Thread by @timwalker919

Interesting as I immediately thought of the fact that RENAMO received significant seaborne supply/support via Apartheid South African Navy and Recces - as outlined in detail in Iron Fist from the Sea by Arne Söderlund and Douw Steyn @JonathanBallPub

https://twitter.com/jsphctrl/status/1381514175030104064

Seaborne/maritime tactics and operations could be very important to the Cabo Delgado insurgency too. There are significant geopolitical and economic implications should the Mozambican government lose control over the Cabo Delgado coastal and offshore areas.

A huge humanitarian tragedy is also unfolding in a region infamous for crimes at sea/maritime routes and smuggling

While the prospects for adequate force generation/preparation and Regional Maritime security cooperation appear limited, they potentially offer decision-makers with the means of compensating for the limitations of ground forces and logistics

Thus degrading and severing a lifeline that armed groups are increasingly using and complementing/enabling conflict resolution and humanitarian measures on land too.

The lack of control and vulnerability of islands and littoral waters surrenders the strategic initiative to the insurgents and providing them with maritime assault and resupply options they should never be allowed to consider in the first place

The LNG sector in Mozambique is likely to be restricted for the foreseeable future to offshore floating facilities above the Coral South gas field in Area Four. @eni is operating it's permanently moored floating liquefied natural gas vessel 50km offshore from Cabo Delgado

Guided by some of the lights that Joseph Hanlon has earlier provided (Mozambique’s Frelimo gambled everything on gas – and lost) - then isn't increasingly likely that this becomes a new target?

Especially (referring back to the first tweet of what became this thread) that Hanlon suggests from Mozambique'sMozambique's history that direct attacks are not required/imperative in a strategy, but rather disruption and harassment is often preferred and...effective?

I am not saying there are signs of an independent maritime strategy or that it is undertaken operations driven/motivated by a specific maritime strategic or operational imperative. Rather, as Martin Murphy suggests in general, it is sensible to remain alive to the possibilities.

What I am saying is the lack of local maritime/naval response or withdrawal of SADC navies (such as the South African Navy) could alter the strategic situation by encouraging tactical adaptation if this LNG site becomes the strategic centre of gravity for Mozambique's economy.

I should add that I am keen to discuss this further - here or through other platforms and apologies too if some points stated above are not well explained enough yet!

dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-0…

Worthwhile to include the full quote I am referring to (pg 275 of @HurstPublishers 'Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money')

@Jasminechic00 and @ACLEDINFO already suggested in June 2020 that insurgents are showing a propensity for moving by ship, and that access to the coast is important to them. They can make frequent use of the sea for these unspectacular logistical purposes acleddata.com/2020/06/16/cab…

@timbenbow1 @DSD_Kings - your 2007 article ' Maritime Forces and Counter-insurgency' in @CSP_journal is helping guide my thinking on this too
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…

@threadreaderapp unroll

Can you outline something in detail?!?