Thread by @DrRadchenko

A fairly common-place take on the late Cold War that is somewhat off both in terms of the broader picture and the particulars. As far as the Soviets were concerned, detente began to fall apart almost immediately after it was inaugurated with the 1972/73 Brezhnev-Nixon summits.

https://twitter.com/RadioFreeTom/status/1377415818820997121

Brezhnev's hopes for economic engagement with the US ran aground, partly because of Ford's weakness, and the passing the Jackson-Vanik amendment. Decline in the Soviet positions in the Middle East post-1973 pointed to limits of condominium Brezhnev hoped to achieve with the US.

So disappointed were the Soviets with Ford that they welcomed Carter's election in 1976 but he annoyed Moscow with his human rights agenda that (to the Soviets) smacked of arrogance unacceptable in relations between "equal" superpowers.

They were also frustrated by the Sino-US normalisation, and warned Carter of the dire consequences of building up China against the USSR. The arms control dialogue stalled because of Carter's initial unrealistic expectations but they finally signed a deal in 1979.

It's not true that the Soviets liked Reagan more than Carter. To the ailing Soviet leaders, Reagan came across as decidedly unreasonable (perhaps crazy) at first. Of course, they weren't too fond of Carter either but that had less to do with his arms build-up...

... and much more with Carter's sanctions against the USSR in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and his boycott of the Moscow Olympics. The invasion itself was a consequence of the Soviet fear that Amin would flip to the Americans; it thus had conservative aims.

We know from the Soviet record that Brezhnev began to look for an exit out of Afghanistan as soon as the Soviet troops were introduced there; he repeatedly pressed Babrak Karmal to take responsibility for governance, in many ways precipitating Gorbachev's slow withdrawal.

But by the early 1980s Brezhnev was a wreck, and did not have enough mental or physical energy to bring this war to a close. He did launch an important initiative in 1982, giving impetus to Sino-Soviet normalisation. Gorbachev continued this policy (one of his lasting legacies!)

The Soviets were worried about a possible conflict with the US in the early 1980s but their discussions with the Americans (not least with H.W. Bush during Brezhnev's funeral) suggested that Reagan's rhetoric was just that - rhetoric - and that Washington was actually pragmatic.

There is no evidence that Romanov or anyone else in the Soviet leadership c. 1985 would have led the Soviet Union on a road to imperialist conquests or towards a war with the United States.

As for Gorbachev, it's simply not true that he pursued arms control because he felt the Soviet Union was losing the arms race. Well... it was one of three reasons. The first reason was that Gorbachev really thought that nuclear weapons were bad & dangerous (esp. post-Chernobyl).

The second reason was that he thought that arms control was a way to give the Soviet global standing a new lease on life (it was, if you will, a case of projecting moral leadership at the expense of the US). The third - yes, the costs. But only the third.

That's why one-sided takes about Reagan outspending the Soviets to end the Cold War are not exactly correct. I'd say exactly incorrect. Footnotes? Well, yes, after 10 years of research for the book, I have thousands of footnotes to back up these claims.

But where is the damn book, you'll say. Ah! [Goes back to writing].