Democrats lost vote share among Latinos, from 71-29% in 2016 to 63-37% in two-way, but gained among white voters with a college degree, from 50-50 to 54-46% in 2020
Democrats did not gain share disproportionately from younger voters, despite the crashing level of 3rd-party support, but Democrats did gain from the rising younger generation share of the electorate
The married proportion of the electorate was down from 56% in 2016 to 52% in 2020. But the marriage gap declined from 18 points to 13 points; it also declined in House elections. Dems improved with married men from 2016.
More cross-tabs:
White educational polarization continued in 2020, especially in congressional voting. dropbox.com/scl/fi/hzqbc0g…
Despite sky-high turnout, there were no major changes in the composition of the electorate in 2020; the changes that did occur were likely part of long-term trends in population composition rather than changes in groups’ relative turnout rate
Polled issue opinions are associated with ballot initiative outcomes but popular policies underperform; voters systematically prefer the "no" option #polisciresearch dropbox.com/s/zn2uf6kyv8id…
CW among consultants is that an initiative should start with 2/3 support in the polls to pass (with 50%), usually explained not just as status quo bias but responsiveness to negative information; eg, con spending on initiatives is more important than pro: amazon.com/Populist-Parad…
The run-for-President successful Republican agenda is apparently:
- restrict mail voting
- fine social media for bans
- riot / protest restriction
- ban vaccine passports
- ban transgender in girls sports
- spend the federal stimulus miamiherald.com/news/politics-…
Noem is pursuing a similar focus on symbolic cultural politics & appeals to conservative media: nytimes.com/2021/05/02/us/…
In Red State Blues, I find that Republican control of states polarized cultural politics but didn’t shift state economic policy much: amazon.com/Red-State-Blue…
Meanwhile, Democratic state governments are continuing to move leftward on economic & cultural issues, though without reinvention: seattletimes.com/seattle-news/p…
Federal $ means size & scope of gov will continue growing across Dem & Rep states, continuing long patterns I found
Biden’s reconciliation-driven spend without strings or reform policy agenda seems to reverse Obama-era technocratic trends in Democratic policymaking, with a return to old Dem pol constituency distribution objectives. But it also reflects updated & diversifying academic advice
Economists have largely changed their balance of concerns on deficit spending & on cash benefits. Biden is also relying on more diverse & sociologically-inspired academic advice, visible in defining infrastructure to include social care & greater attention to racial equity.
Points 3 & 4 in @ezraklein's column are similar, but he emphasizes economics losing credibility & change in public mood: nytimes.com/2021/04/08/opi…
Point #2 about the new generation of staffers also applies to the academic help: more diverse, liberal, & less tied to traditional econ
Infrastructure plan is likely to substantially raise both high-income individual taxes & the corporate tax rate. Biden’s 2nd most likely major agenda item is going to be more difficult to pass & not primarily due to the filibuster axios.com/corporate-tax-…
Business opposition & high-income voter opposition are both associated with difficulty enacting proposals, even if they are supported by the public as a whole. Democratic leaders are not aligned with business, but business still has the power to block most change
Much discussion of bills with near zero chance of passage, but even the next most likely bill to pass (infrastructure, after COVID) faces big obstacles
Republicans are more optimistic about (relative & absolute) social mobility, but no less accurate. Democrats (public & officials) understate social mobility. Dems think mobility is constrained by race & parent wealth; Reps think it’s hard work. dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/mobilit…
In estimating chance of making it from the bottom quintile in childhood to the top quintile in adulthood, the public is more optimistic than policymakers. In predicting children’s chance of making more $ than their parents, Republican officials are the most optimistic
Partisans (in the public & among officials) divide on factors that matter for social mobility. Everyone thinks education is important. Republicans are more likely to cite hard work & not having kids until marriage; Democrats are more likely to cite race & parent wealth
State political elites are more trusting of state & local government than the public, but not the federal government
They also see Whitmer as an effective actor in the pandemic, but not federal actors
Michigan political elites had lower levels of white identity, racial resentment, SDO, & moral traditionalism than the public & higher levels of white guilt & egalitarianism. There were also big differences on sexism: ippsr.msu.edu/sites/default/…
Elites remain less averse to value change & more accepting of increasing diversity than the public, but both the public & elites have become more accepting of social change since 2016.