We are in for a long, bumpy, and, potentially, dangerous ride as the UK & EU work out how to live next to each other in a post-Brexit world.
There are four fundamentals to keep in mind when considering how this relationship might develop:
1. All roads lead to the border.
This was true at every critical moment during the negotiations & will continue to be the case as the new relationship develops.
2. The only objectives that matter are defending sovereignty (UK) & defending the single market (EU).
Almost all disputes will be a variation of the UK resisting what it perceives as encroachments on its sovereignty, & the EU resisting what it perceives as the UK seeking unfair access to the single market.
3. This govt has no interest in having a good relationship with the EU.
While the PM may talk of “European friends”, actions speak louder than words, and these demonstrate that govt is comfortable with, feels that it is necessary to, and/or is actively pursuing a combative relationship with the EU.
4. Neither side trusts the other.
When these are taken into account, it is hard to imagine a world where the UK & EU will quietly work together to repair relations, build trust, and implement the agreements that they have signed.
So those hoping for a quiet life are going to be disappointed. There are going to be many more moments when the UK and the EU fall out, and more often than not, they are going to fall out over Northern Ireland.
Managing what happens in NIre is one of the few areas of the UK/EU agreements (beyond broad implementation) where there is shared responsibility. Much of the rest of the relationship is set up to be transactional, but the Protocol demands cooperation.
It is in the context of NI that the new UK/EU relationship will be forged, and their ability to live with each other truly tested.
What is concerning, is that we appear to be in a vicious cycle where an absence of trust encourages a combative approach, and that combative approach helps undermine trust. And then all that is left is the UK and EU’s contrasting priorities clashing within the crucible of NI.
What might make matters worse is if application of these priorities, particularly by the UK, becomes more absolute (the EU’s position is already fairly absolute).
It is only in the context of the Protocol that the UK made a significant break with its desire to defend its sovereignty at all costs.
Unlike in GB, EU rules (some, not all), still apply in N.Ire. This was a price the govt was willing to pay in 2019 to break the impasse, & win an election, but its actions since wld suggest that it wants a refund.
If the govt. decides that the Brexit it agreed is in fact intolerable because part of the UK remains subject to EU rules, and that it will do what is necessary to address this, it is left with three options...
(i) Rip up the Withdrawal Agreement & unilaterally erect a border on the island of Ireland
(ii) Allow NIre to exit the UK
(iii) Renegotiate key elements of the Protocol
Options 1 and 2 come with significant risks. Option 3 is extremely difficult but is by far the most palatable if the govt. really cannot live with the Protocol as it stands
But if renegotiation is what the govt. wants, then it needs to go back to the fundamentals of its relationship with the EU and change the ones that are in its control. Specifically, it must address the lack of trust in the relationship.
It can do this, in part, by dialing down its combative approach. It can also build trust by doing all it can to implement the Protocol as it stands. Unless the govt demonstrates that it wants to make the new arrangements work, not just wreck them, the EU will not trust it.
If the UK does this & it is clear that the Protocol doesn’t work, then it can justifiably ask that a discussion begin about changing it.
And, if sufficient trust has been built up, the EU might be willing, not only to have that conversation, but to take a less absolute view of its priorities if that is what is necessary to create a sustainable framework for future relations.
Ultimately, all roads will continue to lead to the border, and contrasting priorities will always result in the UK and EU clashing on occasion, but it is within the govt’s gift to make the ride we are currently on less bumpy and less dangerous.
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Some thoughts on David Frost following his elevation to the Cabinet, why he is perfectly qualified for the job and why that doesn’t mean relations with the EU will improve or that the flaws in the TCA that so many businesses have been pointing out will go away.
First, his qualifications. No-one is better placed on Whitehall to manage future relations with the EU.
This isn't because Frost will crisscross the continent, repairing relations, & befriending leaders from Berlin to Bucharest, & Rome to Riga, but because future relations with the EU will be confined to the frameworks set out in the TCA & the Protocol, treaties Frost negotiated.
I don't think there is anyone in this govt. able to smooth UK/EU relations (they are now confrontational by nature, & will remain so until there is a change of govt).
However, in @DavidGHFrost, govt. have put the most qualified person they have in charge of the relationship. No-one in govt. knows the TCA as well as him, & he is clearly attuned to what the PM wants.
And by making him a Minister, Parl. will have more opportunities to scrutinise him & govt's. approach to the EU relationship. This move allows for a little more transparency (although don't expect govt. to suddenly become an open book).
It has been less than a month since the UK left the single market and the customs union, and the result has been chaos.
Fishers are anchoring their ships and halting the catch because they can no longer sell their product in the EU. Produce is being left to rot because an enormous increase in paperwork means it cannot get to market quickly enough.
Hauliers are stuck in queues at the border or left stranded in the cold and wet in some bleak lorry park in Kent.
Maybe I wasn't listening properly, but I don't recall Brexiteers spending the last four and a half years setting out all the many problems that would be created by Brexit.
Admittedly, they have consistently railed against the protocol, but then again, those Brexiteers in Parliament also enthusiastically voted for it.
So the government is going to ask business yet again, what rules it wants to scrap. Another in a long line of “red tape challenges” and I’ve lived through a few.
There is no legal provisions available to extend the status quo (i.e. the transition). The deadline for doing this passed on 1st July. That's it. Opportunity gone. Now the only options are to end transition with a deal, or without a deal.
So the only way now to extend the status quo is to create a new legal base in international law that make provision for this. This can only be done by: