Wait a minute. Say what you will but Trump Admin was 💪 on Taiwan . Blaming US *attempt to focus* & clarity on need to confront China for China’s aggressiveness against 🇹🇼 is frankly absurd. Beijing is menacing all by itself. Trump Admin recognized need to address the problem. 1/
The notion that US caused China to want to invade b/c strengthening our defense capability & signaling resolve is ridiculous. China’s ambitions re Taiwan are driven much more by: 1) revanchism, 2) Taiwan’s value on way to regional hegemony, 3) PRC +++ military power. 3/
BTW, who is talking about independence declaration by Taiwan??? Haven’t seen anything about that. @iingwen seems v prudent on this uber sensitive point.
These quotes from anonymous “defense officials” don’t hold up. 🤨4/
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I welcome debate w @HalBrands & @ZackCooper & this important contribution! But I think lets have the debate where it actually is. Tho they link to Bob/my piece (foreignaffairs.com/articles/unite…) as opposing "realism" example, their piece isnt engage w our actual arg. Some egs&thoughts. 1/
Our arg is that competition w/China isn't ***primarily*** ideological. Used word 5 times in article. World is complex so ideology et al play a role in int'l politics but our point was that primary driver is state power. Not trying to be cute - we made clear arg for primacy of 2/
state power in intl politics - but that's different than "purging ideology from American statecraft." Ditto: "Better, these analysts argue, to approach the rivalry in realpolitik terms—as a cold-eyed contest over power." In fact we said "We are not proposing a one-dimensional" 3/
I'm a huge Max Hastings fan so ☹️ to see this. A number of points I have w his piece but the bottom line is this: The *WORST* US policy is half-pregnancy, which keeps our cred attach to Taiwan but doesn't resource ability to defend it. This is most dangerous & damaging if war. 1/
If Taiwan isn't worth it &/or too costly/risky to defend, we should ensure our cred isn't attached - which it now is. But if we leave this vulnerable part of our perimeter ill-defended, China has *even more of an incentive* to challenge it - beyond just revanchism. 2/
If Hastings & Blackwill/Zelikow think that, then the right policy for them should be to *abandon* Taiwan. Deftly, diplomatically, etc. but still to extricate our cred from its fate. Not ambiguity. That wld minimize the damage to our cred in Asia. 3/
Quite extraordinary @POTUS speech #MSC2021. V liberal hawk. 🌍view basically ideological - systemic clash b/democs vs. authoritarians, *both* 🇨🇳&🇷🇺. Strategy based on big big bet that democs will align, yet signal is burden-sharing talk is hortatory. 1/
Don't take it from me. Here's @POTUS: "We are in a fundamental debate about the future & direction of our world. We’re at an inflection point b/ those who argue that autocracy is the best way forward & those who understand that democracy is essential..." 2/
"I believe that — every ounce of my being — that democracy will and must prevail. We must demonstrate that democracies can still deliver for our people in this changed world. That, in my view, is our galvanizing mission. 3/
It's one thing to think last Admin was too tough on allies re burden sharing. But it doesn't make sense to go back to *saying* allies needed to do more but *clearly telegraphing* there will be little to no consequences for failing to shoulder their part of the burden. Some egs 1/
SD "charms NATO allies" & "mood lovey-dovey" according to @herszenhorn. "US sounded like friend...felt refreshing... participants in the meeting said." SD "emphasized that [allies'] contributions are also measured by how used, not just by size." 2/
SD "offered a message of thanks and urged [allies] to keep up the good work." Does that sound like pressure on allies to spend more? Not to me. Sounds like telegraphing 0 consequences for free-riding. How's that going to enable focus on PRC/Asia? How's that fair to Americans? 3/
There is some valuable analysis in this report, but on the defense front this report is deeply flawed. There are other sections of value in report but, candidly, I don't think it helps us think through critical question of Taiwan defense issues in clear & well-grounded way. 1/
Normally as it might seem churlish to be so critical, but @cfr is so high-profile & the co-authors so distinguished I think it’s key to be clear. If not, people - including in Beijing - could get the wrong idea & this report could do real harm if influential on defense issues. 2/
BLUF: The defense discussion in this report does not engage at the depth needed to add to this critical debate. Accordingly conclusions in report are ill-founded - & in key parts harmful/misleading, esp that US shldnt be prepared defend Taiwan directly (alongside own efforts). 3/
I make the case why Taiwan is defensible & why US shld defend it in @WSJopinion: wsj.com/articles/ameri…. No 2 ways abt it: V. tough to do, BUT can be done IF it's overriding DOD priority. Esp crucial w/new admin, assertive PRC & many influential voices saying it's impossible. 1/
Defending Taiwan key for 2 reasons: 1) critical geography in first island chain; otherwise China can project power freely into WestPac; 2) US differentiated credibility - US word clearly on the line in Asia ilo TRA, 6 Assurncs, long record of standing w TWN agnst PRC coercion. 2/
For these reasons, the recently declassified 2018 Indo-Pacific strategy specifically ordered the Pentagon to implement a defense strategy that will make the U.S. capable of defending Taiwan.