There is a crucial concept in risk management: a group of companies.
Because they are strongly connected, the risk of those companies is similar and highly correlated.
So you want to know if companies belong to the same group.
This is precisely the crucial topic that explains (in part) the bankruptcy of Greensill and the criminal proceedings against its German bank @BondHack & @cynthiao have been talking about:
Was the “Friends of Gupta” a group or not?
This concept is used e.g. by banks to calculate their large exposures limits, by investment funds to calculate their concentration ratios, by insurance companies to calculate their capital ratios, etc.
It's everywhere, the 1st pillar of risk management, who is your risk on?
But how do they do it? How do you know if a company belongs to a group?
Basically, you need (as always) a dataset for reference.
If you’re an investment fund and know your risks well, you can use e.g. Bloomberg and make manual corrections.
But what if you’re a giant organisation? With tens of thousands of clients or more?
You often use a third-party data provider.
Back to little me.
My clients often ask me to produce all sorts of reportings that include that information on a line by line basis.
It’s time consuming, so I decided that maybe I could externalise the work a bit…
So I consulted three providers.
My God what have I done. The can of worms.
Part of the “test” for those providers (all big names) was a bond issued by Banque Fédérative du Crédit Mutuel.
I know, it’s not the easiest one, but it’s a top 3 bank in France, so not exactly small fish.
And it has dozens of billions of bonds issued in the market.
Believe it or not, I got THREE different groups for that same bond.
Three different entities.
Three different legal identifiers.
Maybe you think it’s no big deal, but think about it for a minute.
A large insurance company will have funds invested with many fund managers; each will produce the same kind of reporting…
Now suppose the insurance company has in total 600m€ invested in BFCM bonds…
If the managers have different data providers, the insurance company will never see it has 600M€ on the same group.
It will believe it has 200m€ on three different groups.
A well diversified book.
Except it's not!
And that's just one of the many errors you'll find in those datasets... Good luck regulating that!
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A smart analyst at Autonomous has spotted something weird in the Archegos disclosure by Credit Suisse.
Bear with me for the hunt for the missing billion.
Pre tax the bank lost -757m ow -4430m on Archegos so 3673m ex Archegos.
Pre Archegos the tax rate guidance was 26%, so a tax of -955m on the pre Archegos profit before tax.
The CFO said they took only 650m of tax shield on Archegos because the loss was so big that the relevant legal tax entities (in US & UK) could not absorb the loss with future profitability
This is exactly what’s happening when you’re buying a synthetic CDO (if you’ve seen The Big Short, you know what they are, nothing to be worried about) and want to measure your counterparty credit risk.
For my new followers, counterparty credit risk (or CCR), is the risk you’re taking if you trade a derivative or a repo with someone who goes bust.
It feels like a big mystery about Credit Suisse remained largely unnoticed.
OK, they took a 4.4bn hit from Archegos… but how did they manage to lose *only* 900m in Q1 and wrongfoot analysts who had all estimated much lower capital ratios?
To understand the magnitude of the mystery: the Q1 consensus *before* the Greensill mess was around 1.4bn.
1.4bn-4.4bn=-3bn. Where the hell did the extra 2.1bn come from?! Not to mention a potential Greensill provision.
Let’s be super generous and assume no Greensill provision (hmmm) and a fabulous Q1 with PBT at 2bn.
We’re still missing 1.5bn. Not exactly small change. Where could this come from?