There's a lot that can be said about the CA6's Meriwether opinion, most of it way outside my expertise. But just one small thought about the para below. If the prof thinks that taking attendance is deeply wrong, wouldn't that make refusal ideological? opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/2…
Calling roll sends a message, that the school is in charge: A student's presence in class is critical, the school says, whether the student wants to be there or not. Many profs disagree w/this message, though. They think students should be allowed to attend or not as they wish.
If a professor thinks it is critical to learning that the environment be open, and not compelled, the professor may think it important to send the message that attendance is *not* required. They may not want to call roll for an ideological reason.
Granted, there is no broader public debate right now over whether attendance should be required. Professors have strong ideological views about it, but it's not of broad interest outside the classroom. But I don't know if that makes a 1st Amendment difference.
To be clear, I don't have any views on what is ultimately protected or not protected. That's a 1A question outside my expertise. But whatever the answer is, I don't think I'm persuaded by the court's way of distinguishing the roll call hypo. /end
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
In dicta, magistrate judge concludes that govt use of a cell site simulator is a search requiring a warrant because it might be used to locate a phone in a place where there's an REP. (DDC, 3/25/21) (Faruqui, M.J)
First, why it's dicta: The issue arose when the government applied for a warrant, so no one was trying to conduct surveillance without a warrant. (Also, I don't tend to think Article III allows a merits ruling like this now, as how the 4A applies is not yet a ripe dispute.)
On the merits, the court's conclusion that a search occurs if a search might occur -- if a tool might be used to conduct a search -- seems wrong in light of United States v. Karo, which limited but did not overturn Knotts. scholar.google.com/scholar_case?c…
A bit about the federal law of enticement and so-called traveler cases, which may be of interest in light of the story below. nytimes.com/2021/03/30/us/…
Every state has age of consent laws, prohibiting sexual intercourse with a person under the age of consent. The age of consent varies by state, generally being 16, 17, or 18. See the chart here: aspe.hhs.gov/report/statuto…
Federal law makes certain interstate conduct done with intent to commit such crimes a federal crime. For example, 18 U.S.C. 2423 makes it a crime to transport a person under 18 in interstate commerce w/ intent to engage in an illegal sexual act. law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18…
Supreme Court rules 5-3 in Torres v. Madrid that “application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure, even if the force does not succeed in subduing the person.” SupremeCourt.gov/opinions/20pdf…#n
An expected result, although a closer vote than I expected, based on the argument. More tweet commentary soon.
A few quick thoughts now. First, this seems like a really narrow ruling. It's always been clear that "application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain" is a seizure when the police succeed in stopping the person, temporarily, and that's most cases.
Here's thread on today's oral argument in Caniglia v. Strom, on the community caretaking exception. Thread will be thoughts on the argument, not an overview of the case, which others have done.
First up, Roberts questioning counsel for petitioner, the plaintiff in the civil case. Roberts starts with what I think is plaintiff's hardest hypo: what about wellness checks on seniors who haven't been heard from? Not a surprising question.
If I understood P's argument, their position is that you can't search to do a wellness check, but eventually, after a few days, there will be probable cause to get a warrant to search for a missing person.
I don't have a clear view of how Carp should apply to pole cameras -- hard Q, I think -- but I thought DOJ's arg should have been simpler than it was. Best arg for DOJ, I think, is "Carpenter is about an REP in the whole of a person's movements, and a pole camera doesn't move."
From the govt's perspective, that's your limiting principle in a pole camera case, I think: Carpenter is only about the whole of movements, and it doesn't apply to a camera fixed on one place. (May or may not persuade a particular court, but I think it's the govt's best arg.)