Thread on #Mozambique: 1) Since 24 Mar news of a multi-pronged militant attack on the town of #Palma in northern Mozambique have made international headlines, with reports of ongoing clashes, fatalities, displacement & militants capturing, at least temporarily, parts of Palma
2) But #ISIS, which has affiliated fighters in the region and operates through its so-called Central Africa Province branch, has yet to make any comment on the events. In fact, ISIS hasn't claimed any activity in Mozambique in nearly 5 months, since 1 Nov.
3) After a series of deadly raids on and a brief capture of villages and towns in Cabo Delgado (where Palma is also based) in 2020 - namely in March, April, May, June, August and late October - IS went quiet about its operations in the province
4) It's unclear if IS has continued its activity in Mozambique without publicly parading it, for reasons unknown to us. Last year it was similarly late in claiming big attacks in Cabo Delgado that made int. headlines, or it downplayed the nature of the attack when reporting it
5) Such delays could be down to communication difficulties between militants in Mozambique and IS's central media apparatus, or they could be linked to operational considerations
6) IS commonly relegates delayed claims to the pages of its weekly paper al-Naba, including previous late claims on Mozambique. However, the latest issue of al-Naba, which was released late on 25 March, carried no news on Mozambique
7) Militant violence in Cabo Delgado predates IS’ emergence in Jun 2019 when IS appeared to have co-opted local Islamist militants. They were known as Ansar al-Sunna (aka Ahlu al-Sunna Wa-Hamo), & locally called “al-Shabab" (not linked to Somali-based al-Shabab).
#ISIS has finally claimed responsibility for capturing the town of Palma in #Mozambique. Says it killed 55 ppl including soldiers, Christians and “foreign contractors”. Claims it seized gov buildings, factories & banks. Claim made five after days after militant attack started
9) ISIS has released a brief video claiming to show a large gathering of its militants after capturing the town of Palma in northern Mozambique. The militants are not in any uniform but many wear red head bands - a battlefield headdress that signifies important raids.
In the latest issue of its weekly paper al-Naba, IS said the Mozambican military had completely cut off all communications between Palma and the outside world from the start of the attack. IS may have deliberately added this info to explain why it was late in claiming the raid.
10) In the latest issue of its weekly paper al-Naba, IS led coverage with the Palma raid but failed to offer significant additional original info about the op. Instead, it gleefully highlighted the international media attention given to the offensive: monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c202h4…
11) Via al-Naba, IS said the attack was launched from Mocimboa da Praia - possibly in response to doubts cast about image IS shared on 29 Mar claiming to be from inside Palma but had sign 'Mocimboa da Praia'. Claimed army imposed comms siege, possibly to justify delay in claim
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🧵On latest IS message about events in Syria, featured in the editorial of the group's weekly publication al-Naba on 12 Dec (and covered in detail, with insight and context in BBCM output: )monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b0002y…
1/ IS says it will continue its “jihad” in Syria, claiming the HTS-led Islamist authority was imposed through “infidel” intervention and won’t establish Islamic rule. IS compared HTS to the Taliban in Afghanistan, using similar arguments to justify ongoing attacks there
2/ IS welcomed the release of "Muslim prisoners" from Assad’s jails but didn’t specify if IS members were among them. Online, IS supporters hinted some members may have been freed but warned against sharing sensitive details. Others called for exploiting unrest to target prisons and camps holding IS members in NE Syria
🧵on reports and clips of revenge attacks against alleged former gov/military personnel and "Shabiha" (Assad henchmen) in Syria
1/ On 9 Dec, the HTS-led rebel authority in Damascus issued a decree granting amnesty to military conscripts and foot soldiers not implicated in human rights abuses
2/ This sparked anger among some hardline Islamists in Syria and online, particularly on Telegram. Critics called the stance weak, unfair to victims, incompatible with Sharia, and an attempt to appease the West
1/ The current HTS-led rebel offensive in Syria is making waves, not just for its relatively swift territorial gains, but for the relatively widespread support it’s getting among pro-opposition voices. This includes segments of the local population, journalists, activists, clerics, and militants (as far as I can gauge from social media activity and online debates on X's Spaces tool - despite dissenting voices and some critics in pro-opposition spaces)
2/ Over the past years, one of the biggest challenges for the Syrian opposition has been disunity: fragmentation, factionalism, and the involvement of global jihadist groups that severely weakened the revolutionary cause
3/ What sets this offensive apart is the relative unity - despite smaller existing frictions/rivalries - and broad support the rebels have achieved. Despite cautious criticism of HTS and its leader Jawlani fronting the offensive, this unity is seen as a potential game-changer
1/ The HTS-linked Islamist rebel authority in Syria has launched a well-coordinated PR campaign aimed at projecting a sense of professionalism, transparency, and moderation while distancing itself from its jihadist roots. Through official messaging, it has sought to reassure a broad spectrum of key players and populations
2/ Notably, the rebels have made efforts to pacify potential adversaries like Russia and Iraq, emphasising that they mean no harm to these nations and aspire to establish positive future relations with them. This is clearly part of a strategy to diplomatically isolate the Assad government. A similar message was directed at the Kurdish-led SDF forces in Aleppo, urging them to withdraw to the northeast. The rebels assured the Kurds of their respect and described them as an integral part of Syria’s social fabric, underscoring a commitment to inclusivity
3/ The campaign also includes outreach to religious minorities, including Christians and Shias, emphasising protection, respect, and inclusion. Diplomatic missions and the media have received messages portraying the rebels as pragmatic actors willing to engage constructively on a national and international stage
1/Rebel groups in northern Syria have announced a new offensive, named "Repelling the Aggression", targeting government forces in western Aleppo. They claim to have already captured a string of villages. There a number of interesting points about this op:
2/ The offensive has been supported by a highly coordinated and well-organised media campaign mostly run by propagandists linked to the Idlib-based militant group HTS
3/ HTS is clearly playing a central role in this offensive, yet for some reason it has kept its name and that of the operations room it leads, al-Fatah al-Mubin, out of the official branding of the new campaign
1/ The AQAP statement of 20 Oct mourning the killing of of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar is not the first from al-Qaeda to lament the death of a Hamas leader, but the first to openly weigh in on the jihadist/Islamist ideological divisions over Hamas
2/ The important Yemen branch urged jihadists/Islamists to set aside their reservations about Hamas, which it did not name, and come together in support of the Palestinian cause. It expressed its "astonishment" and disappointment that "some" would not even offer words of support due to their ideological differences with Hamas. Al-Qaeda's South Asia branch (AQIS) also issued condolences over Sinwar and mentioned Hamas by name
3/ It remains to be seen if the new AQAP message will calm divisions between pragmatic and hardline jihadists, or cause a further rift. In April, an al-Qaeda message of condolences to Ismail Haniyeh over the death of some of his family members triggered a strong backlash against al-Qaeda by some of its own supporters