I welcome debate w @HalBrands & @ZackCooper & this important contribution! But I think lets have the debate where it actually is. Tho they link to Bob/my piece (foreignaffairs.com/articles/unite…) as opposing "realism" example, their piece isnt engage w our actual arg. Some egs&thoughts. 1/
Our arg is that competition w/China isn't ***primarily*** ideological. Used word 5 times in article. World is complex so ideology et al play a role in int'l politics but our point was that primary driver is state power. Not trying to be cute - we made clear arg for primacy of 2/
state power in intl politics - but that's different than "purging ideology from American statecraft." Ditto: "Better, these analysts argue, to approach the rivalry in realpolitik terms—as a cold-eyed contest over power." In fact we said "We are not proposing a one-dimensional" 3/
"realpolitik. The United States must stand for freedom, republican government, and human dignity." Our point was that US must see balance of power as key dynamic, not that ideology is wholly irrelevant or should be purged from US FP. 4/
Moreover, their argument fails to acknowledge that US *use* of ideology as element of FP *primarily motivated by geopolitical concerns* is wholly consistent w our argument. They accuse us of ignoring freedom's role in mobilizing Americans & drawing others to our side. 5/
Hence we said "Standing for these values will draw others around the world to the U.S. banner, help demonstrate the dangers of bowing to Beijing, and provide a motivating force to collective efforts." Obvi not call to go overboard, but realists can leverage our ideol/HR edge. 6/
They argued "a strategy that requires the United States to cast aside its values and ideals would be unwise and unrealistic." Ok! We said: "The United States can and should certainly emphasize respect for human dignity and political rights as a way to distinguish itself..." 7/
"from China. But policymakers must maintain a clear-eyed perspective and be selective, especially when the stakes are so high." So this smacks of strawmanning. I wouldn't mind if it weren't using our article as the basis for it! 😉 8/
Here's the rub: There's a real argument in here. As the authors state, prudence & compromise our part of FP - we can blend "ideology & realpolitik". 👍👏 The ? here is *how* central is ideology in how we see the stakes and what we emphasize in our FP. 9/
I assume they think ideology is a lot more central & key in the competition & for our FP than Bob & I argued. Ok! But then let's carry their point to its conclusion. We can't be safe unless PRC is a lib dem, right? But they blink! Say that fear is "innacurate" on part of PRC. 10/
Why? If ideology is so central (not just as a useful tool but as what's *really* going on in the world), then doesn't it make a *HUGE* difference that PRC is a Leninist state? So wouldn't it logically follow that we should seek regime change, however prudently? 11/
If all they're saying is US should leverage its advantages as democracy etc for geopolitical purposes w/in reason, GREAT! Totally on board! Matter of proportion & doing then - prudential. But this debate should go deeper. How important is China's ideology to its behavior? 12/
How important is it that our allies & partners are lib dems? Are we in a "techno-dems vs. techno-auths" world? They hand wave this *crucial* point w point that Vietnam et al will have no choice. But this is a huge issue *esp* if hard power matters most & thus Asia is esp key. 13/
Are we assembling a "democratic coalition" motivated w "ideology at the center of the competition" as they suggest? Or shld we put together a more ecumenical grouping motivated by shared fears? Again, matter of degree in practice but lucidity good from outsiders IME. 14/
Final point: They say Bob & I are "self-described foreign policy 'realists.'” Can't we just be realists? Didn't know it was *such* a desirable moniker! As Kissinger says, only in America is calling someone a realist considered an epithet! 16/
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Wait a minute. Say what you will but Trump Admin was 💪 on Taiwan . Blaming US *attempt to focus* & clarity on need to confront China for China’s aggressiveness against 🇹🇼 is frankly absurd. Beijing is menacing all by itself. Trump Admin recognized need to address the problem. 1/
The notion that US caused China to want to invade b/c strengthening our defense capability & signaling resolve is ridiculous. China’s ambitions re Taiwan are driven much more by: 1) revanchism, 2) Taiwan’s value on way to regional hegemony, 3) PRC +++ military power. 3/
I'm a huge Max Hastings fan so ☹️ to see this. A number of points I have w his piece but the bottom line is this: The *WORST* US policy is half-pregnancy, which keeps our cred attach to Taiwan but doesn't resource ability to defend it. This is most dangerous & damaging if war. 1/
If Taiwan isn't worth it &/or too costly/risky to defend, we should ensure our cred isn't attached - which it now is. But if we leave this vulnerable part of our perimeter ill-defended, China has *even more of an incentive* to challenge it - beyond just revanchism. 2/
If Hastings & Blackwill/Zelikow think that, then the right policy for them should be to *abandon* Taiwan. Deftly, diplomatically, etc. but still to extricate our cred from its fate. Not ambiguity. That wld minimize the damage to our cred in Asia. 3/
Quite extraordinary @POTUS speech #MSC2021. V liberal hawk. 🌍view basically ideological - systemic clash b/democs vs. authoritarians, *both* 🇨🇳&🇷🇺. Strategy based on big big bet that democs will align, yet signal is burden-sharing talk is hortatory. 1/
Don't take it from me. Here's @POTUS: "We are in a fundamental debate about the future & direction of our world. We’re at an inflection point b/ those who argue that autocracy is the best way forward & those who understand that democracy is essential..." 2/
"I believe that — every ounce of my being — that democracy will and must prevail. We must demonstrate that democracies can still deliver for our people in this changed world. That, in my view, is our galvanizing mission. 3/
It's one thing to think last Admin was too tough on allies re burden sharing. But it doesn't make sense to go back to *saying* allies needed to do more but *clearly telegraphing* there will be little to no consequences for failing to shoulder their part of the burden. Some egs 1/
SD "charms NATO allies" & "mood lovey-dovey" according to @herszenhorn. "US sounded like friend...felt refreshing... participants in the meeting said." SD "emphasized that [allies'] contributions are also measured by how used, not just by size." 2/
SD "offered a message of thanks and urged [allies] to keep up the good work." Does that sound like pressure on allies to spend more? Not to me. Sounds like telegraphing 0 consequences for free-riding. How's that going to enable focus on PRC/Asia? How's that fair to Americans? 3/
There is some valuable analysis in this report, but on the defense front this report is deeply flawed. There are other sections of value in report but, candidly, I don't think it helps us think through critical question of Taiwan defense issues in clear & well-grounded way. 1/
Normally as it might seem churlish to be so critical, but @cfr is so high-profile & the co-authors so distinguished I think it’s key to be clear. If not, people - including in Beijing - could get the wrong idea & this report could do real harm if influential on defense issues. 2/
BLUF: The defense discussion in this report does not engage at the depth needed to add to this critical debate. Accordingly conclusions in report are ill-founded - & in key parts harmful/misleading, esp that US shldnt be prepared defend Taiwan directly (alongside own efforts). 3/
I make the case why Taiwan is defensible & why US shld defend it in @WSJopinion: wsj.com/articles/ameri…. No 2 ways abt it: V. tough to do, BUT can be done IF it's overriding DOD priority. Esp crucial w/new admin, assertive PRC & many influential voices saying it's impossible. 1/
Defending Taiwan key for 2 reasons: 1) critical geography in first island chain; otherwise China can project power freely into WestPac; 2) US differentiated credibility - US word clearly on the line in Asia ilo TRA, 6 Assurncs, long record of standing w TWN agnst PRC coercion. 2/
For these reasons, the recently declassified 2018 Indo-Pacific strategy specifically ordered the Pentagon to implement a defense strategy that will make the U.S. capable of defending Taiwan.