#CreditSuisse International published its annual report which contains this useful information on #Archegos:
3 lessons: 1) Addt'l 600m loss in Q2 2) Still 3% exposure! 3) Thanks to the banking surcharge, UK taxpayer providing a "tax shield" of 1.3bn$ (maybe more with new budget)
Also interesting to notice that CSI didn't book the full DTA (54% by my quick calc), suggesting they won't pay any tax in the UK for more than a decade.
Final important point: 0 loss in the US, 0 loss in Switzerland, so the PRA might be the one who takes a close look at the operations and risk management.
Especially when a bank you supervise loses 25% of its equity on a trade...
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There's something really weird going on with Monte Paschi's Q1 results.
i) they booked a massive gain on BTP
ii) they changed real estate valuation to fair value to increase equity
iii) they delayed the impact of TRIM
As a consequence they don't have a capital shortfall 1/2
But the capital shortfall is going to appear soon, in 2022. Why is this weird? Because we have the EBA stress test results in Q4. It almost looks like they're engineering a 'no shortfall' situation ahead of the stress test in order to have one in the stress test. 2/3
Why would they do that? Well, state aid/BRRD rules are not the same if the shortfall comes from the stress test...
There is a crucial concept in risk management: a group of companies.
Because they are strongly connected, the risk of those companies is similar and highly correlated.
So you want to know if companies belong to the same group.
This is precisely the crucial topic that explains (in part) the bankruptcy of Greensill and the criminal proceedings against its German bank @BondHack & @cynthiao have been talking about:
A smart analyst at Autonomous has spotted something weird in the Archegos disclosure by Credit Suisse.
Bear with me for the hunt for the missing billion.
Pre tax the bank lost -757m ow -4430m on Archegos so 3673m ex Archegos.
Pre Archegos the tax rate guidance was 26%, so a tax of -955m on the pre Archegos profit before tax.
The CFO said they took only 650m of tax shield on Archegos because the loss was so big that the relevant legal tax entities (in US & UK) could not absorb the loss with future profitability
This is exactly what’s happening when you’re buying a synthetic CDO (if you’ve seen The Big Short, you know what they are, nothing to be worried about) and want to measure your counterparty credit risk.
For my new followers, counterparty credit risk (or CCR), is the risk you’re taking if you trade a derivative or a repo with someone who goes bust.
It feels like a big mystery about Credit Suisse remained largely unnoticed.
OK, they took a 4.4bn hit from Archegos… but how did they manage to lose *only* 900m in Q1 and wrongfoot analysts who had all estimated much lower capital ratios?
To understand the magnitude of the mystery: the Q1 consensus *before* the Greensill mess was around 1.4bn.
1.4bn-4.4bn=-3bn. Where the hell did the extra 2.1bn come from?! Not to mention a potential Greensill provision.
Let’s be super generous and assume no Greensill provision (hmmm) and a fabulous Q1 with PBT at 2bn.
We’re still missing 1.5bn. Not exactly small change. Where could this come from?