I'm wondering if the protests today across Lebanon are not only a natural reaction of people in distress, but also a concerted effort by the political leadership opposed to Aoun and Bassil to raise the pressure on them both to greenlight a new government: bit.ly/3dWfaEa
The sudden proliferation of protests across different geographical and sectarian areas makes me think that there is a political dimension as well here: Is this a new May 7, which brought down Rashid al-Solh's government in 1992? But this time directed against Aoun and Bassil?
Both Aoun and Bassil seem to believe, perhaps rightly, that if there is a Hariri-led government in which they don't have a blocking third, they will be marginalized by the other forces in it, particularly if Hariri prioritizes a partnership with the Shia parties.
On top of this Bassil realizes that a priority for "reform" will be the Energy Ministry, given that it's an open vein in terms of government expenditures. This means that there will be majority wanting to focus on fixing the ministry, the one strong card Bassil still holds.
Making matters worse for Bassil, the French hold him responsible for the blockage, calling him "incompetent and dangerous for the country's future." This message is beign circulated in the media: bit.ly/3dYIr0Y
The problem is that Aoun and Bassil have burned all their bridges. They've failed to read the shifts in Sunni-Shia relations and thought they could rely indefinitely on Hezbollah's support. They're now on their own, with everyone arrayed against them.
If this reading is correct, the protests will escalate, creating a semblance of a crisis which Aoun will have to address. Simply sitting and waiting catatonically, as Aoun has been doing for over two months, will no longer be an option. Hezbollah will also make this clear to him.
So this may be the start of a push by the political cartel, against one of their recalcitrant members. In the days ahead we will see if this escalates, and I predict it will. Hezbollah's cover for Bassil, which was fraying in recent weeks, may simply no longer be present.

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More from @BeirutCalling

26 Feb
Saad Hariri, in his interview with Marcel Ghanem last October, signaled a radical change in his political approach, composed of two parts: First, a decision to base his domestic political strategy on a partnership with the main Shia parties, Hezbollah and Amal.
This he showed by denouncing his erstwhile allies Samir Geagea and Walid Joumblatt, who had spent months criticizing Hariri. He effectively told them that if he and the Shia parties agreed, Geagea and Joumblatt could follow if they wanted, but if they did not, tough luck.
Two days later Joumblatt shifted his position, realizing that he risked being isolated. Geagea didn't, but is today marginalized domestically, as if confirming that those who are aligned with Saudi Arabia in Lebanon are destined to write themselves out of the story politically.
Read 12 tweets
10 Feb
The deadlock in the Lebanese government-formation process may not be as permanent as it seems. The dilemma of Gebran Bassil shows why. Aoun's refusal to sign off on Hariri's cabinet is based on one aim and one desire:
The aim is for Aoun and Bassil not to be weakened in any new government; and this is tied to their desire for Bassil to succeed Aoun as president. The two feel the first can only come by having a blocking third. The second is more problematical.
The reason is that for Bassil to become president, he needs two things: Hezbollah's support, so the party can do for him what it did for Aoun in 2015-2016 and blackmail the political class into voting for him. And he needs to have resolved his problems with the U.S.
Read 6 tweets
15 Oct 20
It's not surprising that Aoun delayed parliamentary consultations a week. The reason is that Hariri was about to be named by the Future bloc, the Shia duo, Joumblatt, and their allies, with the FMP left out. Aoun bought Bassil an extra week to come to an arrangement with Hariri.
But Bassil is politically weak and his margin of maneuver with Hariri is narrow. Hezbollah's and Amal's denunciation of the negotiating team with Israel yesterday—a team selected by Aoun—was a further sign of deteriorating relations between Hezbollah and the Aounists.
It seems that Hezbollah will not torpedo Hariri's chances so as to save Bassil's political skin. Hariri can form a government with independent Christians and Franjieh, and his interview last week was a clear sign of his willingness to ignore the Christian parties' reservations.
Read 8 tweets
13 Oct 20
One very strong message came out of Saad al-Hariri's interview with MTV last week, namely that he was ready to make a deal with Hezbollah and Amal, and that his former allies could come along if they wanted to, but had no latitude to interrupt the process.
In other words if the Sunnis and Shia are in agreement, the minorities must go along. Even the FPM in this phase are mere adjuncts to the Shia duo, while the Lebanese Forces and Walid Jumblatt are on their own. That's why Walid effectively gave up on Geagea last night.
Suleiman Franjieh got the message and, today, announced that he would vote for Hariri in parliamentary consultations. He thus effectively becomes Hariri's favorite as president to succeed Aoun, at Gebran Bassil's expense: bit.ly/3iTslo4
Read 10 tweets
18 Sep 20
I’m puzzled as to why everyone is saying the French initiative is dead. Yes it looks like blockages everywhere, but the strategic picture is fundamental here. First, whether a government is formed by Adib or not, Lebanon has to form a government anyway today.
So why would Hezbollah do so later and miss the political advantages of doing so under France’s plan? Second, a generalized financial collapse if no deal is struck harms Hezbollah’s strategic interests. It would destabilize Lebanon, weakening the party’s ability to defend Iran.
This is all the more urgent as Israel has just concluded peace deals with the UAE and Bahrain, which would facilitate any Israeli military operation against Iran. Hezbollah cannot afford to be neutralized domestically in such a volatile regional context.
Read 9 tweets
9 Sep 20
Now the equation is that if they block reforms, they risk losing everything they have—the billions stolen from the country over the decades. And while, yes, they don’t want to give up anything, the French, with tacit U.S. backing, have altered the equation.
Does this mean success for the French plan? Who can say, but in the game of chicken, the politicians have suddenly seen the car bearing down on them transformed into a 10-ton truck, with one off ramp: the French road map.
The French proposal was effectively negotiated between Macron and Hezbollah, so it’s not clear whether the politicians can seek to undermine it. Nor is it at all clear that Hezbollah wants it to fail, only heightening the dilemma for the recalcitrant politicians.
Read 6 tweets

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