Joint investigation by @AuroraIntel and me. Last weekend, a ballistic missile fired by the Houthis at Dhahran seems to have impacted in an open field, less than half a mile away from Aramco worker housing. Thread
Last Sunday saw an attack on the tri-city area of Dammam, Dhahran and Khobar with the the Houthis claiming to have attacked targets in Ras Tanura and the Khobar region using drones as well as a single Zulfiqar missile.
A video circulating on social media showed what appear to be interceptor missiles in the sky, as a loud blast can be heard in the background.
And while we are talking about Syrian CW, here's a short thread about the Syrian air force's decentralized chemical weapons production facilities destroyed by the OPCW.
In 2013, the Syrian government declared a large part of its CW program to the OPCW. While its official declaration has remained classified, some UN documents do mention the names of facilities.
This 2013 letter from the UN Secretary General lists a total of 18 fixed chemical weapons facilities and also mentions mobile units. securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF…
So this is quite interesting. If I am correct, the Zoljanah motor test Iran showed us already took place in December 2015. How can we know and what does it mean for Iran's missile and space program? A quick thread.
Let's start with the basic location. The footage was recorded at AIO's large horizontal test stand in Khojir ( 35.653232° 51.658307°) which was built between 2005 and 2008.
The first thing to note is the scorch mark visible in the footage. A scorch mark first appeared at the site in Mar 2015. While it faded and regained strength after testing, it never completely disappeared. So the footage must have been recorded after Mar 2015.
A quick thread on the Tondar 69, a missile that is often forgotten but played an important role in Iranian missile development.
Like so much of Iran's missile program, the history of the Tondar 69 goes back to the Iran-Iraq war when the Iranians were seeking ballistic missiles from a variety of sources. Among them were the Soviet Union and Syria, both of which rebuffed their requests for Scuds.
Libya and the DPRK proved more cooperative but there was also a third country willing to sell ballistic missiles to Tehran – China. For reasons of secrecy, negotiations with the Chinese were held in Thailand and on the Iranian side they included both Moghaddam and Vahid Dastjerdi
And it's time for more Scud history! Here's the story of how Iran began a Scud B reverse-engineering effort and ended up buying a factory from the DPRK. Thread.
Reverse-engineering the Scud was a priority for the Iranians from the very beginning despite the extremely bleak initial prospects for doing so. Moghaddam was obsessed with the idea and when training with his crew in Syria in late 1984...
he actually instructed them to leave their barracks at night under the pretext of holding religious ceremonies. They would sneak into the Syrian warehouses to rasp off material samples of the missiles to be brought back to Iran and analyzed.