Thread by @nukestrat

1/n Wow: New report from @USGAO concludes: "every nuclear triad replacement program - including the B-21, LRSO, GBSD, and Columbia class submarine, and every ongoing bomb and warhead modernization program- faces the prospect of delays…” gao.gov/assets/gao-21-…

@USGAO 2/n These risks are not just about existing systems getting old but also about DOD/DOE planning overly aggressive timelines, workload from several concurring systems, and immature technologies.

3/n Check this out: Because of a requirement to have 400 ICBMs on alert, the Air Force "will be largely constrained to fielding GBSD into the 50 launch facilities with silos that are maintained empty” under New START!

4/n …and, "the GBSD program’s draft developmental testing schedule only includes 2 months to address deficiencies found in flight testing before the next test is expected to begin, including any resulting design changes.”

What could possibly go wrong?

5/n …and, "the Air Force has yet to evaluate all of the launch facilities and, accordingly, the full scope of work necessary to prepare the facilities for use by the GBSD program has yet to be determined.” Additional time needed for construction could delay GBSD fielding.

6/n …and because the GBSD program now also includes replacement of the Airborne Launch Control System, the increase in scope could present additional pressures on the program schedule. "However the Air Force has yet to fully evaluate risks to the GBSD program."

7/n …and "if the Mk21A and W87-1 programs do not remain aligned or adequately share information at key points, the Air Force may not discover problems with pairing the Mk21A reentry vehicle and the W87-1 warhead until shortly before it is deployed.”

What could possibly go wrong

8/n On the Columbia class SSBN, "In 2017, the Navy awarded a contract for detail design; however, critical technologies remained unproven...some critical technologies remain immature.”

The SSBN is the backbone of the deterrent.

9/n …and the "Navy plans to build the lead [SSBN] over 7 years - or 84 months.” But "this duration is shorter than what the Navy achieved on any recent lead submarine construction effort - including during high levels of Cold War submarine production.”

Ahem!

10/n Moreover, construction of the USS Columbia overlaps with the shipbuilders also starting work on the first few Virginia class submarines built in a new configuration. Last time sub construction increased, it resulted in cost and schedule growth at the shipyards."

11/n On warheads, W87-1 "will be composed of all newly manufactured components,” requiring use of numerous manufacturing capabilities. "An unexpected failure or work interruption at a critical facility...could significantly affect modernization production schedules."

12/n …and "Delays in the B61-12 LEP and W88 Alt 370” can delay W80-4 program as well. "Delays, in turn, to the W80-4 LEP could create cascading delays in subsequent programs” that NNSA has planned.

13/n "DOD is increasingly reliant on the Hedge Strategy to mitigate risk to the efficacy of the nuclear deterrent.” But DOD/DOE will have limited ability to address these risks because each department faces challenges in implementing the Hedge Strategy outlined in the 2018 NPR.

14/n 2018 NPR "identified two additional categories of risk that DOD could mitigate using the Hedge Strategy: programmatic and operational.” GAO "found that DOD currently faces all four categories of risk for which it could implement the Hedge Strategy as mitigation."

15/n Mitigating risks categories might potentially involve generating more ICBMs, subs, bombers, or load more non-deployed warheads onto ICBMs. But “using MIRVs on the Minuteman IIIs would necessitate a change of standing U.S. policy."

16/n Adding warheads to ICBMs to mitigate risks might potentially involve “accepting the consequences of ‘overflight’” of Russia to get to targets in China and elsewhere. This discussion has been redacted from public version of the GAO study.