Do wealthier households save a larger share of their incomes than poorer ones?
I suspect most people's prior is that the answer is "yes." Turns out that's incorrect, or rather: things are considerably more subtle, at least in our Norwegian wealth tax registry data.
A short 🧵:
The 🧵 is based on a major revision of "Saving Behavior Across the Wealth Distribution: The Importance of Capital Gains", which is joint with @AndreasFagereng@BlomhoffHolm & @GNatvik
Why do saving rates matter? Answer: for (i) secular trends in income & wealth inequality and (ii) how such distributional shifts feed back to macro aggregates
If we measure saving net of capital gains, i.e. "net" or "active saving", then saving rates are flat across the wealth distribution, i.e., the rich do *not* actively save a larger share of their incomes than the poor.
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At the same time, saving rates *including capital gains* increase strongly with wealth.
Why? Wealthier households own assets that experience capital gains which they hold onto instead of selling them off to consume.
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Also here's what saving rates look like in different years 2005-2015: in all years "net or active" saving rates are flat & vary little, while saving rates incl capital gains fluctuate lots depending on asset markets (e.g. it's way down in 2008, also note the different scales)
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Aside: the flat active saving rates are v different from what Saez & @gabriel_zucman found using "synthetic" saving rates. Instead our results are more in line with Smith @omzidar Zwick's attenuated saving rate disparities and more important role for asset price changes.
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What's going on?
We show that our findings are actually consistent with completely standard models of wealth accumulation with homothetic preferences under one additional assumption: rising asset prices are accompanied by declining asset returns rather than rising cashflows.
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Intuitively, when asset prices rise even though cashflows do not, richer households do not experience a larger income effect than poorer ones and therefore consume approximately the same fraction of their disposable incomes. See Proposition 1.
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Part of the booming asset prices of recent years are due to falling interest/discount rates. That this probably matters for wealth distribution is also catching on -- see the great work of @ProfGreenwald@HannoLustig@SVNieuwerburgh, Gomez & Gouin-B
We do some counterfactuals to flesh out the implications. We conclude that saving rate heterogeneity across wealth groups is not likely to be an important contributor to changes in aggregate saving and the wealth distribution, but capital gains are.
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Now a final important point: some of you may now think "oh, in that case these capital gains and the accompanying changes in wealth distribution are just welfare-irrelevant paper gains."
Takeaway same as here: the macro, wealth inequality and PF literatures need to consider changing asset prices with more care. Fortunately this has started to happen, see e.g. the great work of @cmtneztt, @kuhnmo@schularick & Steins
#EconTwitter hivemind: what are your favorite papers combining “causal” micro estimates (say from DiD or RCT) with a general-equilibrium macro model to answer an interesting macro question?
This is for my PhD teaching so the easier to read the better. Thanks in advance!
The benefits of new technologies accrue not only to high-skilled labor but also to owners of capital in the form of higher capital incomes. This increases income and wealth inequality.
Coincidentally this @voxdotcom "Billionaires Explained" show has a pretty good intuitive version of our theory netflix.com/watch/81097618 (from minute 8:00), there explained by @JeffDSachs.
It's also worth adding that standard theories predict exactly the opposite, namely that (in the long-run) all benefits of automation accrue to labor in the form higher wages.
This @TheEconomist article does not reflect the views of most economists I know.
Most economists I know did not "get off on the wrong foot" with epidemiologists. Instead they highly value their work and just try to learn from it as much as possible.
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They do not "intensely criticize" epidemiologists' models or their use. Instead they have hugely benefited from them and been very much aware of how difficult it is to forecast an epidemic in the face of limited and fast-changing data availability and quality.
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As far as I can tell, your and others' economic policy advice assumes single-peaked epidemic scenario.
What if epidemic cycles? Same policies for longer? Or should the policies also cycle?
Clarification: "what should policy response be w cycles in 2nd graph" should have said "what should *economic* policy response be" eg how structure liquidity injections to firms and households?