2/ "There is great disparity in the way we think about and address different sources of environmental infection. Governments have for decades promulgated a large amount of legislation and invested heavily in food safety, sanitation, and drinking water for public health purposes"
3/ "By contrast, airborne pathogens and respiratory infections, whether seasonal influenza or COVID-19, are addressed fairly weakly, if at all, in terms of regulations, standards, and building design and operation, pertaining to the air we breathe."
4/ "We suggest that the rapid growth in our understanding of the mechanisms behind respiratory infection transmission should drive a paradigm shift in how we view and address the transmission of respiratory infections to protect against unnecessary suffering and economic losses."
5/ "It starts with a recognition that preventing respiratory infection, like reducing waterborne or foodborne disease, is a tractable problem."
That's the core of the message: we can reduce respiratory infections a lot, but **we have to try**. So far not tried, except hospitals
6/ This schematic gives some ideas. Lots of techniques exist that can greatly improve indoor air quality, while balancing energy consumption (which we need to minimize due to climate change, as long as we keep using fossil fuels for energy).
7/ But it has to start with accepting that COVID-19 and most respiratory infections have important components of airborne transmission.
Which has been denied since 1910, and only accepted as little as possible when undeniable (a pattern that continues for COVID-19).
8/ I have explained the history of the denial on this thread:
(see also @zeyner's article in @nytimes, in Tweet #4 on that thread)
10/ If the fact that airborne transmission is dominant for COVID-19 is news to you, see our peer-reviewed publication in @TheLancet where we summarize 10 reasons that support it:
12/ From ~1910 to 1962, it was accepted that no natural disease displayed airborne transmission.
William and Mildred Wells tried to prove otherwise, eventually succeeded for tuberculosis in 1962. (M. Wells had died by then, and W. Wells would die shortly afterwards)
13/ I find it especially poignant that Prof. William Wells published a paper in a predecessor journal to @ScienceMagazine in 1945, 76 years before our perspective, where he said very similar things to what we just published!
14/ Wells: "The lag in sanitary ventilation during a period of rapid development of water purification, milk pasteurization, and pure food administration is a public health paradox." Yet it was quite natural for sanitary interest in ventilation to lag with the decline..."
15/ "... of infectious diseases formerly attributed to at- mospheric miasma, since close proximity of persons breathing indoor atmospheres made direct transfer of contagious disease without a vehicle a possibility."
16/ Ane Wells goes on to quote Chapin's 1910 fateful denial of airborne transmission:
"Bacteriology teaches that former ideas in regard to the manner in which diseases may be air-borne are entirely erroneous; that most diseases are not likely to be dust-borne, and they are..."
17/ "... spray-borne only for two or three feet, a phenomenon which after all resembles contact infection more than it does aerial infection."
The consequences of that denial have haunted us during the COVID-19 pandemic, and underlie the @WHO and @CDCGov denials and resistance.
18/ Lots more details about Chapin, Wells etc. in the history thread and in our history preprint:
19/ The @ScienceMagazine paper was led by Lidia Morawska, collaborating with the "group of 36" scientists that confronted @WHO with the evidence on airborne transmission on 3-Apr-2020 (encountering serious denial), and have worked together since on many papers.
“We expect to have clean water from the taps,” said Lidia Morawska, and clean, safe food in the supermarket. In the same way, we should expect clean air in our buildings and any shared spaces”
25/ And the press release from QUT, Lidia Morawska's home institution:
Prof. Morawska: need to shift perception can't afford cost of control, given globally harm from COVID-19 of $1 trillion and cost of influenza in the US alone ~$11.2 billion annually
Now that @WHO and @CDCgov have finally accepted *after a year of denial and delays* that airborne transmission is a major mode for COVID-19, it is time to review the history to try to understand why this response was so poor.
2/ Remember, the evidence is overwhelming that airborne transmission (1 to 1 in close proximity, and 1 to many in shared room air = superspreading) is the dominant mode of transmission.
3/ And probably we are being charitable by saying only "dominant." Can't find any real evidence that airborne is not 99%. Airborne can explain all the epidemiological patterns, while large droplets and fomites can't, and they are pathetically lacking ev.
1/ A radical shift today by @CDCgov, finally aligning itself with science on the modes of transmission, and throwing away the 1910 error of considering "close contact" a mode of transmission!
"Modes of SARS-CoV-2 transmission are now categorized as inhalation of virus, deposition of virus on exposed mucous membranes, and touching mucous membranes with soiled hands contaminated with virus," the new guidance reads."
3/ This finally follows science, most elegantly summarized by Prof. Yuguo Li of the Univ. of Hong Kong on this recent paper:
El video de la charla de hoy (30 min + 1 hr de preguntas) sobre "Métodos prácticos para estimar y monitorear el riesgo de contagio de COVID-19 cuando se comparte aire en interiores" se puede ver en YouTube:
2/ Y todo el artículo es muy interesante: las escuelas aumentan los contagios de los padres y maestros, pero se pueden reducir mucho con medidas correctas de protección:
3/ Lo cual es consistente con otras líneas de evidencia.
Como explicamos en este preprint, una escuela con la ventilación mínima de ASHRAE (o menos, que es lo típico) tiene bastante riesgo. Pero con mascarillas, ventilación, menos densidad, se mejora muchísimo. (Linea verde)
1/ UPDATES TO COVID-19 AEROSOL TRANSMISSION ESTIMATOR
We have just implemented several updates:
- added increased risk of variants
- made clearer how to enter vaccinated people
- added calculation of infection risk parameters
2/ The risk parameters allow quantitative decisions on which mitigations are needed to avoid outbreaks. See the thread from yesterday on that topic and paper:
3/ We also added a sheet with a quantitative version of the BMJ table (bmj.com/content/370/bm…). See sheet "Risk Table", where you can modify it for your conditions.
2/ It can be very confusing to estimate how risky different activities are, depending of size of space, duration, number of people, vocalization, intensity of breathing, ventilation, air cleaning, masks + their quality + fit.
We combine it all into a single parameter, rigorously
3/ We'll explain the parameter(s) later, but first let me convince you that it works.
The key is Fig. 1 b:
- X-axis is risk parameter in log. scale. MUCH riskier to right, MUCH less risky to left
- Y-axis is attack rate (% of people present infected in outbreaks)