It is realities of this sort that complicate any simple narrative about political messaging on inequality. I used the (not new) term 'environmental racism' here, but it might be too jargony for mass communications. But then: how do you talk about problems like this? (1/n)
In this vein, the Kalla & English (2021) study was well done and comports with prior studies. I don't dispute it & I think it is relevant for communications about *some* things. But many issues require you to confront race, and you can't message your way out of doing so. (2/n)
Indeed, this is broadly true, given just how interwined economic and racial inequality are in this country. There's certainly a conversation to be had about avoiding jargon or trendy terms when discussing racial inequality and finding the best way to talk about it. (3/n)
But at the end of the day, there's no simple or effective way to take racial inequality off the discursive table and still deal with social reality as it actually exists. (4/4)
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
A related comment: there's something to the argument that conservatism is more of a temperament than an abstract ideology. But how does temperament get fleshed out in practical terms? (1/n)
The notion of conservatism as cautious, limit-seeking temperament is certainly consistent with at least one stream of research on personality and politics, e.g., (2/n) annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.114…
...a characterization that is nevertheless subject to various social and historical contingencies, as Ariel Malka and I show here, e.g., (3/n) onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.11…
What I keep coming back to is that the modern 'conservative' ideological framework -- crystallized under Reagan -- more or less collapsed during GW Bush's second term. (1/n)
By 'ideological framework,' I have in mind the conservative elite consensus behind Reaganism: laissez faire economics, muscular foreign policy, and traditional values. (2/n)
The Great Recession and its aftermath (along with long-term growth in inequality as a function of education, professional status, etc) discredited the small-government ethos, which has struggled to contend with the resulting challenges. (3/n)
Here are some results for the white subsample only. Note that the ideology measure = ideological self-placement, so symbolic rather than operational ideology in these models and the earlier ones. (1/n)
Been digging into the new 2020 ANES release this week, and I got curious as to what might predict negative attitudes toward increasing ballot access. So, I took a look at the ANES items on early voting, voter ID, and felon disenfranchisement. (1/n)
The following analyses look at the full sample, with dummies for racial group. I was especially interested in the role of racial attitudes, so I ran 4 sets of models -- each using a different racial attitude. (2/n)
Bottom line up front: racial attitudes predict opposition to ballot access, even after controlling for ideology, PID, authoritarianism, and perceptions of whether votes are counted fairly. For example, here's what we see for racial resentment: (3/n)
There's nothing wrong with this article; the last line is perhaps the most important. But in terms of the Broader Discourse on this point, a lot of folks seem to have unrealistic expectations of what education & knowledge accomplish. (1/n) washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/0…
The general idea is that fancy Ivy League educations mean that folks like Cruz and Hawley should "know better." Putting aside the elitism involved in accepting that premise, there are a number of ways that it us not consistent with what we know about education & knowledge. (2/n)
Following Converse (1964), we've known for a long time that variables like education and knowledge are associated with a stronger rather than weaker tendencies to hew to an ideological worldview. (3/n)
Since we're now in another period of center-left hand-wringing about What The Election Results Mean (absent complete data on what actually happened, of course), let me note a few things I believed on the basis of research even before the election. (1/n)
Americans are operationally liberal, but symbolically / philosophically conservative, per Ellis & Stimson and Free & Cantril before them (2/n). amazon.com/Ideology-Ameri…
To some extent, this means that the symbolism of the left -- as valued by elites and activists -- is not what Democrats should lead with or put up front. In a sense, that symbolism is esotericism that many people do not relate to. (3/n)