This headline could have been written in 2008, 2009, 2016, or 2017. If U.S. troops stay in Afghanistan, U.S. military commanders will say the same thing the next time a U.S. President tries to pull them the troops of this useless civil war. It’s the same thing, over and over.
It’s the same old argument. Senior U.S. military commanders are broken records. Interview McKenzie or Miller, and they will subtly suggest that extending the U.S. military presence will hold Afghanistan’s peace process together. Ask “how so?” & they will struggle for an answer.
I’ve seen countless claims over the last two weeks about why sticking to the May 1 withdrawal date in the U.S.-Taliban accord would be a disaster for Afghanistan. There has been virtually no talk about the risk of disregarding that deadline. The debate is heavily skewed.
Earlier this week, Max Boot had a column explaining why getting the U.S. out of endless wars involved a lot of risk. washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump… I sent a letter to the editor in response. The WaPo decided didn’t run it, so I’m posting it here for anyone who might be interested.
“In his latest column, Max Boot lectures his readers about the dangers & pitfalls of withdrawing U.S. troops from countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. Yet nowhere in his piece does he spend a second acknowledging the dangers and pitfalls of staying in any of these areas.
The American people, however, have seen the pitfalls on a daily basis. They see it in news reports of casualties in Afghanistan, where 13,000 U.S. troops are still fighting and dying in a war that has been on an endless loop over the last 19 years. They see it in the trillions...
General Boot, assessing the situation thousands of miles away in his Washington, D.C. luxury apartment.
Here’s the deal: the U.S. didn’t intervene Afghanistan to bolster human rights, women’s rights, democratic rights, or any rights. It intervened to clobber UBL’s Al-Qaeda.
That job was accomplished in the first few months. By the winter of 2002, the Taliban were hunkered down; Al-Qaeda’s infrastructure was eradicated; its fighters were cold, bleeding, and wondering where their sheikh was; and the Taliban were begging to negotiate.
Instead of calling a win a win, we stupidly decided to change the mission completely into building a democracy, a national army, a functioning government, and a sustainable Afghan economy. Terrorist hunting became nation-building, which eventually turned into strategic myopia.
Over the last few days, I’ve gotten a few emails and messages asking why I’ve been all worked up over this Iran thing. Others have said I’ve gotten too personal in my attacks. So, without further ado, I’ll try to explain myself a bit and tell you where the angst is coming from.
I’ll preface this by saying that I’m honored many of these people think I’m so important (I’m not) and have so much influence (I definitely don’t).
My favorite targets are Dubowitz (really, everybody at FDD), Boot, Pompeo, Bolton, Trump, Michael Rubin, Cotton & Graham.
I’m going hard after them b/c every person on this list (there are more) has helped create the current pool of shit we are swimming in right now. This is a self-inflicted disaster of epic proportions, initiated by the laughably poor advice & actions of each of these people.
Let’s not beat around the bush: the Trump administration’s Iran policy is fuck*d. It’s wrong from all directions.
Pulling out from the JCPOA was monumentally stupid. If the objective is to prevent Iran from getting a nuke, why leave a deal that helps do exactly that?
The JCPOA is likely dead. Congratulations FDD, you got your wish! But what has the U.S. gotten out of it? Not a damn thing other than a lot of pissed off allies and partners who are scratching their heads and wondering if we’ve gone nuts.
But enough about the JCPOA. What about the administration’s maximum pressure policy? What are the benefits there? Again, nothing. Crimping the Iranian economy is not success. Success would be Iran becoming the “normal nation” we would like it to be (ie do everything we want).
A few bare-bones thoughts on the upcoming Trump-Kim summit in a week’s time. I feel like I’m beating a dead horse here because people smarter than I have already made these observations, but bear with me.
First, the ugly:
The administration’s diplomatic strategy depends on which official you talk to. Trump says he isn’t in a rush. Biegun says it will be a process involving step-by-step concessions. And a senior admin official (Bolton?) says DC not interested in incrementalism(2).
All of this mixed messaging not only looks juvenile for those keeping score, but it’s also confusing to the North Koreans. Kim may very well be listening to all of this and wondering whether Biegun is actually speaking for Trump when he talks to his representatives (3)