This is an interesting case. At one level, you might argue that the rift between Russia and Ukraine is clear (damning!) evidence of the failure of Russian foreign policy. At another level, one might also ask about the purpose of Russian foreign policy. 👇🏿
https://twitter.com/steven_pifer/status/1393234456270475269
If the purpose is to maximise Russia's influence in its immediate neighbourhood, promote Russia's economic interests and project soft power, then the record is utter and complete failure.
On the other hand, if the purpose is to legitimise Putin's otherwise illegitimate regime by promulgating the narrative of confrontation with the West and Ukraine, then one might argue the policy has succeeded very well.
Therefore, when asking whether Russian foreign policy is a success or failure, we need to disclose the underlying assumptions of the question.
By the way, to disclose my own underlying assumption here - and in response to people criticising me for repeatedly questioning the legitimacy of Putin's regime: my understanding of legitimacy is that it is attainable *only* through free and fair elections, which Russia lacks.
Putin resorts to self-legitimation through promulgation of a particular legitimacy narrative. This is not to say that political actors in the West do not do so; only to say that for them, such narratives are just the dressing; for Russian political elites, it's the sine qua non.
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