We see a lot of variance at the end of Feb that continues into the beginning of Mar. This was due to a number of runaway alerts and some signatures that needed tweaking.
What’s most interesting is that the variance decreases after we released the suppressions features on Mar 17.
We believe this is due to analysts having more granular control of the system and it’s now easier than ever get a poor performing Expel alert back under control.
What makes that useful?
Context: I told you what you're looking at - you can read. I don't need to tell you we had 21k alerts.
Multiple passes: I told you how to find the trend line and what it's doing.
Structures and functions: I called attention to the mean and variance.
Structures and functions: I called out the fact that variance was increasing and now it's decreasing.
Meaning: I told you why variance increased in late Feb and why it decreases after mid-Mar and what you should think about that.
If folks found this helpful I'm more than happy to walk through some additional examples.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Process tree below so folks can query / write detections
Also, update!
Detection moments:
- w3wp.exe spawning CMD shell
- PS download cradle to execute code from Internet
- CMD shell run as SYSTEM to run batch script from Public folder
- Many more
Bottom line: a lot of ways to spot this activity.
Build.test.learn.iterate.
Also, update. :)
And some additional details from @heyjokim after further investigating:
Attack vector/Initial Compromise: CVE-2021-27065 exploited on Exchange Server
Foothold: CHOPPER webshells
Payload: DLL Search Order Hijacking (opera_browser.exe, opera_browser.dll, opera_browser.png, code)
1. Create an inbox rule to fwd emails to the RSS Subscriptions folder 2. Query your SIEM 3. How often does this happen? 4. Can you build alert or cadence around inbox rule activity?
- Pro-active search for active / historical threats
- Pro-active search for insights
- Insights lead to better understanding of org
- Insights are springboard to action
- Actions improve security / risk / reduce attack surface
With these guiding principles in hand, here's a thread of hunting ideas that will lead to insights about your environment - and those insights should be a springboard to action.
Here are my DCs
Do you see evidence of active / historical credential theft?
Can you tell me the last time we reset the krbtgt account?
Recommendations to harden my org against credential theft?
2020 @expel_io incident stats tell a familiar story: a lot of commodity malware *still* being deployed via evil macros and zipped HTA / JS files.
This isn't a thread to tell you to block macros or associate WSH files with notepad (like PS), but questions to ask if you can't.
On blocking macros: If it were easy, everyone would do it.
But if you're a #SOC analyst, do you fire an alert when winword.exe spawns an unusual process like PS or regsvr32?
Can you create a macro that behaves like an evil one but is totally benign to test your alerting?
Can you use #EDR to understand which processes are almost never spawned from winword.exe? Or maybe ask which processes spawned from winword.exe initiate an external connection out? Can you fine tune your logic and deploy in BLOCK mode?