Thread by @SamoBurja

As late as 1941, the United States’ nuclear weapons research program was practically non-existent.

Most important work was being carried out by independent scientists at universities, the small “Uranium Committee” notwithstanding.

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The Uranium Committee had been formed thanks to the famous Einstein-Szilard letter, which warned FDR of the potential of nuclear weapons technology and, more importantly, the risks of the Germans developing the first atom bomb.

But the committee was basically inactive.

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Meanwhile in Britain, a group of scientists called the MAUD Committee were carrying out more productive research.

James Conant, the president of Harvard and second highest-ranking government research administrator, visited them in March 1941 to coordinate research.

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Conant was told that the atomic bomb could be developed and that it should be prioritized. But he did not act on this information.

Rather, since nuclear research was not his official responsibility, and there was no official memo on the atom bomb’s potential, he did nothing

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This was not the only attempt by scientists to accelerate nuclear development that was ignored for administrative and political reasons.

The Berkeley physicist Ernest Lawrence lobbied the president of MIT, also a government research administrator, to accelerate development.

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Lawrence managed to get a meeting with Vannevar Bush, the head of the US government’s wartime research efforts.

What happened next? Bush scolded Lawrence for acting outside of official channels and conveyed that he was “running the show”, not Lawrence.

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Bush, to his credit, commissioned a report on his own on the potential of nuclear technology.

But the report recommended greatly accelerating nuclear research and development. So Bush commissioned another report on the first report.

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In July 1941, MAUD published the most comprehensive report yet arguing the atom bomb could be built quickly, it would be militarily decisive, and that the US & UK should collaborate on its development.

Bush got an unofficial summary of this report, but still did nothing.

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It was only months later, when the British *officially* transmitted the same report, that Bush, FDR, and the VP agreed to initiate and fund a serious nuclear program using a black budget.

Thus, the Manhattan Project was finally born, thanks to bureaucratic imprimatur.

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Key powerful insiders exercise disproportionate control over bureaucracies.

They often use official justifications for maintaining their power as gatekeepers. Ideas they endorse receive top priority, attention, exception, resources, and are much more likely to occur.

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Ideas they do not endorse and the people pushing them—rather than be dismissed outright—are often sidelined through endless initiatives, committees, reports, and projects that do not receive priority and can go on indefinitely.

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If the powerful bureaucrat is later convinced to pursue the project, or to hire or promote a previous outsider or low-ranking individual, he can then pluck them from obscurity and give them priority, attention, exception, and resources.

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https://twitter.com/SamoBurja/status/1388211279307984899

This thread is part of a series on Bismarck Analysis’ case study on the development of nuclear weapons. Check out the other threads in the quote tweet here:

You can read the full case study here: bismarckanalysis.com/Nuclear_Weapon…

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