This month’s spotlight is being sent not a moment too soon. So much attention is being directed at undeserving "scholarship" on the #Uyghur region, that groundbreaking work is (maybe) going unnoticed. Enter Sär Tynen @sbtynen, a post-doc @Akademie_ved_CRcolorado.edu/geography/sara…
Tynen received their PhD in geography from the University of Colorado at Boulder and has published in several peer-reviewed journals including @Pol_Geog_Jl, @Geopolitics_Jl, @spaceandculture as well as edited volumes on urbanization Asia. Their book is under contract @ibtauris
I’ve been an admirer of Sär’s work for quite some time, but most recently read their 2020 @CA_Survey article “Dispossession and displacement of migrant workers: the impact of state terror and economic development on Uyghurs in urban Xinjiang” tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…
Tynen's sustained field work in the region (24 months from 2014 to 2017) is animated by thick description, grounded in mastery of theory, amplified by impressive language skills (Chinese and Uyghur), and remained empathetic to their interlocutors' traumatic experiences.
Specifically, this article brings shocking clarity to the dispossession (i.e. socio-economic realities/processes that strip identity) and displacement (i.e. physical relocation and part of dispossession p. 3) experienced by Uyghurs in their homeland.
Tynen’s central argument is powerful and convincing: “In addition to loss of land and livelihood, [Uyghurs] experience loss of personal autonomy and sovereignty over one’s own body, home, and family, a key goal of state territorial control” (2).
The dynamic interplay between dispossession and displacement is perhaps most apparent among rural Uyghurs who seek opportunities in Urumchi. Many of Tynen’s interlocutors left their hometowns behind them to escape invasive surveillance & tightening restrictions.
Yet, Uyghur migrants were unable to reap the benefits of urban “economic development.” In fact, a popular perception (not necessarily reality) among this group was that government takeover of local resources/markets has disproportionately benefited Han people (10).
This reality created a conundrum and deep despair among Uyghur migrants: Before Uyghur migrants were forced to leave in 2016-17, they were unwilling to return home because of increasing repression in rural areas. Here is an example of where Tynen’s brilliance shines...
...Tynen notes that their interlocutors never used the Uyghur term “to move” (kuchup kelmek) to describe relocation to the city; rather it was described as “to live and stay” (turup qalmaq) (p. 11). In other words, Uyghur migrants were describing a state of “suspension”.
The situation deteriorated even further. Tynen's fieldwork overlapped with the mass incarcerations of 2017 and they witnessed their interlocutors being swallowed up by the CCP’s police state.
In late May 2017, Tynen’s friend confided: “I have to go back to Kashgar now, or I’ll get arrested. They might arrest me or send me to ‘re-education’…I’m not going to call you”(16) Tynen never heard from their friend again.
In light of these experiences, Tynen concludes: “[Uyghur] belonging was based on institutional barriers and structural violence and inequalities based on class and race, not on attachment to place” (17).
You can learn more about Sär Tynen and their groundbreaking work at Tynen’s incredible personal site: sarahtynen.com. The name is one you will want to remember and follow.
Today @pen_int highlights detained Prof. Rahile Dawut--one of the world's foremost scholars on Uyghur religious cultures. This thread begins to show just how important her work is (and why the CCP feels so threatened by this scholarship)
Prof Dawut's scholarship reaches many corners of Uyghur pious expression, but she is perhaps best known for her trailblazing work on sacred shrines, which are called mazar in Uyghur
Prof Dawut established deep trust among religious communities in the Tarim Basin, recorded their histories, practices, and published them for Uyghur and international audiences
Twitter is buzzing about Jiang's interview with @CNN. I've never interviewed Jiang, but here is what I can corroborate by the Chinese sources. 1: police were sometimes armed, and detainees were commonly hooded during transport
Some officers reported that they assisted in the detentions of hundreds of people each day
Many of these officers came from neidi (inner/eastern China) as part of the Aid Xinjiang 援疆 program. Their posts typically lasted three months
@GFPhilosophy I’m not sure who you are. But my wife’s sister is here so I’m kinda doing my own thing. I’ll give you the benefit of the doubt. What would you like me to explain? Why 土炕改造 is different in Uyghur communities from neidi?
@GFPhilosophy it's late, i want to go to sleep, so I'm going to assume that is the question. First, we cannot equate سۇپا with 土炕, although Chinese conflates the two. Supa is often the site for religio-social rites such as name-giving ceremonies and circumcisions. not the case in 内地
@GFPhilosophy although 土炕改造 is used in the 新疆民生 source I posted, it isn't it's own policy in the region. Rather it's part of the 三新活动. In Uyghur communities, authorities require families to tear down 拆除 or tear apart 拆 the supa. I.E., it cannot remain
After pausing for May [sorry, just ran out of gas], Scholar Profiles is back! This month: David Stroup @davidstroup, Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Chinese Politics at @UoMPolitics who specializes in #Hui (i.e., Chinese Muslim) ethnicity.
I recently read his 2020 article, “‘Why don’t you go to the mosque?’: the problem of epistemic deference in researching everyday ethnicity in Hui Muslim communities.” cambridge.org/core/journals/…
Let’s continue. To be honest, I’m not sure if this is a take on banknotes/nods to indigenous groups or language policy, but I’m going to treat it as an uninformed attempt to create a mirage hiding current language policy. Fact: Uyghur will, at best, become a “kitchen language”
The Party’s goal has been clear: all schools in Xinjiang are expected to adopt “mode 3” delivery—i.e., Chinese as the language of instruction (and using native languages only if necessary). (from Zuliyati Simayi, yes, this Zuliyatyi)
Some locales failed to meet the 2016 deadline, but are still expected to institute these changes, so they’ve dramatically increased the number of classroom hours spent on Chinese.
Chinese media, CCP leaders, and apologists have been recycling the official number of mosques to convince you that Uyghurs and Kazakhs can freely express piety. This number is meaningless. Here are the facts (from Chinese sources):
Minors, college students, and anyone who is employed by the government cannot attend mosque. Period. It is stated explicitly outside many mosques (my photo from Pichan which says no minors can enter).
Schools devote classroom time to instruct students not to believe in religion and not to enter mosques.