While we wait for the protests to kick off, it's worth spending a bit more time looking at the economic aspects of Putin's speech today.
TL;DR: It's underwhelming, but informative.
/1
For context: Broadly speaking, Russia has an economic problem, but not a fiscal one. The budget is in deficit but the fiscal position is strong, as are reserves, and the country can afford to borrow (even despite US sanctions on sovereign debt).
/2
GDP growth is unstable and anemic -- the headline projection of 3.8% is unimpressive, given what happened in 2020 (and projections of 5-6% in more mature markets).
/3
More problematically, most of that growth settles in the pockets of corporates and the super rich, rather than individuals. Thus, real disposable incomes (after inflation, rent/mortgage, taxes and utilities) have remained flat since around 2014.
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Putin and his team have long prized sound fiscal and monetary management, and they do that well. Russia's budget has remained austere -- and even with all of the spending announced today, spending as a portion of GDP is likely to stay restrained.
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But it's worth looking at where the new spending will go. A chunk of it will go to direct payments to individuals, which will of course be welcome by those individuals, but these are not amounts sufficient to spur a consumption boom.
/6
This is in keeping with long-standing policy: Aside from pensioners and civil servants, the gov't avoids too much involvement with ordinary Russians' pocketbooks: income taxes are low, and so are welfare payments.
/7
Likewise, the gov't largely avoided replacing incomes lost during the pandemic (leaning instead on employers to keep paying people).
/8
A lot of the direct investment Putin announced is focused on building or repairing things: schools, museums, apartment buildings, and, to a lesser extent, roads. A lot of this is badly needed, but very little - except maybe the roads - will have a real impact on growth.
/9
The announced spending will, however, move a lot of money - from both public and private coffers - into the hands of the construction sector, which has become an important part of the polit-econ food chain, competing with resource co's and banks for rents and influence.
/10
Other moves may help spur a bit more investment, in two ways. One is to subsidize lending, for housing, infrastructure and tourism. Another is to move sub-sovereign debt onto the federal books.
/11
Using the ability of the fed gov't to borrow more cheaply than anyone else in Russia does make good sense, but it's impact is likely to be limited -- not least because the beneficiaries will mostly be other parts of the gov't and well-connected corporates.
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Unless I missed it (and please flag if I did!), Putin said nothing about boosting business investment, productivity, trade, etc. In other words, it was all about reallocating money that is already in the economy, rather than creating new productivity and prosperity.
/13
Now, don't get me wrong: redistribution is great, and there's a lot of room for it in Russia (as in the US, UK and a lot of other places). If done on a large enough scale, moving money from the top to the middle and bottom of the economy could create a lot of new activity.
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But nothing proposed today speaks to that level of redistributive ambition -- and nothing suggests that Putin is about to go after the elite's sources of rents.
/15
Perhaps most telling, then, is the fact that Putin said nothing about the impact all of this would have on the economy overall: nothing about rising growth or incomes, nothing about the number of jobs created. Just the amount of homes built and money handed out.
/16
Gone are the days of "catching up to Portugal" in per capita GDP, or doubling GDP overall. Absent are the ambitious targets for reducing poverty and improving standards of living.
/17
What Putin did not do today -- and what he has not done for some time -- is offer Russians a vision of the future that looks like anything other than a continuation of the present.
/END
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And so, #Russia de-escalates: First at home, and then in Ukraine.
(A quick thread. TL;DR: None of this is over just yet.)
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The most recent and very welcome piece of news is Shoigu's announcement that Russian troops will be pulling back from the Ukrainian border. It is very good to know that a full-scale invasion of #Ukraine is apparently not in the offing.
There will be a lot of mostly pointless arguing over why this happened. Some will claim that Russia never intended to invade. Others will claim that deterrence worked. Only Putin knows, and he isn't talking.
/3
The dust hasn't yet settled, but we can draw some early conclusions from today's protests in #Russia. TL;DR: The Kremlin and the opposition are at a stalemate.
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I don't see reliable nationwide turnout figures, but this feels similar in size & scale to the 2017 Dimon protests, which brought out 60-100k nationwide. This may be bigger. Either way, more than the Kremlin was hoping to see, but probably less than the opposition wanted.
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The Kremlin went to extraordinary lengths to keep people off the streets - including preventive arrests, online censorship, and threats to workers and students - and there's little indication it worked (though, I suppose, turnout could have been even higher).
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It is possible to believe that Twitter and Facebook did the right thing to block Trump, and that, having done so, it lays bear a real problem for American democracy. The Biden Administration and the incoming Congress need urgently to address the power of online social media.
/1
First, Twitter’s cancellation of Trump is NOT a First Amendment violation. Twitter has a right to moderate the speech distributed on its network, and a responsibility to take the public interest into account.
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Moreover, Trump has not been deprived of the ability to speak. He has merely been deprived of the ability to speak on Twitter and Facebook. I am not overly troubled by the ability of private corporations to decide how consumers use those corporations’ resources.
/3
I'm struck by something @LisaDNews just reported on @NewsHour from inside the Capitol: Once inside, many -- though maybe not all -- of the protesters seemed to become more relaxed, surprised that they had made it inside, but perhaps also in awe of where they were.
/1
Obviously this is purely anecdotal, but it's a reminder to take seriously the power of institutions, of tradition and of ritual.
/2
There is a reason that our great buildings of state are so impressive. Yes, they project power, but they also -- sometimes -- remind occupants that they are part of something bigger than they are.
I don't know how I want this to end. But I do know how it must not end. It must not end in tear gas in the Capitol Building. It must not end in riot police or the military clearing the halls of state. It must not end in bloodshed.
But it must also not end in impunity.
/1
Part of me -- the part that still regrets not having flown back from the UK to join this summer's protests -- wants to see the Trumpistas bear the brunt of the violence they cheered when it rained down on BLM.
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And I _do_ want to see the ringleaders of this mob fill the prison cells they thought were reserved for Antifa.
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I spend most of my time studying how people fight back against autocratic regimes in places like Russia. But as my fellow Americans worry about the potential of an authoritarian coup in Washington, I’m seeing a different set of parallels – and it worries me.
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If you believe you live in a democracy, elections are a wonderful thing. Sure, the campaign can be nerve-wracking, but at the end of the day the votes are cast, someone wins, someone else loses, and attention gradually shifts to the next opportunity to do it all over again.
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If you live in an autocracy, however, elections are nothing more than another opportunity for the regime to retrench its power and your powerlessness.
/3