Thread by @CollinSLKoh

MINI-THREAD: Yesterday (15/5) at Zhoushan, the PLA Eastern Theater Command Navy dispatched the 38th Escort Task Force for counter-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. Notably, destroyer Nanjing debuts for such mission. My updated table below. xinhuanet.com/english/2021-0…

My first observation is that from 2019, the composition of a typical ETF has stabilized to 1 destroyer, 1 frigate and 1 replenishment oiler. Prior to that, shortfalls in destroyers would mean either 2 frigates were deployed, or that there'll be LPDs filling the slot sometimes. 1/

Second observation is the PLA Navy's increased fleet capacity accords the luxury of dispatching different ships each time, unlike in the past (up until the end of 2017) when the same ship would be deployed again. 2/

From 2019 onward, the Xi'an was the last Type-052C destroyer deployed for the mission (32ETF). From 33ETF onward till this latest mission, it has been the Type-052D being deployed, which appears to hint at the PLA Navy's satisfaction with and confidence in D variant. 3/

From 2014 onward, it appears that the 3 PLA Navy fleets no longer have to intermingle assets to cobble up the ETF. Each ETF is composed of assets from the same fleet. And successive ETF deployments are rotated between the 3 fleets. 4/

Clearly, the PLA Navy's growing fleet capacity paid off handsomely. Besides helping to sustain Beijing's naval presence in the Indian Ocean, this also allows the opportunity for ships to undergo scheduled downtime while other available assets can take their place. 5/

Operationally and tactically, the rotation of assets (and presumably, crews) allows each fleet, each ship and its crew the opportunity to expose themselves to long-distance voyages and out-of-area missions. This goes a long way in building bluewater combat capabilities. 6/

For a navy that has not seen real combat since 1988, such out-of-area missions provide valuable opportunity to build crew's proficiency and confidence in operating faraway from home bases, and these lessons and experiences contribute to other forms of combat training. 7/

These ETF deployments therefore very plausibly serve as precursor training for the PLA Navy's training cruises in the Western Pacific, especially beyond the First Island Chain and short of the Second Island Chain, which is the envisaged future naval campaign theater. 8/

At the same time, these ETF deployments help project Beijing's presence more visibly in the Indian Ocean, besides the benefit of promoting PRC's role as a global security player through such defense diplomacy activities. The benefits derived from ETFs are multifaceted. END