@boys_ian@Steveho25139795@clark_aviation Radar proximity fuzes were a UK concept & engineering development that it took American industrial capacity to make real. (photo)
Time fuzes came in 2 flavors.
Flavor 1 was mechanical like an old Swiss watch. Flavor 2 was a burning pyrotechnic fuze.
This was compensated for by firing "box barrages" ahead of American bomber formations which were ungainly clots of A/C that could not turn quickly.
@boys_ian@Steveho25139795@clark_aviation The problem that most people have -- including on Adolph Hitler! -- is understanding the mission of AA defenses is not to shoot down planes, but to prevent planes from destroying their assigned target.
The attached table is from an 8th AF report on the accuracy of USAAF bombers
It was the fall of the occupied French territory used as a early warning & fighter base glacis that tubed German AA killing %.
RAF Bomber Command WW2 loss rates attached.
@boys_ian@Steveho25139795@clark_aviation It was not until the Allied strategic bombers went after all the German Reich Bahn railway marshaling yards _Simultaneously_, starting with Operation Clarion in Mid-Feb 1945, that German AA gun defenses collapsed from a lack of ammo.
@IntelCrab@IntelCrab, you may have just made the single most important observation of the 2021 Gaza War.
Underground fiber optic cables are extremely & uniquely vulnerable to the seismic shock from high order detonations. They stop transmitting light when subjected to them.
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@IntelCrab This fact was used in the 1991 Gulf War Scud Hunt. Saddam used fiber optic cables to communicate to Scud hide sites.
Many air strikes US SF teams called down in the western Iraqi desert were to "sanitize" an area of fiber optic cables after flushing a Scud launcher.
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@IntelCrab The collapsing Hamas commercial internet bandwidth, decreasing Hamas ability to coordinate large rocket launches, and the IDF's sustained bombardment of North Gaza combined with that GW1 fact tells me the IDF is destroying underground fiber optic cables.
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"Using Iron Dome effectively has always been a matter of numbers. In the 2014 50-day war with Hamas, Iron Dome intercepted 735 Hamas rockets, which were 90 percent of those headed for populated or military base areas...
...That was up from the eight-day 2012 war where there were 421 intercepts and of those 84 percent were headed for populated or military base areas.
Now to explain why Ham radio guys can be a whole lot more useful that academic & archival historians** for EW -- the 2 August 1939, LZ130 Graf Zeppelin flight.
**Note: Every field has it's weak points. Extremely few academic tract historians are radio geeks... 2/
...and being a radio geek is a better skill set for the subject matter than most PhD's not awarded to Dr Alfred Price.
LZ130 flew one of the first ELINT missions ever, against the UK Chain Home system with 25 RF engineers aboard. 3/
@DrydockDreams has put up another Coral Sea post modeling ships & US Navy CAG William Ault plus his disappearance returning from the strike against IJN CarDiv 5.
This thread goes into what the role of preventable HF communications failure played in that
To do so I will be using screen captures from Squadron Leader A. L. Hall, RAAF, presentation "farewell to communication failures" reprinted in the Aug 1944 CIC magazine
This thread is the fourth visit to the logistical disaster known as Operation Iceberg.
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The three previous threads have dealt with the hidden friendly fire, USN doctrine & a horrid staff planning error that left far too few staffers to plan because of a grand standing USMC general/Deputy Chief of Staff in 10th Army .
"Failing to plan is planning to fail."
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This thread focuses on how unexamined CentPac & 10th Army staff assumptions in changed combat conditions turned around and bite them all in the assets.