongly inclined to condemn him in other - in all - contexts.
I was thinking about this today in connection with my take on Putin and Putinism. I recognise that there's evidence (especially going back to the 1990s) that suggests that the West was partially responsible for where we are today with Russia (took two to tango).
Read 5 tweets
15 Feb
I have to say that I am somewhat conflicted on the subject of Russia sanctions. 👇🏿
On the one hand, we know (from ample historical experience) that they do not reverse bad behaviour in the short- to medium- term. On the other hand, in the long term they create a moral framework that makes it possible to tell what bad behaviour actually is.
This actually does help reverse bad behaviour in the long term, since the sanctioned party - for all of its protests - perfectly understands 'who's been naughty', and ultimately seeks to reengage on more acceptable terms. (Case study: Gorbachev).
Read 10 tweets
15 Feb
A very interesting exchange between the Czechoslovaks and the Soviets in 1965, which shows how Moscow's allies were able to manipulate the Soviets. 1965 was a disastrous year for Czechoslovak agriculture, which Novotny and co (not unexpectedly) blamed on bad weather.
As a result, Czechoslovakia literally ran out of bread. In Sept. 1965 Novotny turned to the Soviet comrades to supply grain but was told that because of bad weather (what else) in the USSR, the Soviet Union was also running short, and had to buy grain in the West.
As a result, the Soviets were able to provide just 400K tons (in place of the promised 800K). After Novotny returned to Prague, he continued to pressure Brezhnev to deliver more grain, hinting that failure to do so might lead to "political concessions" to the United States.
Read 6 tweets
13 Feb
And maybe the last series of remarks on Russia's "divorce" from Europe. Europe should exercise strategic patience. The reality is - however the Russian Eurosceptics try to frame it - quality of life across much of Europe is incomparably better than in Russia.
The possibilities for personal growth, self-actualisation - are all incomparably better. Personal freedoms are much wider than in Russia. Legal protections of individual rights are much stronger. Personal incomes are generally much higher.
Moreover, Putinism is a barren idea. It has nothing to offer to the world, except for the dubious freedom of venting one's racism or homophobia (but it comes with a price of having to keep your mouth shut on Putin's transgressions and of having to join Russia's WWII cult).
Read 6 tweets
13 Feb
Comparisons are being drawn between potential escalation of sanctions against Russia and, say, sanctions against Iran that failed to change Tehran's behaviour and, if anything, had a rally-around-the-flag effect. This is not a particularly valid comparison.
First of all, it is a lot easier to present sanctions against Iran as "unjust." After all, why should Iran be denied a nuclear bomb when others have it? (The same, by the way, applies to North Korea). But in Russia's case we are dealing with something else entirely.
Sanctions are being proposed to penalise Russia for the use of chemical weapons against its own opposition activists; the narrative of "injustice" falls flat here. True, the domestic audiences will still be presented with the familiar line of "the West is trying to keep us down."
Read 5 tweets

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