A few quick observations from the $BRKA 10-Q.
The cash balance rose from $138.3B at yearend to $141.6B at 3/31. The media reports cash at $145.4B neglecting a $4.1B payable for T-Bill purchases that appears on the right side of the balance sheet. There was no payable at 12/31. 1/
Berkshire purchased $2.6B in common stocks and sold $6.5B for a net sale of $3.9B. The stock portfolio gained about 2% for the quarter and is up nearly 9% ytd. $GM was the best performing stock, up 37% to 3/31. I'd guess it was sold or materially trimmed. 2/
$BYD had grown to a top 7 portfolio holding from a cost of $232 million to $5.9B at yearend and $7.9B on 1/25. BYD is now down 21.5% for the year. I'd guess (and hope) the position was trimmed during the quarter. 3/
The position in $AAPL declined $9.5 billion or 7.9% during the quarter and is now flat for the year to date. Having trimmed the position during 2020, there were no sales of Apple during the first quarter. 4/
Berkshire repurchased $6.6 billion of its shares during the quarter following $24.7B in 2020, $4.9B in 2019 and $1.3B in 2018. Repurchases averaged $3B per month from June of last year through January. As the stock rose in price this year (up 18.6% ytd), the cadence slowed. 5/
Repos totaled $3.0B in Jan, $2B in Feb and $1.6B in March. An additional 3,294 A share equivalents were bought through April 22, so another $1.3B acquired at an avg $400k/share. Seems the appetite rationally shrinks as the price rises. Most companies are not price sensitive. 6/
Berkshire's share repurchases have been at meaningful discounts to intrinsic value and are a great use of capital.
Seeing an expected improvement in most of the subs that were negatively impacted by the COVID. Clayton Homes continues to crush it. Precision remains very weak. 7/
The Texas freeze, aka winter storm "Uri," was expensive. It harmed Lubrizol and caused $150m insurance losses at BH Primary and $310m in P/C reinsurance. Life reinsurance saw sizable losses from increased mortality in the US, Latin America and Africa, presumably COVID. 8/
Insurance results were mixed. GEICO added policies & written premium but saw a decline in premiums earned - credits for COVID continued during but are finally finished in early April. Underwriting profits at GEICO at 11.5% pretax were terrific. BH Primary at 7.8% also good. 9/
Reinsurance underwriting results fairly weak.
A net $2.5B in debt was retired. Debt issued at the holding company was financed at very low interest rates. 600m EUR 20-year paper at 0.5% and $750m 30-year paper for the leasing companies at 2.5% (the 30-year UST yields 2.3%). 10/
Good improvement at BNSF - still operating below normalized. BHE fantastic & continuing to spend enormous capital at good and regulated returns. Anything housing related killing it.
In the absence of FASB directive, not sure which planet (guess) the AICPA was on when defaulting to treating #Bitcoin and crypto as indefinite-lived intangible assets. Cash? Clearly not. Not legal tender. Just bizarre to book realized gains as an offset to OPERATING expense. 1/
Declines below cost will be tested for "impairment" and when written down will no doubt be explained away as "one time." The room for abuse here is ripe. Why not treat crypto as a trading security, compelling marking realized and unrealized gains and losses through BOTH 2/
the income statement & the balance sheet? Take note of the way Berkshire Hathaway accounts for realized and unrealized gains and losses and makes clear they DO NOT consider them as operating. Lonely crowd. To the extent crypto rises in price, we now have the classic cookie jar.3/
Cathie @CathieDWood, Not a chance was US stock market cap/GDP greater in the late 1800s and early 1900s than it is today. It was a FRACTION of today's level. It measured 90% at the stock market PEAK in 1929 and closed 2020 at a record 183%. Close to 200% now. Far less business 1/
was done by public companies then v today. Absolute levels of global trade were on the order of 20% of today's levels. 1929's market cap was $93B on GDP of $103.7 billion. Of course the stock market then fell by 89%, despite all of the revolutionary technologies you mentioned. 2/
Families spent half of their income on food at the end of the 19th century. You are absolutely correct that electricity, the telephone and automobiles allowed transformative growth in income & output. However, your conclusion that "genomic sequencing, robotics, energy storage, 3/
Brett @wintonARK, Your taking the time to reply is again appreciated. I was going to let @ARKInvest's 2025 $TSLA $3,000 price target and your replies go but in thinking over the past several days a few of your answers just don’t resonate. Comments and a proposition follow...1/
While most of your replies lacked easily quantifiable or direct answers to my questions, your offhand response about Tesla’s expected 2025 share count suggests extremes of either promotional intent or lack of understanding. Perhaps it's neither and I'm missing something. 2/
The ARK model completely ignores coming dilution from the exercise of 165m option & RSU shares already issued (excluding any subsequent grants). This is a BIG deal. I guarantee you @elonmusk gets it. Seeing an even 1B shares outstanding in ARK's 2025 projection was baffling. 3/
@wintonARK Brett, Your additional thoughts on $TSLA’s insurance business are appreciated. That said, I respectfully don’t see where your comments clarify or dispel the points I made in response to the 2025 ARK model and price target for Tesla and its “insurance operation.” 1/
Please allow me to ask a few direct questions for clarification.
1. You confirm Tesla is not yet underwriting insurance & won’t be until 2023. Can you walk through your assumptions that get to your “bear case” $23B insurance revenues at a 40% EBIT margin, $9.2B by 2025? 2/
2. You project Tesla will underwrite at a 70% loss ratio. That’s actually not a better ratio than the US private passenger auto loss ratio over time. In fact, for the three years prior to 2020 the industry loss ratio was under 70%. 3/
I see lots of student company write-ups and pitches. Most are better than yesterday's $3,000 ARK Price Target Report for $TSLA. In reading the report its clear the motivation is to promote a higher stock price. The fantasy involved is simply spectacular... 1/
Let’s go right to the insurance valuation and model update, where the analyst assumes in a BEAR case Tesla’s “Insurance Operation” is worth $23B in 2025, four short years from now. It’s clear that the author and firm have no clue how insurance works. Harsh, I know. However... 2/
To begin and to be clear, Tesla has ZERO insurance underwriting operations. They are brokering auto policies in California alone for an underwriting fronting sub owned by Markel. The business written is so small to not be quantified either by Tesla or Markel in SEC reporting. 3/
My grandmother always told me to focus on relationships. She was the first female stock broker in Kansas City. Perhaps this is what she meant:
Berkshire closed at $398,840, a new high. $BRK bought back stock at $13.63 in the spring of 1965, just before Mr. Buffett took over. 1/
Berkshire's gain is 2,926,100% or 20.2% per year, 2x the annual gain of the S&P 500. Meanwhile, the Caracas Exchange Index was the same 13.63 bolívares in May 2018. It's now 2,576,884 bolívares, an annual gain of 7,190%, 6.5x the gain in $BRK in less than 3 years vs. 56 years. 2/
Now, the dollar lost 88% of its purchasing power since 1965. Bitcoin wasn't a thing so if you wanted to hedge you could buy gold, which was $35/oz for more than 30 years beginning in 1934. Remarkably, gold compounded at 7.2% for the past 56 years. Stocks were a better hedge. 3/