Deepak Kapur Profile picture
13 Mar, 13 tweets, 3 min read
A thread on some observations from #Nazaratechnologies DRHP - largely to do with revenue analysis. The IPO notes of i-bankers aren't delving on these points. Since I noticed them, I am putting them out here.

(not an opinion or recco wrt to IPO)
Reported consolidated revenues:

Sep 2020 (6m) = 200 cr (~annualised 400 cr)
Mar 2020 (12m) = 248 cr
Mar 2019 (12m) = 170 cr
Mar 2018 (12 m) = 172 cr
Interesting insight into the 200 cr rev for 6 months ended Sep '20:

1) 79/200 cr is from segment 'gamified early learning'. This entire 79 cr is attributable to subsidiary, paper boat apps: makers of Kiddopia. Nazara owns 51% - acquired in '20. Entire 79 cr rev is from N America
2) 64/200 cr is from esports. of the 64 cr, 54 cr is from Nodwin Gaming, a subsidiary. Nazara has ~ 55% stake in Nodwin. Acqred in '18. Entire 54 cr rev of Nodwin is from India. Recently Korean gaming co Krafton (PUBG fame) invested 110 cr in Nodwin for 10%. & totally owns 16.3%
3) Lastly, of the 200 cr rev in Sep '20 ending P/L, about 37 cr of rev (and 37 cr of cost) is from following (see image). So essentially this 37 cr, is not true operating revenue
So for 6 months ending 2020, the true operating revenue attributable to Nazara shareholders is:

200 - 0.49*79 - 0.45*54 - 37 = 100 cr

So summary of 6m ended Sep 2020 rev:
Reported consolidated: 200 cr
Adjusted attributable to shareholders of Nazara: 100 cr
It's amazing that of the 100 cr half yrly rev attributable to shareholders of Nazara, ~ 70 cr is FROM non wholly owned subsidiaries acquired as recently as 2018 & 2020!

79*0.51 + 54*0.55 = 70

(other recent acquisitions also giving small contribution to revenue)
Basically, Nazara's traditional heavyweight segment for revenues was Telco subscriptions but is in decline:

Consol telco sub rev share:

153 cr of 172 cr total rev - 2018
96 cr of 170 cr total rev - 2019
81 cr of 248 cr total rev - 2020
43 cr of 200 cr half yr rev - Sep 2020
So Nazara of today is largely what it has acquired in last 3 years + the distribution reach it created over the years.

Future of Nazara is hence the future of these & new acquisitions
NODWIN was a gr8 investment. the 55% stake has grown tremendously in value as have revenues over 3 years.

PAPER Boat (Kiddopia app): Also seen growth over the one year, but tough to put a finger on longevity of growth or sustainability of biz. Covid was definitely a tailwind
To me:

A ) Nazara has to b viewed more as an investment co - not operating co. If we don't consider the investments in NODWIN and PAPER BOAT, rev attributable to Nazara shareholders is barely 30 cr for 6 months ended Sep 2020! it's been around 15-20 years!
B) if u r still going to view it as an operating co from PoV of valuation & thinking of applying the Price to Sales ratio to value it then pls note right revenue to apply the multiple to is 100 cr (annualised 200 cr). (u will annualise b4 applying the P/S multiple of ur choice)
Hope there was some info of interest to you in this thread

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More from @tapak7

3 Nov 20
Not one #lauruslabs bull speaks or deep dives the balance sheet.

So as someone with no position (past, current or expected in future) in LL I am going to highlight a red flag 🚩 - that's bothering me

A short thread....
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C&CE (cr)
Mar 17 - 4
Mar 18 - 3
Mar 19 - 3
Mar 20 - 2
Sep 20- 2

vs Sales (cr)
Mar 17 - 1900
Mar 18 - 2050
Mar 19 - 2300
Mar 20 - 2850
Sep 20 - 4200 (annualised)
The working capital of #lauruslabs (Inventory + Trade Receivables - Trade Payables):

Sep 2020: 1250 cr
Mar 2020: 1080 cr
Mar 2019: 900 cr

To support its recent & projected growth, JUST THE incremental WC need is almost 1 cr per day !!
Read 13 tweets
17 Sep 20
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So was Red Hat that did a IPO in 1999 : a short thread👇
In Aug '99 #RedHat went public. IPO~ $14. IPO day close~ $52.

Outstanding shares end August ~ 66.6 mn. ttm revenue ~ $13 mn. Loss making

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Mcap $3.5 bn
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ttm P/S ~ 270x
By Nov/Dec the shares had touched ~ $140. Mcap > $10 bn

Due to exercise of ESOPS & conversion of preferred shares to common stock the total outstanding shares jumped to 153 mn by end Feb 2000

28 Feb 1999 shares were trading down at ~ $44. Mcap ~ $6.7 bn
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some thoughts...
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I explain:
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With this rigid margining system, in a rapidly falling market, NBFCs r forced to sell collateralised shares if clients can't meet margin requirements within mandated time frames. While forced selling is theoretically possible, r markets clearly lack ability to absorb this selling
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