"firmly safeguard the normal economic and trade cooperation between China and Iran and its legitimate rights and interests"
"If the extraterritorial application of relevant foreign laws and measures violates international law and basic norms of international relations,
and damages the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens, legal persons or other organizations, China will carry out relevant work in accordance with relevant legal provisions, and firmly safeguard national sovereignty, security & development interests"
Two days after the press con, China signed a 25-year comprehensive cooperation agreement with Iran, which includes deals on Iranian oil subject to US sanctions. This would be a classical situation envisaged in China's Blocking Statute, i.e.:
"The extraterritorial application of foreign laws violates int'l law & basic norms of int'l relations, and unduly prohibits or restricts Chinese citizens, legal persons or other organizations from conducting normal economic, trade and related activities with third countries".
If the Blocking Statute is invoked this time, many big companies will be put between a rock and a hard place, as I mentioned in my @nytimes interview on the Blocking Statute when it first came out. nytimes.com/2021/01/09/bus…
As I mentioned in same interview, China wanted to use the Blocking Statute to deter the new administration from behaving like Trump, but as Biden started to unveil trade policies, such hopes are dashed, as many of the Trump-era policies were maintained or even strengthened.
For example, @USTradeRep's 2021 National Trade Estimate Report issued on Mar 31 praised Trump-made “Phase 1 Agreement" as "an (sic) historic economic and trade agreement" with "a strong dispute resolution system that ensures prompt and effective implementation and enforcement"
This is also confirmed by @AmbassadorTai's interview with the @WSJ on Mar 28, where she confirmed that “no negotiator walks away from leverage", but “every good negotiator retains his or her leverage to use it"! wsj.com/articles/new-t…
So if the US is retaining Trump-era trade restrictions as leverage, they shouldn't be surprised that China starts to use its Blocking Statute as leverage.
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Let me try to translate USTR-designate Katherine Tai's opening statement before Senate Finance Committee:
"I previously served as America’s chief enforcer against China’s unfair trade practices":
I've taken WTO cases against China, and won (see rare earth).
/1
"I know firsthand how critically important it is that we have a strategic and coherent plan for holding China accountable to its promises and effectively competing with its model of state-directed economics":
Trade agreements are not just for soybeans. There will be more.
/2
"I know the opportunities and limitations in our existing toolbox".
I will make full use of the existing tools: trade remedies, Sec 301, national security...you name it.
I will also beef up the existing rules.
/3
MOFCOM just issued some interesting clarification on the Chinese Blocking Statute: 1. Injunctions prohibiting firms and individuals from recognizing, enforcing and complying with foreign sanctions only apply to Chines entities, NOT foreign entities;
2. Entities harming interests of Chinese entities by complying with foreign sanctions only include Chinese entities; 3. But entities benefiting from foreign judgments include both Chinese and third-country entities.
To illustrate with examples: 1. US issues sanctions against Chinese entity A dealing with third-country entities B. MOFCOM issues injunction against compliance with the sanction. Only Chinese entity C is required to comply with the injunction. But not third-country entity D.
MOFCOM just issued its first order for 2021: Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures. Key message:
We are going to prohibit firms from complying with foreign laws prohibiting transactions with Chinese firms.
Key provisions: 1. The legislative basis is National Security Law; 2. Chinese firms and individuals are required to report foreign sanctions; 3. MOFCOM may issue injunctions prohibiting firms and individuals from recognizing, enforcing and complying with foreign sanctions.
4. Chinese firms suffering loss from another party's compliance with foreign sanctions can sue for damages in Chinese courts.
Thanks @loyaladvisor for this. This would be the most detailed info on the #CAI before the text is out. Here are a few gems I found in the internet sector:
1. Cloud services "will now be open to EU investors subject to a 50% equity cap". Good for EU but they are late to the Party, as Amazon AMS has been in China since 6 years ago;
2. The ‘technology neutrality' clause, which ensures that equity caps imposed for telecom VAS won't be applied to other online services such as financial, logistics, medical etc. AFAIK these have never been regarded as VAS to start with and never been subject to VAS equity caps.
The decision is hardly surprising, but there are two interesting points in the panel report: 1. Whether the Phase 1 deal constitutes a mutually agreed solution; 2. whether the US tariffs could be justified under the public morals exception.
The first one was easy, while the second one is more tricky, as the US measures were allegedly taken against IP theft, misappropriation and unfair competition by China. The Panel ruled against the US, not because the US couldn't do so, but due to the lack of nexus and necessity.
I'm most amused by the argument by China that the criminalization of a conduct under domestic law doesn't really provide sufficient justification for invoking public morals exception. I wonder if its lawyers ever realized that this argu could be used against China in another case